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1. EU climate change policies - Introduction
This  thesis contributes  to the discussion on climate change policies by analysing the 
performance of different instruments integrated in the European Union (EU) 
framework for climate protection with a focus on renewable energy sources  (RES), 
energy efficiency and particularly carbon savings. The emission of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) is  the main factor contributing to global warming and these gases remain in 
the atmosphere for decades.1
Neither the use of RES nor the reduction of GHG can be influenced directly. EU 
member states have to set the legal framework that creates an eco-friendly economy, 
which allows investments in RES and provides incentives to markets to reduce 
emissions.
In general, there are two main strategies for increasing the share of RES of total 
energy production: firstly, polices that promote investments in RES like direct 
subsidies for private investors or indirect feed-in tariffs that guarantee the return on 
investment after a certain period of time; secondly, a quota system, which change the 
production conditions for energy suppliers, as  they are obligated to include a set 
share of RES in the production mix.
The reduction of GHG is even harder to influence with policy measures because of 
the broad range of different sources of pollution with very heterogeneous polluters 
from private vehicles, through small and medium enterprises with local production, to 
heavy industries like iron and steel production where energy inputs are one of the 
biggest input factors. While private and small emitters are not covered directly by 
GHG saving policies, heavy industries and the electricity production sector are: green 
policies try to force the perpetrators to bear the costs of air pollution (polluter-pays 
principle). Emissions are limited through a cap on the allowable emission volume. 
Emitters have to buy allowance certificates in a (single) European market, the EU 
emission trading scheme (EU-ETS) for carbon emissions. Private emitters are 
important as well. Their contribution to total emission should not be underestimated. 
Policies address this issue with programmes to change individual behaviour through 
education or attempt to influence it indirectly through higher energy prices  or more 
stringent compliance standards.
1
1 See Jacobson (1998) for the general physics and correlation of different green house gases to each 
other, the influence of carbon emissions on global warming and the implication in the long run.
For a long time, research analysis as well as policy makers concentrated on 
economic efficiency of climate protection policies. A popular policy approach to 
control environmental damages is a cap-and-trade programme: often initiated for 
different kinds of pollution or the use of natural resources like fish, to limit the 
pollution or the intensity of use of a certain good. It is currently accepted that a 
certain level of pollution is  inevitable to produce goods, that individuals have the need 
to use a common good like the air, and thus  system participators on the demand side 
should receive permits  to emit and compensate the injured parties. If accepting the 
compensation, they can be considered indirectly by suppliers due to accepting not 
only the use of a good, but also being aggrieved of e.g. worsened environmental 
conditions. The trade of permits is  an effective instrument to price environmental 
damage on the market. In perfectly competitive markets the economically 
optimisation is reached, the cap set by the policy maker will be achieved - i.e., in 
such a scenario the allowed level of total pollution for the whole economy will be 
used completely as it is cost efficient. Further pollution savings will not occur.2 
Surprisingly, such policies do not take into account the social costs  of pollution in the 
long run and do not try to optimise the ecological output, e.g. the minimisation of the 
usage of a specific output or emissions.
The current scientific discussion has reached a consensus on the economic 
efficiency of climate change policies: The resulting optimum can be beneficial in the 
short run. In the long run, however, Schumpeter's theory of growth (1942) generally 
describes the core element of capitalism as  “creative destruction”: Growth and 
development are uncoupled from each other and through innovations economies 
succeed in growing sustainably without increasing the use of resources. With the 
implementation of RES capacities  and the switch towards green energies, economies 
are moving towards a world without the use of fossil fuels. Climate policies  should not 
prevent the innovation process, but can help to accelerate it. For the present, Stern 
(2006) underlines the importance of growth through innovations instead of burning 
fuel and describes climate change more drastically as “the greatest example of a 
market failure we have ever seen” (p.1). Pollution accumulates in the atmosphere 
causing global warming and changes in the ecosystem lead to externalities like 
2
2  In a scenario, where the marginal costs of pollution is lower than the market price of emission 
allowances for all  emitters, the total  emission volume will be lower than the set cap. This indicates that 
the cap was not ambitious enough or set under wrong estimates, see chapter 2.
floods, dry periods, and rising sea level: polluters  do not pay for these environmental 
costs.
For the global system, the focus  on ecological or social rather than private 
optimisation seems to be justified on the basis of warnings  by scientist, which predict 
that climate change is  going to be out of control, if immediate action is not taken. The 
beginning of the twenty-first century is important to reposition the world‘s system 
towards a low carbon economy. A business as  usual strategy would lead to 
irreversible consequences. Through global forecasts of warming, the question is no 
longer whether the average temperature will rise, but to what extent. The IPCC 
(2007) listed predicted consequences of climate change. Empirical analysis shows 
high confidences of sea level rise and consistent warming, with higher precipitation in 
some areas while others are affected by droughts. Extreme weather events are going 
to be more intense. Several scenarios calculate effects that will mainly affect the 
poorest of the poor. By 2020, Africa is projected to experience a 50% reduction in soil 
fertility, as well as increasing costs of coastal protection against flooding, and water 
scarcity for a higher share of the population.
Developed countries will be less affected. Warming can also bring benefits for 
example through less need for heating or higher productivity in the agriculture sector. 
On the other hand, especially in the long run, weather-related extremes will arise 
more often in Europe and floods and droughts are likely to induce high costs. The 
scarcity of water in southern Europe can shift tourism and production capacities away 
from the poorer south. Demographical stagnation and migration movements can 
destabilise the political construction of a united Europe (see Stern 2006). The IPCC 
(2007) underlines Stern's  statements and adds to the discussion the loss of 
biodiversity, and a "medium confidence of some aspects  of human health, such as 
heat-related mortality in Europe, changes in infectious disease vectors in some 
areas" (IPCC, 2007, p. 3, summary for policy makers).
Anyone, in particular policy makers, who takes seriously the above scenarios, is 
urged to design climate change policies  more actively. It is  not clear why the 
Copenhagen Accord specified a 2°C target as  the maximum accepted global 
warming scenario. Why not taking instead another, more restrictive one. A lower 
target might be conceivable, and is called for by environmental experts and 
scientists. Moreover, the head of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), Cristina Figueres, postulates the need for a new 
3
discussion about a 1.5°C target instead of the previous benchmarks  of 2°C.3  Still, 
meeting the 2°C target requires emission reductions in the short run, otherwise the 
percentage reductions required in the future would be on an unachievable level with 
the permanent risk of failing to prevent warming and facing unexpected, abrupt 
changes in ecosystems even if the temperature increases only marginally. As 
emphasised by Steffen (2001, p. 55), “The decade between now and 2020 is critical”. 
It seems, that the 2°C target is the tolerable limit to "allow" industrialisation, while 
beyond this  the damage to ecosystems and human beings as a result of climate 
change will increase rapidly, as summarised in a literature review by Jaeger and 
Jaeger (2011).
In principle, the European Union has recognised the need for action. In international 
negotiations about climate protection plans, the EU acts with a dual strategy. Its own 
climate protection programmes are implemented without preconditions. More 
stringent EU policies  are promised to cooperating partners if agreements  on 
4
3  Conference speach, Carbon Expo 2011, Barcelona, see http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/ 
2011/jun/01/christiana-figueres-climate-2c-rise (last review: 07.08.2011).
Figure 1: European climate change policies, own illustration.
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international cooperation will be implemented, with ambitious  goals especially for 
other developed countries like the US or Canada, and emerging partners  like China, 
Mexico or India. Through these proposals Europe recognises the responsibility of 
developed countries as  the main source of GHG emissions, but less  developed 
countries will not be discharged from their responsibilities, as can be seen in the 
Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009)4 for instance, which was mainly influenced by 
the EU member countries.
As climate policies are enforced through the Treaty on European Union (TEU), a 
uniform law for all member states, the confederation as a global player with diverse 
single members  is a powerful unit to push climate change strategies and is 
influencing the world community through unilateral acting. Because of the diversity of 
the EU‘s member states, the region is an interesting economic area to assess 
environmental policies and thereby to focus on economic and ecological optimisation 
of policies and to calculate the outputs and impacts.
The main instrument for the EU climate change protection plans relies on the 
20-20-20 by 2020 targets5. This roadmap, adopted in 2008, is the result of years of 
continuing work for a joint programme for Europe-wide application of a common 
framework of climate change policies. The positive developments from the past are 
the guideline for further tightening of the environmental policies for European 
member states, enterprises and citizens. A unified market for pollution permits, the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), is the main instrument to 
reduce the emissions of GHG. Within the framework of carbon saving policies, the 
EU members have different obligations. The burden-sharing agreement takes care 
about that fact, that different countries face different (economic) conditions.
Further components are the ecological targets to reduce energy input and raise the 
efficiency of energy use, as well as a higher share of renewable energies  in total 
energy production. Instruments that bring Pareto-efficient and cost-minimising 
solutions are often inadequate replacements high-instruments of environmental 
protection. All three elements, as shown in Figure 1, presumably affect the 
achievement of each other: if one is affected by new regulations or will be 
redesigned, the conditions of all the three will change. The graph illustrates for the 
5
4 The exact formulation of the accord was highly influenced by the European Union.
5 20-20-20 by 2020 - Europe's climate change opportunity, 23.01.2008, COM(2008) 30 final, European 
Communities, Brussels.
three core elements the strength of the side effects on the other two elements, where 
a dark colour indicates a high influence and vice versa. The examples will be given 
below. For the following thesis, there are given three examples, each one from one of 
the three (1-3 as in the following) elements as postulated in assignments and 
decrees based on the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets: cap-and-trade systems (EU-ETS) 
for (1) emission reductions, solar investments  for the share of (2) RES capacities, 
and pressure of policies on (3) energy efficiency. While for (1) the most important 
policy measure is  chosen, (2) give an example of how effective RES promotion can 
be and whether the measures seem to be effective, and (3) is a proof that energy 
efficiency can be influenced directly by policy makers.
Main and side effects of the European climate change policies will be discussed in 
three chapters  along three main arguments. Through the propositions, popular but 
non-proven assertions are formulated to consider them true or false along three 
chapters and a closing, summarising conclusion:
Proposition 1:
If shocks foil emission reduction plans, the policy maker has to
ensure the achievement of national climate protection plans.
Of what use would be the best plan to reduce carbon emissions if the calculations of 
future economic and technological developments  fail due to drastic changes in recent 
developments?
Such a shock occurs  firstly when production is decreasing, e.g. growth declines in 
the economy, and total economy wide emissions fall below the level of calculated 
emissions in a business as usual scenario with steady growth; or secondly when the 
innovation process of economies is faster than expected and leads e.g. to new zero 
emission power plant capacities and reduces the need for emission savings in other 
industries or other emitters. The shock changes the costs of environmental policies 
not just for the individual emitter but for the general public as well. The consequence 
for the ecological success can be that shocks may prevent the implementation of a 
technology, which would have the potential to generate an even larger amount of e.g. 
emission reductions. The question arises further, how to thus  maximise ecological 
success.
6
Reduction plans in the (EU-)ETS set a cap for economies or sectors, where the 
allowed emissions are the upper limit of total emissions of all participators. Financial 
incentives can help to increase investments in RES capacities. If both mentioned 
policies are applied simultaneously, the results  may lead to a partial failure of 
emission reductions for the specific cap quantity if a part of the production is 
substituting carbon emissions while emitted pollution is increasing someplace else, 
e.g. Hogrefe et al. (2007). The issue of resetting the cap on carbon emissions arises 
sharply in the aftermath of a faster increase in new RES capacities that far exceeded 
policy makers' estimated scenarios.
One has to consider the costs and the benefits of climate protection policies. In this 
context, efficiency is a term that can be justified both economically and ecologically. 
The most efficient energy policy will be achieved if measures are inexpensive to 
implement and the results of the reduction of environmental damage are ecologically 
significant: Within a cap-and-trade system, participators are searching for their 
individual optimum. For the single emitter, the individual marginal abatement cost 
curves (MAC)6 is important for every market participator to decide whether to reduce 
their emissions or to buy emission permits.
The literature often emphasises  joint MACs to minimise the costs of environmental 
policies "in" the system. An aggregated MAC of all single emitters shows the system 
costs minimisation and the cost curve of all emitters. This approach reduces the 
costs of the environmental policy instrument of trading the emission permits and the 
target is met under cost-minimising conditions. The priorly set cap is chosen by the 
policy maker with the intention to reduce emissions  to a certain level and is based on 
extrapolated scenarios. Thus, environmental protection costs will be minimised, but 
not the environmental protection itself. Ecological efficiency has to be in the focus of 
the analysis, as  total social costs seem to be higher than the avoiding costs in the 
cap-and-trade system: there is a gap of non covered costs. Long run costs are higher 
if no action is taken or if short run costs (of production) will arise for individual 
participators  in trading schemes. The initial implementation of environmental 
protection causes costs for the system participants: it is  a kind of reallocation of 
social costs  to the emitters. Fiscal income from environmental taxes and other 
7
6  A single firm will  be a seller of permits as long as the permit price is higher than the individual 
marginal abatement costs curve (MAC) of emissions. The market price for allowances will  be equal  to 
the optimum, which can be realised by the joint MAC for all market participants (Montgomery, 1972); 
see chapter 2 for a deeper explanation of the concept.
instruments that price emissions  can be reallocated and serve as additional 
governmental budget to be spent on e.g. investments in green energy capacities, 
projects for sustainabile production, or research and development of RES.
Until now it is unclear if the new policies like RES-promotion schemes, pricing of 
carbon emissions and trading schemes for emission allowances are positive or 
negative for the output of economies, and how e.g. cap-and-trade systems are 
influenced by side effects of shocks through other measures. Shocks, e.g. through 
economic growth or decline, new technologies or innovations, as  well as general 
changes in production processes and substitution of fuels can thwart even well 
balanced emission trading schemes: the demand for emission permits will increase 
or decrease drastically.
If the goal remains to minimise system costs, neither positive nor negative effects 
can be taken into account changing the targets to optimise the ecological efficiency, 
which may even be negatively affected through economic shocks. Will support 
systems to promote new RES capacities only increase emissions somewhere else?
Proposition 2:
Green technologies are too expensive: without subsidies
a share of green energies of 20 percent of total energy
production is out of reach.
The installation costs of RES capacities can be high, but depending on the 
technologies, conventional and green energies are becoming more and more 
competitive. An increasing learning curve and technological innovation lead to 
declining production costs both of green power plants and produced green energy, 
while high prices for conventional fuels raise prices for conventional energy.
Through fixed feed-in tariffs, different member states of the EU are giving incentives 
for private investors to invest in green energies. These feed-in tariffs  are positively 
discriminating in favour of certain technologies. One of the most expensive of them, 
solar energy, counts for the highest guaranteed price per kWh, see e.g. table 1 for 
Germany. Such a positive discrimination can be justified as an efficient instrument 
especially in imperfect markets: REFITs, renewable energy feed-in tariffs, lead to a 
broad implementation of new (ecologically) worthwhile technologies, and welfare 
losses through the lack of implementation of green technologies will be decreased 
8
(Kalkuhl, Edenhofer, Lessmann, 2012). This is a very important point that will be 
discussed in the following chapters on different levels.
The (end consumer) prices of electricity from conventional oil and gas, as  well as 
from nuclear power, are still below the price per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for RES as  well 
as below the REFIT. One can recognise easily the cost disadvantage of the RES 
capacities. The gap closes, however, through continually rising fuel costs on the one 
hand, and on the other hand decreasing investment costs for renewable energy with 
simultaneously increasing efficiency.7
While some emphasise the cost argument and doubt if the plans are realistic, others 
highlight the benefits. Power companies in particular are advised to invest in RES, 
but a 35% share of green energy sources in total energy production, as proposed for 
example by the German government, seems to be too optimistic, and cannot be 
realised without additional costs (see Müller, BDEW, in: Deutsche Bundestag, 2011). 
These arguments do not take into account the social costs of emissions or the 
positive externalities of RES investments. Jaeger et al. (2011) consider counting the 
positive job effects, while Krewitt and Schlomann (2006) present evidence about real 
costs of different energy technologies, see e.g. table 1. It is obvious that RES are not 
9
7 Nuclear power is not included in the analysis, since in particular the assessment of external costs is 
incalculable. Thus, neither the costs of disposal can be valued monetarily, nor can the probability of 













  3.78 2.90   6.68
  3.62 6.30   9.92
  2.97 7.90 10.87
51.79 1.00 52.79
  8.76 0.12   8.88
  7.19 0.15   7.34
15.00 0.18 15.18
Table 1: Total costs of electricity production, in €-Cent per kWh.
Constant prices for inputs based on technologies with end of life point in the year 2025.
Own illustration basing of the following sources: *) production costs for conventional power 
plants (gas, hard / brown coal) based on 25 years amortisation according initial operation in 
the year 2000 (Dürrschmidt, van Mark, 2006); **) production costs for RES (photovoltaics, 
wind / water / geothermal energy) based on 2005 average compensation for the 20 year 
period of fixed feed-in tariff (according Dürrschmidt, Büsgen, 2007); ***) external costs 
based on 70 EUR/1t CO2 (Krewitt, Schlomann, 2006).
yet competitive with conventional energy sources, but there is an ongoing trend to 
reach equal production costs of RES and conventional energies in the near future. If 
external costs are included, the gap should close much earlier.
It seems to be clear that RES have positive effects, but they cannot be implemented 
without costs. The price for the green revolution of energy production is  high. The 
calculation of benefits  and costs  tends to shed light on the optimum strategies to 
firstly decrease the spending and secondly increase the energy harvest.
Proposition 3:
If emissions are correlated to output and growth,
the Kyoto Protocol obligations and energy saving policies
have no effect on the emission output quantity.
Aimed to fight global warming, the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC is a treaty with 
binding targets for signatory countries  to reduce GHG emissions with the goal to 
achieve the "stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system", as proclaimed as the objectives in Article 2, UN Climate Change 
Convention, UNFCCC (1992).8
Various literature sources  point out that the Kyoto Protocol will fail due to the fact that 
the growth of emissions is  in direct relation to population and economic growth. 
According to Ehrlich and Holdren (1971), environmental damages and climate 
change through GHG are determined through a positive correlation with population 
size and growth: GDP and population growth determine emissions. In order for the 
Kyoto Protocol to succeed it is an open question how the policy makers can influence 
economic-wide emissions. Nordhaus (2010) is in line with the findings of Ehrlich and 
Holdren (1971), concerning scientific predictors for climate change. However, he 
stresses that these predictors might be influenced with the right set of policies, if 
economies were not complex systems with individuals trying to optimise their 
individual needs and maximise their utility. Tietenberg and Johnstone (2004) regard 
another approach as best for economies: to analyse first the economic efficiency 
before signing binding targets for emission reductions.
10
8  On the occasion of the UNFCCC conference, which took place in Kyoto in December 1997, the 
Kyoto Protocol was passed as a supplementary document for the application and implementation of 
the UN climate change convention from 1992.
On the other hand, there are positive impacts of policies on the increase of energy 
efficiency and emissions, e.g. the World Energy Council (2008) mentions the effects 
of strengthened efforts  by almost all OECD nations  in the past Kyoto era on the 
application of environmental policies. Delarue and D’haeseleer, W. (2008) describe 
fuel switching as a consequence of emission trading with decreasing emission as a 
result: burning the more expensive gas  causes less emissions in comparison to 
cheaper oil or coal, but carbon emission certificates change the price relation. The 
mix of energy input factors may change drastically and will influence policies, too. 
Parry (2003) analyses, that every policy efforts  more environmental protection than 
doing nothing at all: a price for emission initiates the development of energy saving 
technologies and can reduce the future costs of abatement.
The direction of causality is not clear: not only will GDP growth influence emissions, 
but emission reductions also have the power to put pressure on growth or even to 
influence growth positively. The general upgrading process starts when enterprises 
search for competitive advantages to decrease the costs of production or to innovate 
in the creation of completely new products. Conversely, if enterprises are forced to 
innovate and create new appliance standards, e.g. low energy machinery or 
production units with a more economical use of input factors, these investments for 
innovations decreed by governmental measures can have positive impacts on 
economic development.
It has to be demonstrated, that policy can influence emission savings and which are 
the driving factors  of influence. Without proof otherwise, the strong dependency on 
emissions and GDP growth has to be accepted.
The synthesis of the three propositions mentioned above: Economists  have to 
choose between private or social maximisation, or microeconomic system 
optimisation or macroeconomic supranational policies. As climate protection policies 
are a global issue, one should think big and point out every single policy as a part of 
the whole. System participants may have higher costs  through regulations and 
standards on the on hand, but on the other hand, as they are acting in a global 
environment, benefits cannot be measured in private earnings alone, but in 
worldwide gross social product. One has to ask the question how to minimise costs 
and optimise the use of resources, if it is already broadly accepted that climate 
protection is  the price for our consumption of energy, needed for our high standards 
11
of living. The EU's burden-sharing agreement is of importance in this context. It 
obliges the various countries across the EU to carry their share of the Kyoto Protocol, 
though only in proportion to their economical feasibility. Thus, countries  carry only so 
much 'burden' as they are able to manage given their economic situation, while more 
able countries take on more responsibility given their more stable status, with the 
result, that the individual carbon emission reduction obligation is  different for each 
observed country.
This  doctoral thesis analyses the three components of the European Union climate 
policies, and is structured as follows:
 Chapter 1: EU climate change policies - Introduction
 Chapter 2: Emission reductions - The no cost emission-saving policy
How can a cap-and-trade systems reduce carbon exhausts?
Methodology: economic modelling of a standard market model for emission trading 
under the influences of renewable energy feed-in tariffs.
 Chapter 3: Renewable Energies - Follow the sun
How can the maximisation of a technological-geographical fit raise the energy 
harvest of a chosen technology, e.g. solar power plants?
Methodology: thought experiment with an output analysis approach to compare 
status quo technology and local conditions e.g. of solar radiation and temperature.
 Chapter 4: Energy Efficiency - The influences of climate change policies
EU Burden-Sharing Agreement obligations: are climate change negotiations worth 
the effort and can they influence the energy use with sustainable success?
Methodology: panel data analysis, sample: cross country data from N=25 EU 
member states over a period of T=13 years.
 Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations for policy makers
Table 2: Structure of the doctoral thesis.
The European Union started the worlds biggest carbon emission trading scheme. 
Chapter 2 addresses the question of how to reach higher emission savings without 
higher costs within the framework of a national allocation plan (NAP) for carbon 
permits when other policies are implemented simultaneously. If the NAP cannot be 
adjusted, both instruments seem to neutralise each other.
EU member states have to raise the share of renewable energy sources. Chapter 3 
presents a thought experiment as a country comparison for a selected technology: 
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what if the solar power plant installations undertaken in Germany had been installed 
in Sicily? The thought experiment illustrates the need for a fit between geographical 
conditions and technology. Europe-wide balanced policies for RES would lead to a 
higher amount of installed green energy capacities without higher costs.
Finally, the EU puts pressure on national states  to use energy more efficiently. Thus, 
addressing the European level, chapter 4 proves for the influence of the Kyoto 
Protocol obligations and the following EU Burden-Sharing Agreement on European 
policies to increase energy efficiency. Through the more efficient use of electricity 
additional carbon savings will be realised. But are these savings caused 
endogenously through economic growth and population, or do policies put (effective) 
pressure on consumers' electricity consumption?
The conclusions and a short summary of further implications of the different energy 
policies close the thesis in chapter 5 with recommendations to policy makers and try 
to give answers to the postulates propositions.
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2. Emission reductions - The no-cost emission-saving policy
The EU is putting emphasis on proposing climate saving policies that place Europe 
as the innovator in reducing emissions and increasing the share of renewable energy 
sources (RES). However, the application of suitable instruments appears to create 
problems, with differences between the policy approaches that seek to achieve the 
objectives. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and national 
support regimes such as renewable energy feed-in tariffs (REFIT) in particular are 
often not well integrated in the national allowances plans (NAP). Whilst the aim of the 
former is  primarily to price carbon emissions, the aim of the latter is to increase the 
market share of green energy. However, coordination of the two is sometimes 
lacking.
Firstly, the EU-ETS allows policy makers to set a cap on absolute emissions as  a 
maximum of pollution. As for the whole economy as for the single emitter who is 
participating in the trading scheme, the emissions have to be covered with emission 
allowances certificates. The emitter will decide whether to save emissions and sell 
allowances or to emit and buy certificates. Thus, emissions have a price and can be 
interpreted as a negative by-product of the output, which should be avoided.
Secondly, the key question is  whether increasing RES capacities that are erected by 
private investors  outside the ETS will affect countries‘ NAPs. That part of new RES 
capacities which is not covered in the ETS can be described as an exogenous shock 
on one branch: the power utilities. They are affected by less demand for their 
conventional goods due to the fact that green produced electricity has  to be fed-in to 
the grids and used first. Power utilities  are faced with a huge amount of unused 
allowances certificates. Here, the further question arises  of what the consequences 
are for their business and the end consumer prices of electricity, on the absolute 
amount of emission savings and econonomy-wide effects of wealth from an 
ecological point of view.
In the following, the instrument of the REFIT is identified as a particular and effective 
tool to stimulate new investments. The emissions of CO2 are capped and calculated 
under scenarios  which take into account growth and (technological) development. 
They provide a controlled expansion of RES in the energy sector. RES promotions 
without an upper limit can lead to another scenario in which new RES capacity is 
added by investors not primarily from within the energy sector. Such a situation, 
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without regulation by policy makers, helps  to achieve the national emission target 
sooner and faster, but reduces the pressure for individual emitters  participating in the 
emissions trading scheme, as described before.
Emitters should reduce emissions where emission saving occurs at its lowest price. 
The NAP should guarantee carbon savings and take into account an estimated RES 
capacity. If this capacity is  able to grow faster than as estimated by NAP, the demand 
for carbon permits decreases and a lower permit price follows. The two scenarios 
with i) caped and ii) unlimited growth of new RES capacities  have to be compared 
and discussed with the goal of finding ways to realise additional savings without 
incurring higher costs for the individual emitter.
There are many instruments to guarantee the return on investment of green energy 
plants. These promotions are the basic prerequisite for the private sector to invest in 
photovoltaics, wind or geothermal energies and other new green energy production 
technologies, also if the production costs of green energies are above those of 
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 Figure 2: Different RES promotion systems.
 Own illustration of the consideration in the national allocation plans
 (NAP) for CO₂ emissions. Only a REFIT without limitation of the sup-
 ported quantity opens opportunities for additional emission savings
 without increasing system costs in comparison to the NAP reduction.
conventional energy power plants. Initially, the NAP is calculated under the expected 
quantity of future new installations of RES. If these estimations are exceeded, the 
consequences are manifold. Such an exogenous shock could, in particular, include 
increasing costs  of RES support regimes and decreasing prices of emission permits. 
In the following example, the REFIT costs are borne by end consumers, while the 
additional carbon savings in the energy sector lead to decreasing emission 
allowances prices and thus a shift from consumer to producer rent. To a certain 
degree, market mechanisms lead to decreasing energy prices for the residual 
demand of conventional energy. Without policy intervention, a faster-growing RES 
capacity prevents emission savings elsewhere: other sectors profit from decreasing 
costs of emission permits and are even able to reduce their emission savings by 
absorbing the free permits that will not be used by the electricity producing sector. 
This  factor could weaken the economic pressure to save emissions. The lack of the 
policy maker‘s  ability to cut the cost of RES promotions  once plants are erected 
compels  other possibilities to change the cap on emission allowances to realise the 
initially conceived quantity and price of permits. These limited policies  are referred to 
as the no-cost emission-saving policy: the environmental maximisation of the quantity 
of carbon savings if an exogenous shock threats the estimated NAP scenario through 
measures that restore the original conditions.
This  chapter analyses briefly the literature addressing the two instruments  EU-ETS 
and REFIT and shows how, when jointly applied, they can interact with one another. 
If interaction is possible, what is  the potential to reduce emissions at a faster rate 
without increasing costs in comparison to the primary NAP with a capped RES 
installation? Are additional carbon savings  and the costs  of RES installations 
balanced and  if, to what extent? The discussion of legal options  in addition to 
economic efficiencies and the interdependencies of the relevant stakeholders can 
enable new policies that can help to reach faster the ambitious  climate saving goals 
of the EU.
This  chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 discusses the fundamentals of the 
question of interest: If the EU-ETS and national REFITs are jointly applied in one 
market, will the benefit of carbon savings vary from the single application and to what 
extent? Sections 2.2 to 2.4 will firstly explain the theoretical conditions of a REFIT, a 
cap-and-trade market, and the net effects of its  application. All the three sections are 
more theoretical and less empirical and necessary to describe different equilibriums 
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in the short run perspective, e.g. without future technological development. In section 
2.5, the question of the interdependencies of the two instruments and the possible 
contrary effectiveness  of both instruments when implemented simultaneously is 
addressed. Do emission reductions  through RES lower the absolute economy-wide 
demand for carbon permits? Will the demand for allowances decrease or is the 
market inundated with these free certificates? Section 2.6 will discuss solutions for 
the allocation problem resulting from new installations and the amount of possible 
additional, cost free carbon savings. The focus is on Germany as  an innovator of 
REFIT policies. One must refer to the difficulties between economic demand and 
legal needs, which limit the design of trading schemes. Section 2.7 will conclude the 
chapter with the results of the theoretical analysis and recommendations for further 
policies.
2.1 The two instruments policy mix
If scientific scenarios about global warming become true, time is running out and the 
European Union aims to be a pioneer in climate protection. Ambitious policies agreed 
in the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets (European Commission, 2008) seek to lower carbon 
emissions to at least 20% below the level of 1990. Further, the share of renewable 
energies in total energy production must rise to 20%, and the energy efficiency must 
increase by up to 20% by 2020. Is the achievement of these goals realistic? Most 
member states decided to adopt the policy of a joint application of two different 
instruments. At first sight it seems to be absurd not to concentrate on the strength of 
one, but to implement a second cost intensive policy measure. Nevertheless, the 
advantages of such a policy mix exceed those of a single instrument. It appears that 
this  measure can be used to cut emissions radically and to provide new opportunities 
for the no-cost emission-saving policy, which have not yet been realised.
The instrument chosen to lower carbon emissions is a cap-and-trade market of 
emission permits. If one seeks to raise the share of green energy in total energy 
production, the appropriate instruments  are support regimes, which aim to increase 
new installations of zero emission power plants. While the application of an emission 
trading scheme is  a cross-sector incentive aiming to save emissions at the lowest 
cost point, subsidies for green energies lead to sector-specific and large quantity 
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savings of emissions and thus make a certain amount of conventional production and 
its permits  redundant. The German NAP is calculated based on a scenario with a 
limited quantity of new green power plant installations. The quantity was defined 
before the trading period started. Thus, marginal interperiod expansion of green 
energies about the scale of the NAP scenario imply an external shock on system 
participants. The beneficial industry, e.g. the power utilities, can sell their redundant 
pollution permits to other branches with the result of an unchanged quantity of 
emission reductions in comparison to the NAP but at a lower cost level. Research 
generally focuses  on economic and not ecological efficiency: The lowest costs  for the 
permitted (carbon) emissions are considered to be a Pareto optimisation for the 
emitters, and not what could be obtained as the highest possible carbon savings for 
the general public under a specific budget. Thus, the question arises, if both climate 
protection policy instruments are jointly implemented, what is the combination that 
would lower absolute emissions  across sectors below the cap set in an emission 
trading scheme? The maxim is to optimise the quantity of emissions savings  as 
welfare optimising point of view and keep the costs  on a business as usual level: the 
permit price remains constant, while the amount of savings increases.
But first and foremost, however, both instruments require a more in-depth elaboration 
of their theoretical content. It is  of a lesser importance to explain the exact design of 
the EU-ETS and whether participants are faced with scarcity of emission permits  and 
therefore far from a market equilibrium and what kind of markets are involved. The 
proposition of this chapter does not require proof of a detailed design of support 
mechanisms, but is proven,rather, the simultaneous application of the two 
instruments, which, although seemingly contrary to each other, open up avenues to 
save more emissions at the same cost level for the individual emitter.
The EU is primarily pursuing the instrument of a Europe-wide CO2 emission trading 
scheme, the EU-ETS. The EU-ETS develops  in phases and covers about 50% of 
carbon emissions of all participating sectors. Its design consists of three phases  of 
increasing length: Phase I was from 2005-2007, Phase II from 2008-2012 and finally 
Phase III finally from 2013-2020. Each phase is a closed trading period with a 
maximum allowed carbon emission quantity and permits cannot be transferred from 
one period to another. This instrument sets a maximum allowance as  the limit for the 
emission of greenhouse gases and thus fulfils  the EU climate targets to meet the 
Kyoto Protocol and the 20-20-20 by 2020 Commission targets.
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Within a phase, allowances can be traded between participating emitters  directly or 
with the help of intermediate stock trading. The trading between different emitters is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The overall quantity of emitted carbon pollution is subject to a 
cap. Participating sources receive the historical needed allowances for free or buy 
them from the government in an initial auctioning process or from other participants. 
The allocation process as well as the need to hand over enough allowances to cover 
the emissions of a source is  done year by year. While in the Phase I and Phase II the 
annual allocation is  constant, starting with Phase III the emission cap reduces 
annually.
Phase I and II force EU-member states  to organise the allocation process based on 
their NAP. The NAP is part of the overall carbon-saving obligation. Less savings in 
the EU-ETS lead to the need to save more emissions in other sectors9, which has to 
be accepted by the EU commission. The allocation should be based on a 
grandfathering process of historical emissions.
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9 Sectors not covered by the EU-ETS are e.g. road transport, private consumption or the most 
services branches.
Figure 3: Emission trading scheme, illustration of the function of an 
emssion market and its transactions, own illustration.
Phase I, from 2005-2007, placed emphasis on the learning-by-doing process. The 
allocated emission permissions  turned out to be too gratuitous with the consequent 
decision to reduce prices to zero in 2007.
In Phase II, from 2008-2012, the quantity of allowances was reduced and more 
branches, for example the aviation sector, had to participate. A larger amaount of 
certificates was auctioned rather than given away complimentary to participants. For 
the first time, participants could choose to use either one of two instruments, Joint 
Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as part of their 
obligation: measures, all measures to save emissions in less developed countries. 
These instruments come along with a transfer of technology to develop a more clean 
production capacity in countries without emission-saving obligations.
Phase III, from 2013-2020, is to be marked by major changes in the design of the 
EU-ETS with an annual reduction of the cap and an increasing share of certificates 
that are permitted to be bought through the auctioning process instead of free 
allocation. The basis for allocation shall no longer be grandfathering, and some more 
branches will be covered. The power generating industry is  anticipated to be the first 
sector with 100% auctioning.
Through the flexibilities of the EU-ETS system, emission savings should be done 
where the costs are at the lowest. Participants can also profit from early action. 
Investments in emission-saving technologies lead to a smaller demand in allowances 
and thus decreasing costs. One danger of free allocated emission allowances it the 
issuing of banking certificates that are not sold in the end. While this  may be 
economically incomprehensible, the tendency for human psychology to lead to such 
behaviour is present.10
After Phase I of EU-ETS commenced, the literature discussed in particular if the 
associated cap on emissions was set at the right level:
In a theoretical system-wide equilibrium, the marginal abatement costs equal the 
price of allowances, while single emitters face the decision of whether to buy permits 
or instead save emissions through technical innovations. The market in reality has  a 
price for the good of emission permits, resulting from the supply-demand-function 
arising from the fact that permits are a finite commodity set exogenously by the policy 
maker. It remains unclear to what extent social costs  are considered: burning fuels 
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10 To prevent banking, some trading systems have implemented special mechanisms, see Godard 
(2002) or Tietenberg (2003).
cause damages that are often not included in the overall cost account. Finally, it 
emphasises the need to accept the price as the only economical pressure for 
individual emitters to save emissions at the location of the pollution source. That is 
highly important to understand, because "without government intervention, producers 
would face no cost at all associated with pollution, but only a benefit. (...) Therefore, 
they would select an infinitely large level of pollution." Bovenberg and Smulders 
(1995, p. 379). Higher permit prices lead to higher emission savings for the single 
emitter, because savings become more competitive.
Some authors  focus on whether the quantity of allowed permits is set at the right 
level and on the ecological efficiency, e.g., are the CO2 savings the maximum that 
can be derived from the application of technology at the state of the art? Schleich 
and Betz (2005), as  well as Betz and Sato (2006), determine that the initial allocation 
can already indicate the likelihood of over-allocation or abatement, where the 
potential savings will not occur if allowances are cheaper than the abatement of 
emissions through technological measures for the single emitter. The same problem 
is  encountered within the regulation of NAP for emission permits: Ellerman and 
Buchner (2007) argue that such plans are often less ambitious than technological 
developments would allow. Thus, the reduction of emissions is  not maximised, and 
the potential of technological feasible savings remains unused.
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*   only feed-in tariff or feed-in
    premium apply
** for selected technologies,
    partly besides other
    promotions
Table 3: EU-27 application of RES promotion
Sources: Klein et al. (2010), Ragwitz et al. (2012)
Other authors concentrate on how emission trading schemes can be optimised, focus 
on the economic efficiency of the costs for the participating emitters, see the 
comparative analysis of different analyses about diverse trading schemes and their 
costs for the participants by Tietenberg and Johnstone (2004). While a lot of ETS or 
similar systems were applied locally, the EU-ETS can be seen as the first large-scale 
cap-and-trade market, an "experiment" as  stated by Kruger and Pizer, (2004), with all 
the early stage problems such as the orientation of NAPs based on past emissions 
and growth, as well as the anticipation of growth to future emission scenarios without 
rigorous cuts: the results are present emissions well below the intended allocation 
that leads to permission prices at zero or only a little above zero, which was proved 
positively by Schleich, Betz and Rogge (2007). Not contrary to this  point, but 
supplementary, Alberola, Chevallier and Chèze (2008) analyse the policy intentions 
and criticise the often missing political volition: pressure forces  emitters to accept 
bigger emission cuts. If the pressure is low, this can lead to higher economic costs: 
ETS participants  anticipate (low) permit prices and become less innovative in light of 
the problems associated with the higher costs of the long run perspective. Again, as 
explained before, the price seems to be the only measure to bring emissions down.
At the same time as implementing the EU-ETS, the EU-27 member countries  are 
encouraged to increase the share of RES through national incentives. There is no 
common set of policies, but best practice shows the domination of one specific 
instrument (see table 3). The implementation of new technologies often arises 
through national decrees that guarantee a fixed renewable energy feed-in tariff 
(REFIT)11  for every produced kilowatt-hour (kWh) of energy. The newly installed 
capacity is (almost) free of CO2 emissions. Electricity suppliers are obliged to 
primarily feed in electricity produced from any renewable energy plants in their 
service territories. This  commitment helps the affected enterprises from the power 
generation sector to reduce total emissions without what would otherwise be 
necessary spending on permits. Through selling allowances, other sectors can be 
affected as well, as the supply of permits will arise.
If the additional RES capacities are changing significantly the market conditions, the 
permit market should be reorganised and adjusted under the uncertainty of the future 
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11 Besides REFIT, there is a shift toward the instrument of "Feed-In premium": the general  structure is 
identical to a REFIT, but a fixed amount is paid on top of the average spot market price per kWh. 
Producers of green energies are obligated to sell energy through contracts or spot markets.
realised amount of new RES capacities. Some similarities can be found in the 
literature about the overlapping effects of ETS and the [ETS-] system aside from 
emission taxes. Not all industries are covered by the EU-ETS, thus taxes can be an 
instrument to force emission reductions in non-EU-ETS sectors. Eichner and Pethig 
(2010) refer to the unclear effects of different and overlapping instruments, namely 
ETS and (sector specific) taxes. The authors seek to quantify the economic and 
ecological efficiency and determine the risk of a dry-up of permit markets through 
taxes. The new installation of CO2 neutral capacities in one sector appears to cause 
similar dry-up effects and RES installations may reduce the efficiency of the EU-ETS.
2.2 Introducing RES promotions
The REFIT is a price-driven instrument and shall stimulate private investments and is 
generator based: every single investor decides on his  individual project and its return 
on investment. Other price driven strategies are tax credits, low interest rates or 
softloans, and they are investment focused; quantity-driven instruments include 
tendering or bidding schemes or tradable certificates (see Haas et al. 2011a).
REFITs are the most successful instruments and tend to have the lowest additional 
costs for final customers: "thus, a well-designed (dynamic) FIT system provided a 
certain deployment of RES in the shortest time and at lowest costs for society" (Haas 
et al. 2011b, p. 1033). Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) suggest that "the government 
should pay for the development of new technology and freely provide the knowledge 
to firms", and in particular in the generally assumed situation of perfect competition, 
thus for "new pollution-augmenting technology (...) no quasi-rent would be left to pay 
for (...). Hence, pollution-augmenting technological innovation would not be rewarded 
and thus no research would be undertaken" (p.379), polluting technology would have 
no future in the market, green technologies would have advantages. Without a 
REFIT, the spread of RES investments  through private investors would be much 
smaller and the learning curve and associated increase of efficiency rates and 
decreasing marginal costs  of (green) electricity would not be as intense as observed 
under such a promotion regime. Obviously, other instruments besides the REFIT, like 
quotas or obligations, seem to have economic disadvantages and are not broadly 
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applied. For the application in EU-27 see table 3. Thus, they will not be considered in 
detail below, and are therefore neglected in this chapter.
The general design of REFITs is relatively simple and consistently applied in the EU 
member states: under a REFIT investors  will be paid a fixed tariff for the produced 
energy over a specified duration, typically 20 years. The local grid operator is obliged 
to feed in the green-produced electricity primarily. The REFIT rates are differentiated: 
for example on the basis of technology, geographical conditions or the capacity of the 
plant. The important condition for the REFIT design is  to guarantee a cost-effective 
operation for the investor of the power plant. The REFIT rate for newly installed 
plants is  subject to a regular decrease. That is  important to put pressure on the 
technology manufacturing industry to decrease their prices. The decrease in the 
REFIT compensation can be legitimated through shrinking costs caused by higher 
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Figure 4: Cost of energy produced due to REFIT tariffs, 
where producer surplus PS = Q·PGE - C(Q) with quantity Q, 
price for green energy PGE and total production costs C(Q); 
own illustration according Haas, 2011a.
A     B
C     D
technological efficiency (learning curve) and cost effects  in the manufacturing 
process (economies of scale).
REFITs typically apply with different rates and/or for selected technologies  like e.g. 
the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG, Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz) 
stipulates that the following sources will receive a guaranteed funding per kWh: solar 
energies (photovoltaics, solar thermic): 31.9 - 43.0 cent, hydropower: 3.5 -12.7 cent, 
biogas: 6.0 - 14.3 cent, geothermal: 14.5 -27.0 cent.12
According to Haas (2011a), the "additional costs for consumers (policy costs) have to 
be paid finally by electricity customers" (p.2188) and contain the producer surplus 
plus generation costs  minus revenues from the electricity market (minus avoided 
external costs).
The resulting additional costs are expenditures for the electricity customers above 
the standard or conventional energy price, and thus the profit for the RES power 
plant owners, as  shown in Figure 4. The figure illustrates the economy-wide costs of 
RES: the quantity is determined by the aggregate of all energies, green and 
conventional, that meet the energy demand. Green energies receive a REFIT which 
is  equal to the price of green energies (PGE) on the market, but much higher than the 
price for conventional energy (PCE). The additional costs result of the diagram areas 
A and B,  the higher profits for RES suppliers (A) and the higher generation costs  for 
less efficient RES sources  (B) compared to an equilibrium without the REFIT. The 
investor or producer surplus is based on the generation costs (GC) of the RES and is 
an individual figure, thus equal to the areas A (REFIT) and C (non-REFIT equilibrium 
profit). The RES must be feed in first. The costs  of RES can be above the PCE, which 
would in free markets determine the PGE, too, as both would compete. Here, the 
REFIT is guaranteed and causes PGE > PCE. The economic costs  of green energies 
are the gap between PCE and PGE if analysing the sales  price, multiplied with the 
quantity of RES, and for the sum. The fixed REFIT is coming along with a 
redistribution effect to an increase in the producer rent: for all generators covered by 
the REFIT, the generation cost is  not the benchmark for the payment but the feed-in 
tariff.
The local grid operators pool the difference between the rate paid and revenues from 
the electricity. A national clearance system divides the costs evenly between all 
national network operators. Thus, regardless of regional differences in the generation 
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12 References year: 2008, fixed feed-in tariff for 20 years.
of electricity from renewable energy sources, all energy utilities carry the same 
REFIT payment per kWh. Final consumers will be charged the retail prices due to 
price calculations of the electricity sector.
A detailed overview of the various national RES promotion policies cannot be given 
here and is not relevant to explain the effect, which is not depending basically on the 
exact amount of the REFIT. The general conditions under which the EU members 
support new RES installations are considered to vary too widely for a true 
comparison to be possible, e.g. time duration and amount of the REFIT payment, or 
the selected technologies. Another very important distinction is the capacity capping 
of the REFIT payment. While some national governments set an annual maximum for 
new supported installations, others do without. In case of a cap, there should be a 
negative effect on investment confidence through growing uncertainty over wether a 
new plant will be supported through the REFIT scheme or not. The cap on REFIT 
payments guarantees the achievement of the NAP-calculated RES capacity but 
shatters  the investors' confidence if the standing of the new plant is uncertain with 
regard to its ability to gain REFIT payment.
The theoretical analysis in this  chapter is about the issue of the general integration of 
RES promotion into an ETS with the chances of additional CO₂-savings. An important 
characteristic of a REFIT is the priority feed-in of RES into the grid. The 
consequences are far-reaching as it shifts  the mix of the residual load required to be 
produced by conventional energy sources. Energy utilities will switch off the most 
expensive power plants, under the conditions of transport of electricity to ensure the 
delivery of the base load in the grid.
The REFIT stimulates  RES investments. The REFIT, the investment guarantee for 
the RES, is paid by all consumers through a levy on all energy sources whether they 
are conventional or green. It has two effects on the demand: firstly on energy 
capacities and secondly on the quantity of demanded certificates. Through the 
statutorily stipulated priority feed-in of RES, the merit-order effect13  occurs, see 
Figure 4: for the spot markets pricing in the short run (intraday or within a short 
period) power plants will be ranked according to their marginal costs  of production. 
Those with the lowest cost will be ordered first to fill the gap of the current residual 
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13  The merit-order effect can be observed only if one or more goods (e.g. energy sources) are 
positively discriminated. As for German electricity from RES, in general it has to be immediately fed 
into the grid. Here the effect is most often described theoretically and in absolute figures, see Sensfuß 
and Ragwitz (2007) and further analysis of the authors published by the BMU.
between RES feed-in energy and power demand. Depending on the demand 
quantity, the last considered power plant determines the price for all suppliers. Power 
plants with higher production costs than the spot price are shut down. Hence, the 
demanded quantity for conventionally produced energy is reduced from D1 to D2. 
This  comes along with a price decrease from p1 to p2 and is the cost shrinking 
component on (consumer) electricity prices, as  shown in Figure 5. The supply is 
determined by an inelastic14 short run demand of electricity. Even for the assumption 
of elastic demand, the conclusions do not change fundamentally - compare the 
elastic demand of De1 to De2 with D1 to D2 in Figure 4. In the illustration, the 
geometrical distance between the two demand functions shows how much energy 
from RES is provided. 
The mechanism of replacement has  been proven by Weigt, Ellermann and Delarue 
(2013). The authors describe the injection of REFIT stimulated RES investments in 
the market as such: "RE injections displace whatever is on the relevant margin with a 
zero-CO2-emitting source." (p. S158). The replaced sources are nearly always less 
efficient plants with high carbon emission.
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14 See Morthorst (2003), or Sensfuß, Ragwitz, Genoese (2008) for empirical analyses of German 
energy markets. Branch (1993) described a very low elasticity of US markets, Holtedahl and Joutz 














Figure 5: Merit-order effect, own illustration.
With inelastic demand (D1 and D2), the price decrease from p1 to p2. For the same 
decrease in price, with elastic demand, a larger quantity of RES produced energy is 
needed. For further analysis cf. Sensfuß and Ragwitz (2007). The decreasing energy 
prices redistribute a part of the producers rent to the consumer rent with the condition 
that the REFIT payments themselves are only paid by end consumers. Thus, heavy 
industrial consumers have a real decreasing effect on prices, while for end 
consumers it is  a zero-sum game. The effect of the shift from producer to consumer 
rent is difficult to specify exactly: Wissen and Nicolosi (2008) describe the effect of a 
change in the generator mix for the residual load, influenced by diverse factors, one 
of which is  the RES capacity. They argue that the production cost may decrease with 
an positive effect on the producer rent.
For Germany, the value of the merit-order effect is calculated to be higher than the 
annual costs for the consumer through the REFIT levy, hence the cost effect is 
positive, see Sensfuß and Ragwitz (2007), and Sensfuß, Ragwitz and Genoese 
(2008). For the merit-order effect and for the substituted energy sources, see Bickel, 
Kelm and Edler (2009). If so, one should agree to reallocate the cost of carbon 
emissions to the consumer. REFIT payments  do not stand for carbon costs, but the 
installed capacities reduce the pollution due to a reduced need for conventional 
energy consumption. Thus, the REFIT payments are decentralised carbon savings 
made exogenously, without additional costs as long as they do not exceed the cost 
savings caused by the merit-order effect. For further analysis, the REFIT payments 
and merit-order effect will be counted equal with resulting costs of zero.
2.3 The theoretical framework of a trading scheme
The implementation of a cap-and-trade system creates a market for the good 
"emission allowances" under certain regulations. Pollution allowances become a 
good: modern economies are based on industrial production and as a negative 
consequence, the environment is polluted and damaged by by-products of 
manufacturing processes. The emitter is using the air as a good for private purposes, 
while the costs of pollution, cleaning mechanisms and the reduction of environmental 
impacts are public.
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Production has to pollute, otherwise there would be no output. Regulation is an issue 
due to the missing price of the environmental impact of production and the resulting 
social costs of its pollution. Pollution implies for the free usage of public goods, e.g. 
air, water, forests, natural resources, or land. The missing price for these goods and 
the non-compensation for the ecological negative outcome of production can be 
classified as a market failure.
The idea of an ETS is to charge polluters for their emission quantity and reward the 
injured parties. The question of interest is, how to price carbon emissions? During the 
production process, when burning fuels, the exhaust gas will be emitted at the place 
of the manufacture. But the ecological impact often does not appear at the same time 
and place. If a fisherman cannot fish any more because the water close to a 
production unit is polluted to the extent that all fish die, the injured party is identified 
easily. The fisher should have the right to negotiate with the polluter about how much 
pollution will be and has to be accepted, and the price of compensation for the 
abandoned fishing. For example, direct costs are easy to name but it is much harder 
to identify who is affected by pollution and when. The emitter can pay for pollution 
directly. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the damage to nature and the 
consequences over time. If the emitter has not paid during the fuel burning process, it 
will be rather hard to identify who is responsible and to what extent for environmental 
damages a long time afterwards and estimate the costs. A price for the social costs of 
greenhouse gases is hard to set. It is much easier to establish a system that prices 
the emissions directly at the source, i.e. where the emitter pollutes the air. Thus, 
pollution and its ecological impacts are internalised.
Emission allowances are a market-based instrument that prices air pollution. The 
allowances become an additional input factor influencing production processes and 
the prices of goods. Other measures such as carbon taxes are an option, but not 
market based and thus less cost effective (see e.g. Parry, 2003). Only markets force 
emitters to compete for the emission permits or save emissions if prices for 
allowances are higher than the cost of savings. A cap on allowable emissions is set 
that determines the absolute quantity of pollution for all emitters, e.g. in one 
economy. The demand for permits makes them a scarce commodity and every 
permitter has to decide to make-it or buy-it: if one does not emit there is no need for 
allowances. The alternatives are holding permits or avoiding emissions. Single 
emitters will decide according to cost minimising conditions. The advantage for the 
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whole economy is the avoidance of emissions and the meeting of the target set as 
the emission cap, assuming a least cost solution.
The scientific discourse about the best solution for cost compensation of pollution 
has a long standing:
Pigou (1912) described the only private use of air and the general public as the victim 
of air pollution, where the state should be willing to undertake corrective actions, 
otherwise no compensation would occur.
Coase (1960) first addressed the debate on a compensation for ecological damages 
payable by the emitter to the injured individual as a reciprocity process: Both parties 
should thus find the price for the damage through private negotiations under the 
condition of perfect information. Due to the asymmetric allocation of information the 
problem cannot be ideally resolved, as it should be. He gave the example of a 
cattle-raiser whose herd stray onto the cropland of the neighbouring farmer. The use 
of one of both is the damage of the other. Thus, both should accept a solution where 
meat and crop will share the property rights of the land. Depending on the individual 
marginal cost curves, independent from the initial assignment, the allocation should 
be pareto efficient where the marginal costs of both parties are equivalent. The 
example can be easily transferred to the public good air, where the polluter has a use 
of air, while the damage of pollution causes a negative use.
Crocker (1966) proposed to link emission allowances to the ownership of land. The 
allowance for air pollution refers generally to the own land, heavy pollution will result 
in a tax or other compensation for damages: the use of air produces a positive output 
(e.g. goods) at one place that causes damages at another place (e.g. waldsterben - 
forest dieback, or health problems and higher mortality rates from cancer and other 
diseases). Both parties should have a (financial)  incentive to allow a specific amount 
of pollution on one side and avoid emissions on the other side.
Dales (1968) added that the policy maker must fix the maximum quantity of 
emissions allowed with an exact description of where and when the emission is 
allowed, while the price of every single permit must be found in a classical market 
scheme in relation to the number of allowances demanded.
The explanation of the market of a cap-and-trade system requires simplification. In 
the following, a classical market shall be assumed under the conditions of perfect 
competition and perfect information.
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The one side of the market covers the private emitters: All emitting sources have to 
participate in the market. The pollution of air allows emitters to produce goods and 
services. Without any regulations, emitters will produce at the maximum capacity that 
returns positive earnings. By introducing market regulations such as a cap on 
permitted emissions, each single emitter is price taker and can decide to reduce its 
production with the consequence of a reduced output of carbon emissions and a loss 
of profit, or let the production remain on the same level as before and pay for the 
superfluous emissions not covered by the cap.
On the other side of the market, the general public grants permissions to the private 
emitters to pollute the air corresponding to the price of the damage that occurs 
through pollution.
The cap-and-trade market can be described as to being comprised of two 
submarkets: in one submarket, or the demand side of the cap-and-trade system, 
participants compete for emission allowances, emission savings will occur where 
they are cost-efficient corresponding to the aggregated marginal abatement cost 
curve. The other submarket, or the supply side, is dictated by the policy maker: the 
estimation of the damage costs through pollution determines the quantity of pollution 
allowances and thus the equilibrium price regarding the supply side's aggregated 
marginal emission cost curve. The social optimum than is realised at the point where 
both curves intersect.
In reality, it is not clearly explained how markets for emission allowances work. 
Empirical studies show evidence of (partly)  normal market conditions for some 
periods, while others are characterised by uncertainty about real consumption of 
permits ex ante, the influence of weather and other forces majeures, market 
participants, limited trading periods, and the artificial implementation of markets for 
permits as a new good. All factors can lead to over-accumulation and banking of 
certificates on individual level, while the effect on markets are not affecting prices or 
efficiency, moreover, volatility seems to be less, cf. Ellerman and Buchner (2007), 
Wagner (2007).
The following model will first generalise the emission permits market in this section, 
and discuss the efficient set of a cap. In the further two sections the 
interdependencies of RES and the EU-ETS will be discussed, focussing on one 
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single branch, namely power production as one of the biggest groups of air pollution 
through GHG emissions.
If the use of the air becomes a good, the individual profit of the emitter is the 
corresponding benefit of the emission less the cost.  The aggregated use is the 
private profit of emitters, while the environmental damage costs are to be born by the 
general public. The welfare-maximising condition is the point where marginal use of 
emission equals marginal damage. This Pareto efficient situation indeed turns to be 
hardly obtained.
It is difficult to implement the optimal cap due to missing information about real costs 
of emissions. Each single emitter knows his individual marginal cost and use curves. 
The estimation of the damage costs is much more difficult due to lack of information, 
the time horizon and the global impact. While the benefits of emissions can be 
measured for the emitter as his profit, the damage remains abstract. Baumol and 
Oates (1988) describe the problem as the responsibility of the policy maker to set the 
emission cap regarding its information, scientific analysis and economic forecast, but 
in any case as an arbitrary choice. This choice might be a Pareto optimum, but more 
probably the set is too strict or to generous, emitters face a not-optimal situation for 
abatement. The set standard should be achieved cost-effectively. The authors 
summarise this so called standards approach as a system of "efficiency without 
optimality" (p.159).
Böringer et al. (2006)  describe the standards approach for the national EU-ETS 
markets. The following analysis adopts the considerations and shows that any 
individual emitter must reduce its profit-maximising quantity of emissions by a 
specific avoidance. The amount of emission savings depends on the individual 
marginal abatement cost curve in relation to the aggregated market cost curve. The 
emitter choose between two options, emitting or avoiding of emissions, and takes 
into consideration the market prices for his decision. The aggregated market cost 
minimisation solution is efficient for the given set.15
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15 The authors are analysing the cost efficiency of separating carbon markets, while the basic 
assumptions are similar to the approach of an efficient cap-and-trade system.
Without restrictions, in the absence of any regulations, the total emission E0 is 
equivalent to the sum of the individual profit maximising CO2 emissions Emax of N 
emitters, namely pollution sources:





Under the unrestricted use of the air, the polluters realise the production quantities 
that maximise their private earnings, while the damage through pollution is the 
negative environmental impact and thus causes undefined costs for the general 
public.
The overall welfare comprises of the private profits of the polluters, who can realise 
earnings through the selling of the production of goods and services, reduced by the 
social costs of air pollution and environmental damage. It is difficult to calculate the 
net benefit of pollution. The net use of pollution is the resulting GDP and the strength 
of the economy. The net damage is the sum of the diverse impacts of the 
environment that are already occurring, such as a weakened, less healthy workforce 
and those that shall occur in the future, such as negative growth perspectives if a 
shortage of natural resources will occur due to environmental conditions.
Within an emission trading scheme, here the EU-ETS, the policy maker limits the 
total allowed emission quantity and limits not only pollution, but private profits. It is 
the responsibility of political leaders to balance net use and net damage to guarantee 
a welfare maximisation for the general public and its net use of pollution. It underlines 
the major policy challenge of implementing instruments to control emissions under 
the conditions of economic-ecological needs. The cap-and-trade system is just one 
component in the environmental policies framework. It can illustrate well the 
difficulties of examining the correct functions of the net use and the net damage and 
where to set the pollution cap, for the further analysis of the resulting net effect of a 
cap, see chapter 2.4.
The set cap ‡ determines the allowed quantity of emissions and is equal, or below, 
the emissions level of the profit maximising quantity, thus system participants have to 
reduce their system wide maximum demanded emissions E0 by the sum of the 
abatements An of all N emitters to satisfy ‡, the cap set by the policy maker. This is 
ideally at the point where the marginal costs of emission saving are equal the 
marginal costs of damage through caused emissions:
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The most common scenario is the shortage of emission allowances in comparison to 
a policy without restriction. The cap ‡ forces emitters to reduce partly their profit 
maximisation emissions Enmax by the abatement An:





The single emitter can individually choose between avoiding emissions or buying 
permits under market conditions for the remaining emissions depending on their 
marginal costs for the additional reduction in one unit of pollution, the individual 
marginal cost curve (MAC) 16. The aggregated MAC is the sum of all emitters' 
individual curves and determines the system wide emission saving. This aggregation 
is highly important in the further analysis when discussing the right set of the cap. 
Here, it is assumed that the system-wide cost minimisation leads to emission 
savings, which are realised at the lowest cost point. Emission rights flow to where 
emission savings are cost intensive and emitters will buy allowances from 
participants who abate pollution. MACs are an often-used approach to "communicate 
findings on the technological structure and the economics of CO2 emissions 
reduction", (Kesicki, 2013). They can show the potential for carbon abatement though 
with the flaw that they are unable to explain in detail technological changes or 
interactions of influence factors on abatement costs. Nevertheless, for the following 
theoretical discussions, the aggregated MAC simplifies steady conditions for 
emitters: price and quantity effects will not be influenced by other factors like 
technological change or global increase or decrease on demand.
Each single emitter produces under its individual marginal cost curve.The aggregated 
cost curve for all emitters and its first order conditions explain the system wide saving 
potential. Emitters are price takers, the short run MAC is steady, e.g. technological 
change will not influence the cost function. The shortage of emission allowances 
determines through the set cap the autarkic price. If the autarkic price is lower than 
one emitters individual abatement costs, the emitter is willing to buy emission permits 
from the market; conversely if the autarkic price is higher than the emitters 
abatement costs, he will save pollutions and sell the corresponding abatement 
quantity into the market, see Ellermann, Decaux (1998). The MAC curve gives the 
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16 Parry (2003) describes the primary costs as the triangle that span under the MAC curve "equal to 
forgone benefits from fossil fuel production net of reduced production costs" (p.388). The result is the 
sum of emission abatement or reduction in emission output.
same information for the marginal use of emission and the marginal abatement costs, 
depending if the point on the MAC is above or below the autarkic price.
The decision about abatement or pollution comes along with its cost function. It is 
composed of the sum of the remaining emissions for all emitters N after their 
individual abatement (Enmax - An), and the sum of emission pollution (Enmax - En). 
Both, the emission saving or pollution, have the same price p. The emitter pays the 
price of the permit that the avoider sells.
The abatement cost curve is characterised by progressively increasing cost, thus it is 
assumed that C' > 0 and C'' > 0, cf. Böhringer et al. (2006).
System participants emit will reduce their profit maximising emissions E0 by the sum 
of their individual emission reduction An, the emissions En remain. For those 
remaining emissions, emitters have to buy emission permits. The abatement An has 
the identical price p and results through the technical costs of emission savings and 
the loss of production. The compliance cost of the set cap thus is







The abatement An is equal to the profit maximising emissions Enmax minus the 
present permissions En. Individual emitters control their emissions according to the 
emission costs p. Depending on the decision about the emission amount of the cap, 
the abatement costs follow as a result of the abatement quantity An and the 
abatement costs.
Under the assumption of the abatement as the sum of the maximum demanded 
emission quantity reduced by the emission reduction, the single emitter choose his 
individual saving strategy as a price taker: An = Enmax - En.
The associated first-order condition for the aggregated cost curve shows that the 




= p1 − p2 = p
Giving up one unit of production is saving the cost of one emission permit p, the 
costs are equivalent to the abatement costs p. The damage will be reduced by one 
unit of emission, equivalent the equilibrium price Ù.
The single emitter will emit, if his utility of emission is higher than the cost of 
abatement. The marginal abatement cost MAC curve is decreasing by the price, 
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equal the avoidance of one produced unit or its individual emissions. The marginal 
damage or marginal emission cost curve MEC is increasing by the price of emission. 
The welfare optimisation is reached, where MEC equals MAC.
The compliance costs result from the necessary permits, multiplied by their price p 
for the emitted pollution quantity. The obligation to acquire allowances can be 
substituted by an emission reduction. Realised cost savings by this emission 
avoidance are equal to redundant fuel costs. The substitution will take place when 
and where the marginal cost of avoiding one unit of pollution is lower than the price Ù 
for the emission allowance. The total costs then consist of the avoidance costs and 
the costs of allowances for the remaining emitted amount Enmax-An.
In case of realising a larger abatement, the emission amount actually realised by the 
sum of all En, can be less than the set target cap and should be equal to the cap as 
long as the marginal costs of abatement and the marginal costs of damages are 
equal:
Every produced unit causes a use, U, and a damage, D; thus while the abatement of 
a single unit on the one hand decreases the profit of the emitter, but on the other 
hand reduces the social costs of pollution.
The use, U, is the benefit through emission, e.g. production and earning, reduced by 
the permit price in relation to the emission quantity.
The damage, D, is a negative use function of emission and the resulting pollution, the 
compensation equal to the price of permits in relation to the emission quantity, partly 
reduces the damage.














The cost effective optimum is achieved if the marginal costs of emission reduction 
per unit are equal to the emission price. The emission price itself is depending on the 
emission demand in the cap and trade system. To evaluate the use and damage 
costs, it is an exogenous given, constant price.
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= p = p1 = p2
Effective cost control and sanctions for the individual failure of participants lead to a 
system that ensures the exact attainment of the maximum allowed emissions ‡, the 
policy maker chosen cap, equal to the sum of all emitters' Enmax-An. Hence further 
technically possible reductions of pollution will not occur. They are not cost-effective 
for the individual emitter who is a price taker, because the individual costs for one 
unit of abatement A are higher than the equilibrium permit price Ù.
The advantage of the ETS system is the efficiency of permit trading between system 
participants, the flow of emission permits to the point where the physical abatement 
is at the highest cost. Emissions savings are found at the minimum cost point, as 
described by Baumol and Oates (1971). Hence the initial allocation, i.e. 
grandfathering according to historical pollution, auctioning in the market or other 
instruments, is without influence. Permits are "flowing" to the place where emission 
saving would cause the highest costs. A single firm will be a seller of allowances as 
long as the permission price p is higher than the individual marginal abatement costs 
curve (MAC) of emissions: correspondingly the MAC for the whole market 
determines the absolute emissions - for the aggregated market, the price p for 
allowances will be equal to the optimum, which can be realised by the joint MAC for 
all ETS market participants (Montgomery, 1972). Tietenberg (2003) verified the 
theory by evaluating different applications of diverse ETS. He highlighted the 
importance of the appropriate implementation of financial sanctions for the case 
when a participant fails to hold enough permits to cover his emissions output. Thus, if 
sanctions are high enough and at least equal to the permit price, all participating 
parties in the ETS meet the binding cap.
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2.4 Net effect of a cap
In the framework of an ETS, the policy maker can choose the level of the cap and 
thus set three different scenarios in motion. The setting of the cap at the appropriate 
level is thus important for the economic wide emissions. Due to a certain trade-off 
between the two purposes, namely, cost efficiency (price), and ecological 
maximisation (savings quantity), it is important to define the initial cap as the 
measure that determines the achievement of these objectives. Put differently: the net 
benefit NB results of the sum of net use NU of pollution for production purposes 
reduced by the net damage ND for the general public.
(10)
Derived for the use of pollution, the optimisation of the net benefit, social use, results 
as the equilibrium emission price and quantity for which the marginal abatement cost 








The welfare maximisation for the general public complies for D‘ = U' where the 
efficient emission level is reached. The emission of each single unit is a decision 
which influences private use, the damage for the general public, and, in sum whether 
the general welfare is increasing or decreasing. As long as the use through the usage 
of air is higher than the environmental damage, the net benefit increases. Referring 
to the aggregated cost curves, the damage is described by the MEC, the use by the 
MAC.
Figure 6 shows three different scenarios of setting a cap through the policy maker 
and the consequences for the emitters. The initial situation is pareto efficient under 
the condition that the cap is set exactly at the market equilibrium in the intersection of 
MEC and MAC, which was referred in chapter 2.3.
The cap in scenario 1) shows a cap under conditions of estimated environmental 
damages equal social use, D‘=U‘, while in scenarios 2)  and 3) the cap is influenced 
by over-allocation or scarcity, which can be interpreted as a change of the supply 
curve, compare Ellerman and Decaux (1998) for further analysis. For the net 
analysis, the notation simplifies to e.g. Emax for the sum of all single emitters profit 
38
maximising emissions, Ù and ‡ 
represents the equilibrium price 
and emission.
1)  The policy maker sets a cap ‡ 
equal to the point where the 
aggregated marginal abatement 
cost curve MAC is identical to the 
marginal emission cost curve MEC 
demanded emission quantity. The 
result is a reduction of the 
emission under the maximum 
demanded quantity and that the 
cap is met , bu t no fur ther 
reductions will occur.
The cap itself is in the social 
optimum without forcing further 
savings, except for the fact that the 
future increase of emissions will be 
prevented and the solution is 
welfare maximising: In comparison 
to the absence of environmental 
regulations, this situation is not 
affected by welfare losses. The 
price Ù of one permission right is 
equal to the abatement costs of 
one unit of emissions. The cost 
minimising solution of the net 
benefit equations above is realised 
if the status quo is maintained 
regarding demand and technical 
progress.

































Figure 6: Carbon savings in different 
scenarios for the allowances cap.
1) Cap with  optimal allocation; 2) scarcity in 
allowances; 3) over allocation of permits.
Emax illustrate the profit maximising demand 
for emissions in absence of environmental 
policies, Ù the cap. MEC as marginal 
abatement cost curve, MEC as marginal 
emission cost curve. Own illustration.
cost, the intersection of MAC and MEC0, is represented in the optimum ‡A. If the 
policy maker's estimation on ecological damage per unit is higher than the real costs, 
the cap is set wrong, according to ‡B, and thus below the present level of emissions. 
The cap forces emitters to save an additional amount of pollution, which is not 
optimal and results in a loss of use:
Initially, the intersection of the market MAC and the profit maximising emission 
demand curve is at point A, emissions are above the cap ‡B, which has to be 
achieved. Emitters have to reduce emissions under the present, welfare maximising 
emissions, represented by point A. The permit price increases to ÙB. The emitters 
face a loss in their rent, the overall welfare is negatively affected, assumed that the 
initial abatement of pollution was already equal to the former MEC-MAC intersection, 
where MEC0 described well the real social costs of pollution. The realised aggregated 
MEC will turn left from MEC0 to MEC1. The compliance of the policy maker‘s set cap 
basing on a wrong estimate of environmental damage, results in additional costs: 
The emitter pays a surplus on real social costs what can be interpreted as a penalty 
tax.
3)  An over-allocation, i.e. government supply of a permit quantity above market 
needs, leads to a decrease of the permit price Ù. The MEC curve for emission 
damages turns right to MEC1, what can be interpreted like subsidies on pollution or 
an under estimated damage cost curve. As one scenario, emitters could increase 
their emissions along the MAC, the price will decrease below the initial price ÙA to ÙC, 
the quantity of emitted pollution will raise to , ‡C > ‡A, corresponding to point C. As 
an alternative, if market participants are remaining emissions on pollution level ‡A, 
total emissions do not change, but the price drops from ÙA to ÙD, corresponding to 
points A and D in Figure 6.3. The emissions remain steady. Polluters will be affected 
by lower costs of permits, and in the more likely event of expansion of the emission 
level, welfare losses are realised along the increase of absolute emissions and the 
linked social costs. Especially in the short run, such a scenario may occur if e.g. 
production capacity and technologies are not adapted due to restrictions or shortage 
in labour force or missing demand in additional production output.
For all three scenarios, in the short run, there are no economic reasons to cut 
emissions under status quo levels in the absence of effective environmental policies. 
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Thus, if the policy maker implements a cap, which is smaller than the present 
emissions, he has ecological intentions for future periods and risks welfare losses in 
the short run, as the resulting MEC of a shorter cap is economically equal to 
overestimated damage costs. The cut and the decrease of the environmental 
pollution will, as a consequence, prevent further social costs and can lead to 
innovation in technologies to decrease (individual) abatement costs with a left shift of 
the aggregated MEC to solve the net benefit condition D'=U‘.
2.5 Interdependencies between EU-ETS and national feed-in tariffs
The European Union’s ambitious climate protection plan is based on market 
instruments for emission trading and support regimes seeking to increase the share 
of total energy production from RES. As demonstrated, the EU-ETS ensures the 
achievement of a pre-defined cap on carbon emissions. The policy maker sets the 
amount of the cap. The second measure, a REFIT, helps to increase the share of 
RES energies and is a kind of financial promotion of research and development. It is 
cost intensive. The question arises wether REFITs bring further benefits of CO2 
savings or are just cost intensive. What drives the EU to force the joint 
implementation of these two instruments? Is it simply expensive or is it well thought 
out with results that can be interpreted as a calculation yielding more than 1+1 = 2?
The first climate protection policy of the EU is the Europe-wide emission trading 
scheme (EU-ETS) that seeks to reduce carbon emissions by at least 20% below the 
level of 1990. The first multi-annual trading period, Phase I of the EU-ETS, was 
based on a grandfathering process where the status quo emission less a compulsory 
reduction were the benchmark for the initial allocation and setting of the cap. In future 
periods, the free allocation will be substituted by a certain quota of auctioning, while 
for the long run perspective the full auctioning will become the standard for allocation. 
The length of one period of the EU-ETS will be expanded from phase to phase over a 
few years. The early adoption of energy saving technologies will become more 
efficient and release redundant certificates for sale on the market.
The EU-ETS was initially designed as a system with three periods. The length of one 
period grows from Phase I to III, running from three to seven years. Thus, even if the 
EU continuously evaluates its directives for the trading scheme, (policy)  scenarios 
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must consider more parameters under the heading of uncertainty. The period‘s length 
and the fact that the cap is set before the trading phase starts, brings less flexibility 
during the single phases if market demand and supply do not develop consistently 
and in relation to one another. This was already shown for over allocation, i.e. the 
supply of permits exceeded the demand of the market, which leads to prices near 
zero; this is however not at all a shortcoming of the general ETS design. Concerning 
the inter-periodic adjustment of the permit amount, the EU member states have a 
strong instrument, the annual allocation of allowance rights. In Phase I in particular, 
but also in Phase II, grandfathering, the free allocation of allowances based on 
historical emissions (see e.g. Ellermann and Buchner (2007) for detailed processes), 
caused high windfall profits in the power sector. When pricing the initial permit prices 
into retail prices after the trading period has commenced, energy suppliers are 
overcharging consumers due to the price inelasticity of electricity and the market 
dominating influence of some suppliers. Power producers often do not feel the need 
to seriously save emissions as the cost of allowances will be paid by consumers. 
Lower retail prices would only reduce the producer rent, so cost intensive long run 
innovations, which reduce short run profits, do not occur, as determined by Betz, 
Schleich and Rogge (2006), and Schleich, Betz and Rogge (2007), or see Bukold 
(2015a, 2015b)  for similar analysis about price decreases of energy inputs, which are 
not or only partly passed to consumers. Further, if permit prices decrease, 
consumers still have to pay the initial price: It can be observed in reality that at least 
in the short run, energy prices are sticky. Price adjustments, also e.g. in case of 
decreasing fuel prices, are normally made only every 12-24 months. Parry (2003) 
underlines that every price of carbon permits > 0 leads to positive welfare effects as 
emitters reduce their emissions according their MACs.
Banking free permits can result in a shortage of markets and carbon prices can even 
increase if the market power is strong enough. Auctioning cannot solve the problem 
of over-allocation and high prices on consumer bills. Hephurn et al. (2006)  evaluated 
the grandfathering process in Phase I and estimated auctioning in Phase II. 
Auctioning can provide solutions to prevent distortions through banking permits: 
emitters have to pay for every single pollution allowances, while grandfathered 
permits must not be paid initially and hence have no negative financial impact when 
not sold, even though they are unused. Partly or full auctioning instead of 
grandfathering makes strategic hoarding less attractive and expensive at the same 
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time. High prices and price volatility due to market domination of single players will 
not occur or will be reduced, if market participants do not have incentives to hold free 
allocated, unused permits.
Thus, in terms of general theory, the price should regulate emissions and force 
carbon savings. If the individual MAC is lower than the allowance price, savings are 
economically worthwhile and saved emission allowances can be sold to the market. 
High prices of permits signal that an abatement is needed, the price is higher than 
the market MAC, and individual savings occur where the abatement costs are low. 
Emitters can buy allowances if their individual abatement costs are above the market 
price.
It is often not taken into consideration that other factors also play an important role:
(i)  high market power of a single player or inefficient markets can distort prices when 
market participants bank permits. In this scenario, the market will have a shortage of 
tradable permits, resulting in high prices. There are several possible explanations for 
this behaviour: Hintermann (2010) analysed empirically Phase I of the EU-ETS, 
stating that market participants could prefer holding certificates due to uncertain 
estimates about future needed capacity, when it is better to hedge certificates than 
paying penalty fees. As a reason for strategic hoarding, Grubb and Neuhoff (2006) 
see firms faced with the difficulty of predicting the future prices and the firm specific 
needs of permits. This effect of waiting comes along with a delay of adjustment of 
prices and investment decisions. For the same uncertainties, Sijm, Neuhoff and Chen 
(2006)  mention a delayed adjustment of prices but note that due to the free allocation 
market players may be inclined to high prices of certificates, thus leading to an 
increase in windfall profits;
(ii) the simple correlation between economic growth and certificate prices, where 
there is a gap between economic growth estimated for the setting of the cap and the 
real rate of growth (see Alberola, Chevallier and Chèze, 2008).
The setting of an emission cap has important impacts on energy efficiency and 
emission abatement. If firms have to pay for emissions, they raise their efforts in 
saving carbon emissions. Innovations in energy saving technologies become a 
competitive advantage and result in lower production costs. Thus, the permit price 
has to be higher than the individual MAC if a firm will abate emissions instead of 
buying certificates from the market. The EU-ETS and the pertinent NAPs of the 
member states have to implement a certain shortage in the quantity of allowances in 
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order to secure and hold a specific price level - also if exogenous shocks occur. 
Otherwise, the remaining sources will increase their emissions. The allocated 
allowances will be used by less sources at lower prices, with the consequence that 
the percentage reduction of every single emitter will reduce.
The second climate protection policy of the EU is the introduction of national support 
regimes that are aimed to push the share of RES of total energy production to at 
least 20% by 2020. Where new capacity expansions of RES lead to a lower demand 
in required certificates, the price of allowances will fall. Hence, in existing 
conventional power plants, the realisation of emission savings will occur at a lower 
cost level. The full technological potential of emission savings through innovations to 
the production process will not be realised.
Countries have good reasons to implement RES support regimes: decentralised 
energy production, security of energy supply, innovation and research in RES 
technologies, steeper learning curves and cost shrinking effects in the future (to 
name only a few, see, for example, Abrell and Weigt, 2008, or Nicolosi and Fürsch, 
2009). Furthermore, set caps are a forecast of future power plant generation - the 
emissions result from a combination of current emission amounts with expected 
scenarios regarding the implementation of new technologies. For example, if RES 
efficiency becomes higher and/or the share of total production is growing faster, the 
policy maker can set a lower cap. Technological conditions available on the market 
allow energy utilities to reach the emission target faster and/or more cheaply. This is 
the focus of the German government, also underlined in different publications of 
authors like e.g. Klinski (2005), and Wenzel and Nitsch (2008).
The general approach of the market model in section 2.2 with perfect competition has 
to be discussed and modified, if necessary: through RES, a part of the energy 
production of the utility sector is not calculated in the NAP, if the new installations are 
above the expected value. The model and its optimisation problem face new 
conditions. Are ETS and support regimes two systems interacting or contrary to each 
other? How are the new RES capacities influencing the endogenous variable?
If the growth of RES capacities is well below expectations, the markets are in a 
similar situation as shown in Figure 6.2. where the cap is shorter than the demand. 
Without knowing the exact values, the present emissions are above the cap on 
allowed emissions and must be reduced. Thus, the pressure through the scarcity of 
permits increases.
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The situation changes totally if the amount of new installations exceeds that 
calculated in the NAP, which can be interpreted as a shock. A huge part of RES 
installations is an investment from outside the electricity producing branch. The 
amount of additional produced electricity from green energies not within the 
investment plans of the utility sector leads to the avoidance of an additional amount 
of CO2 that was not planned in the national pollution plans. For the concerned 
industries, this constitutes an exogenous shock with the same consequences as the 
exit of a part of the production capacity: a part of their conventionally produced 
electricity and the linked emissions is redundant. Here, the shock is a new, not 
planned RES capacity, other examples of such a kind of shock could be a technology 
innovation process or a decrease of production caused by an economic crisis.
Figure 7 shows the unclear consequences: Most likely, the utilities' MAC shifts left 
with. Diverse scenarios may occur:
 - (A) if other branches can buy unused permits, prices will return to the initial level, 
the pollution level will remain unchanged. The MAC is returning to the initial level, 
the emissions meet again the cap with resulting emissions ‡ For this trade-off, all 
branches have to be participating in an ETS under perfect market conditions. Real 
world ETS often include only selected branches, permits cannot be sold to every 
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Figure 7: External shock on emission demand, own illustration.
 - (B) a very unlikely but not absolutely unrealistic scenario is the presence of market 
dominating players with very personal interest in high permit prices. If they can 
dominate the markets, starting from the equilibrium point A, the absolute emissions 
decrease from ‡ to a lower level if the permits are already allocated and the 
owner, i.e. the utilities, will neither use nor sell them, the permit price p will remain 
steady, while the absolute emissions of all branches will decrease to E'B. The 
scenario in point B seems to be realistic if market players have enough power to 
influence the market price, e.g. in the electricity sector: utilities price certificate 
prices into sale prices and the sum is going to be higher than selling the permits 
on the market for a decreased price, for further analysis see Sijm, Neuhoff, and 
Chen (2006). In (B), damages are over compensated: MEC and MAC are not in an 
equilibrium, the total net use is negative.
If the permits flood the market, first the price Ù drops:
 - (C) to p'C and the emissions E'C in point C will be realised in a new equilibrium of 
MEC and MAC', but only if the cap will be adjusted on a lower level, C seems to 
be a realistic scenario;
 - (D) seems to be a more realistic scenario. Under the scenario of the left shifted 
MAC', prices for permits decrease drastically to p'D and permitters will substitute 
cost intensive carbon savings with higher pollution exhausts. The emission cap ‡ 
will be realised, the net damage is negative: MAC‘ and MEC are not in an 
equilibrium and environmental damages will not be totally compensated.
To summarise, the shock of unplanned RES capacities may result in less emissions, 
remains unclear whether this becomes reality. The new balanced but not completely 
market confirm equilibrium is depending on the eventually domination of single 
market players, the fuel switching options of energy suppliers e.g from gas to oil, the 
shutdown of energy plants in relation to management decisions instead of 
environmental reasons, and other obstacles of a perfect market.
The analysis of Weigt, Ellermann and Delarue (2013) is one of the few empirical and 
not only theoretical articles about the interaction of RES-promotion and ETS. The 
authors give a small comparison of different scenarios with and without a price for 
carbon with the conclusion that the use of both instruments, REFIT and EU-ETS, 
save more emissions than the application of only one of both policies, and that the 
effect increases in direct proportion to the carbon price. Only if having permit 
markets, carbon gets priced, thus an effect of unplanned RES capacities may result 
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in some additional savings, those by green energies will not be all over absorbed by 
other emitters that increase their emissions.
The spot market prices analysis of CO2 certificates by Wagner (2007)  asserts that 
pricing does not necessarily follow the assumptions of perfect market pricing. 
Reasons seem to be uncertainties about factors such as future environmental 
policies, but also that the actual emissions ax ante are unknown and the market 
participants do not act completely rational. Sometimes, strong players are identified, 
which can influence the price, while at other times this effect is not observed. The 
limitation of the trading periods also results in greater volatility at the end of a period. 
Other influence factors on prices have been mentioned earlier in this chapter and 
often appear to be a consequence of uncertain predictions of the future price 
development and the demand of the single emitters.
Considering free market pricing, the risk of a rebound effect exists. This is the simple 
mechanism that falling factor prices, here emission permits, and the linked pollution 
saving at one place lead to more pollution at a different location. Described by 
Jevons (1866)  for the use of carbon fuels, this effect can be easily converted to CO2 
certificates. The excess supply of free allowances through for example CO2 savings 
in power plants leads to a decrease of permit prices and an increase in emissions 
elsewhere. This is expected across all industries, also because some industries will 
outsource manufacturing processes and the linked emissions offshore. Of course, 
the set cap is met, but the exogenous RES installations will not result in additional 
pollution reductions in comparison to the cap.
Here, the question arises what assumptions are a realistic scenario. Two main 
factors have to be taken into consideration: the decision of the policy maker whether 
emission reductions are to be solely done through the instrument EU-ETS, or 
whether the use of the second instrument, REFIT, makes sense. If the policy mix of 
both instruments is chosen, the question is then how they change the conditions of 
the system. This discussion prepares for the subsequent section which will clarify 
how emissions can be further reduced under these new conditions.
Buttermann, Hillebrand and Hillebrand (2009) propose full auctioning in Phase III of 
EU-ETS for energy utilities. Otherwise, the amount of allocated certificates is 
sufficiently high for a continuous use of conventional fuels as was used previously in 
the past. A slight cut in the cap for example can be compensated by a switch from 
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coal to gas. In this scenario, physical switches to new RES capacities are not an 
option and too expensive.
Fuel switching, the change from one conventional fuel to another with lower 
emissions per burned unit, is an important issue. If carbon permits have high prices 
or the cap is significantly cut, the first option for carbon savings is to switch from coal 
to gas capacities, which both already exist in the power plant mix of energy utilities. A 
long run switch to RES would cause higher costs in the short run. The advantage of 
the implementation of a more efficient technology in the energy mix is a disadvantage 
in the short run and causes higher costs. Delarue, Voorspools and D'haeseleer 
(2008)  investigated scenarios for Phases I and II of the EU-ETS with the obviously 
result of a correlation between prices and CO2 savings. Nevertheless, the overall 
effect appears to be a positive emission reduction and, contrary to this, the prices in 
the EU-ETS tend to be low (Delarue and D'haseeleer, 2008). In this case, one can 
propose that the EU-ETS leads to carbon savings in the existing power plant park. 
The policy strategy might aim only at preventing an unchanged pollution scenario, 
but not a fundamental change in energy production processes. RES are neither 
needed nor demanded. Therefore, innovations in new technologies will occur only 
where conventional fuel efficiency has the potential to increase and results in 
additional inter-system savings.
This confirms that the political capacity to act is limited. The policy maker should set 
a relatively small cap if carbon savings are the main intention of the political 
framework and this decision cannot be adjusted as the cap can only be set once 
before the period has started. The EU-ETS directives do not allow adjustments 
during the on-going period. The EU-ETS and the NAP goals will be met by the 
economy. Thus, a REFIT does not bring any additional carbon savings additional to 
the EU-ETS. But then, why should such a policy be adopted?
Fischer and Preonas (2010) analyse the two-way influence of ETS and FIT. Lower 
permit prices can lead to a crowding out of a favourable technology and 
technology-specific FITs can help diminish disadvantages from, for example, higher 
costs of green energy production and push RES into the market. The cap for the next 
period can thus have more ambitious targets.
De Jonghe et al. (2009) focus on welfare maximisation through an ETS, but criticise the 
fact that, depending on the energy mix, especially in countries with a high share of 
nuclear power plants, the marginal production costs of energy are very low and prevent 
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the spread of RES, and fuel switching will not occur. Thus a FIT for RES is highly 
recommended in order to encourage a significant share of RES in the market.
The demand for carbon permits is analogous to the discussed merit-order effect on 
energy prices, but with a contrary result. High prices for permits lead to savings 
where burning fuel causes high costs, e.g. where the degree of efficiency is low. A 
higher expansion of RES increases the amount of allowances available and can 
counteract this desired effect.
Literature on RES promotion often quantifies only the pure costs of RES support 
systems, but not the possible substitution effects in the energy mix, or social costs of 
air pollution. If pollution is free of costs, it prevents carbon savings as explained in the 
scenarios above. The allowance prices have a huge influence on the 
make-it-or-buy-it-decision for emission reductions and thus lead to fuel switching to 
sources with the lowest fuel costs, e.g. for permit prices equal to zero, substitution of 
natural gas with coal. The contribution of different papers by authors such as Bickel, 
Kelm and Edler (2009), Wenzel and Nitsch (2008)  or Sensfuß and Ragwitz (2007) is 
important when quantifying the spending on support systems for green energies and 
estimating fuel switches and emission quantities. The resulting effects on spot prices 
of electricity and carbon permits are indicators of targeting the future emission cap. 
Low spending on RES support regimes and low costs of permits show an 
over-allocation of permits and open up the option to cut the set cap more rigorously.
Ecologically this may result in either additional or reduced CO2 savings with changes 
in demand for emission permits. Delarue and D'haeseleer (2008) and Delarue, 
Voospools and D'haeseleer (2008) explain how short run fuel switches influence 
carbon emissions under the EU-ETS. If emissions have a price, less competitive but 
ecologically advantageous sources will become cheaper. The monitoring of Phase I 
of EU-ETS shows fuel switching from coal to gas that has already led to emission 
savings not previously realised. It is important to take into account the effects when 
support regimes for green energies have an impact on allowance prices and the 
demanded quantities of permits in the market.
Mennel and Sturm (2009) stress the inundation of the market by permits caused by 
the additional green energies and the negative associated impacts; it is somewhat 
harder to obtain higher fuel efficiency if emissions have a price equal to zero, or at 
low levels, as shown above. Wissen and Nicolosi (2008) point out the unclear effects 
in terms of the implications of the EEG and the German REFIT, which are already 
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included in a defined quantity in the NAP. Without green energy capacities, the import 
of cheaper nuclear power would have had an influence on electricity prices. The 
authors do not negate the merit-order effect and mention the importance of 
increasing prices and the price elasticity of energy demand in the long run.
Besides the issue of permit prices and the usage of permits by the emitters, the 
named effects on both electricity (merit-order)  and permit prices (shock related price 
increase) have an impact and should lead to lower costs for energy consumption in 
perfect markets.
However, the German example shows a more complex situation, the exact market 
conditions are unclear. Due to a (decreasing) tendency to market dominating or 
influencing players and the low elasticity of electricity, prices are relatively sticky. 
Calculated permit prices are set pre-periodically, before billing the consumer:
Maubach (2013) describes the German electricity market and its characteristics 
influenced in a large part of future contracts, which price in the today's prices and / or 
future expectations, and not all consumers can profit from cost efficient spot market 
prices. Following this specific finding, it can be argued here that energy utilities cash 
the profits by themselves, while the permit prices as one part of the end consumer 
prices remain on high levels, equivalent to a scenario as shown before in point B of 
Figure 7.
Empirical evidence of the German antitrust authority shows a potential dominance of 
the four biggest power suppliers and the tendency towards too high prices for private 
households, which account for approximately 25% of all electricity consumption, 
while industrial clients are able to profit from decreasing prices (Bundeskartellamt 
2011, 2014). The authority describes further a sharp increase in market dominance 
and a weakened price increase for private consumers. This points towards a 
tendency for markets to develop into fully competitive markets, also if studies of 
energy markets of Bukold (2015a, 2015b)  analyse the gas and oil price decrease. 
Energy supplier in neither case pass this decrease on through their prices, or not 
more than partly.
To what extent market power is and especially was misused to drive prices remains 
unclear. Sijm, Neuhoff, and Chen (2006)  calculate that price adjustments of the 
power sector with opportunity costs pass-through rates are between 60-100% for the 
Netherlands and Germany. End consumers pay the calculated permit prices through 
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their bills, even if the (initial)  allocation was free of charge. Müsgens (2005) observes 
energy prices above competitive benchmarks, and "exercise of market power has 
increased over time" (p. 92). In contrast, Lang (2007) finds less evidence for market 
power, but even if natural conditions can explain most prices, for some years market 
power of dominant players is obvious. Further, Hirschhausen, Weigt and Zachmann 
(2007)  describe asymmetrical cost calculations for permit prices in spot markets and 
as a part of electricity prices. Ellersdorfer et al. (2009) recapitulate other studies and 
assert, that evidence about market power is not clear, but prices tend to be hard to 
find due to many uncertainties. End consumer prices can thus be affected by high 
prices, while on the other hand scenarios with prices below marginal costs are not 
implausible.
To summarise and conclude here, one can state that 1) the EU-ETS is the measure 
for the compliance with government regulations on carbon savings at the lowest cost 
point and thus welfare maximisation is given for the on-going period, whereas 2) a 
REFIT pushes technological innovation and broaden the possibilities to cut emissions 
in the future periods of the EU-ETS faster and more cheaply regarding the single 
emitter's source.
For the market model, the consequences are that, in the case of perfect markets, the 
change in the demanded quantity of allowances itself and the abatement quantity 
and its price affect the certificate price. The avoided emissions and the absolute 
emissions for the specific period will affect the price. The price will still be influenced 
by the set cap which determines the necessary abatement quantity, but the 
influences through RES can affect the further demand for emissions and the need for 
savings.
Support regimes for RES technologies lead to emission savings, which are 
exogenously made if they exceed the NAP. Conventional capacities can be shut 
down, and system participants from other branches can buy cheaper certificates up 
to the allowed system-wide emission quantity that is determined by the cap, which 
was set for NAP expected emissions. The change in the demanded quantity of 
allowances itself affects the certificate price.
As shown, newly installed RES capacities enter the market without any direct impact 
on the system participants. Figure 7 showed that, depending on whether 
conventional production capacity can be substituted, lead to less efficient use of fuels 
or free permits will be sold to other sectors: 
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- in the case of non-substitution and the use of less efficient plants, or selling the 
certificates to other emitters, exogenously made RES installations lead to a 
movement on the profit-maximising emission curve. Ultimately the total emissions 
remain in accordance to the cap.
- in partial or full substitution of fuel burnings through the RES plants, and non-usage 
of the free permits elsewhere, the total emission decreases below the initial cap with 
uncertain consequences for the price.
In the literature review and the theoretical market analysis, it was demonstrated, that 
if both measures, EU-ETS and RES support regimes, are jointly implemented, the 
ETS cap set by the policy maker will always be achieved. Feed-in tariffs are not 
contrary, but have an impact on the effective achievement of the emission saving 
cap. Further reductions through rigorous cuts and a smaller future cap are options for 
future policies.
2.6 How to reach the zero cost emission policy
As shown before, retail prices of electricity remain at high levels even if permit prices 
tend to zero. Energy utilities often act in oligopoly markets and can bill consumer 
prices, including allowance prices of the past, which are, according to the general 
design of the EU-ETS, often higher than they are in the present. Thus, if allowance 
prices decrease, energy utilities may gain a part of the welfare effect arising as their 
own rent. These windfall profits  are an imbalance at the expense of the consumer. In 
absence of the windfall profits, the second option for the utilities is to expand the 
carbon savings for the same costs  as  before. Redundant certificates due to the 
external shock of an expansion of RES installations can be used for the remaining 
conventional energy production with the option of full switching to less clean sources. 
If the utility let the energy mix unchanged, not used certificates can be banked with 
the tendency to influence the market into the direction of high prices. Smaller market 
participants are price taker and will have the highest private profit if selling the 
permits on the market.
From a welfare-maximising perspective, it is legitimate to cut the recent windfall profits 
of (especially) the energy suppliers. The question is how to achieve lower consumer 
prices, or, in particular if the pricing and single player dominance are not explained 
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adequately, how to force a larger amount of carbon saving, e.g. a smaller emission 
cap. If single players can dominate the ETS market, it is difficult to place pressure on 
the energy utilities to decrease (consumer) prices. Is it thus legal to withdraw free, 
unused certificates from the market or at least to reallocate them to other market 
participants? Windfall profit problem-solving instruments  consist of special taxes or a 
levy on such profits with the aim of lowering or reallocating windfall profits from 
private suppliers to the community.
For the system participants, the maximum emission quantity is  given exogenously, 
but as the policy maker orchestrates  a further shortage of permits  through policy 
regimes and thus forces additional savings, the cap itself becomes 
quasi-endogenous (see Tietenberg and Johnstone, 2004). Its economic efficiency is 
influenced by the emission target and the implementation of technologies within the 
ETS, and because of the influence of new RES installations triggered by the REFIT. 
Chosen policies  can undermine the achievement of the emission target, and market 
participants may influence the cap. The technological and economic possibilities to 
save emissions  are determined by endogenous changes through the application of 
environmental changes as well as climate saving polices. Thus the question arises, 
what the legal options to withdraw allowances from inside the system are and 
whether the system conditions change, as they do for example through a REFIT.
Full auctioning is  one option. Especially for Germany, Schleich, Betz and Rogge 
(2007) attesting the advantage of full auctioning to avoid windfall profits, but also 
support the simplification of the NAPs to lead to more transparency:
The advantages for the community are that the emitter must buy all necessary 
allowances in periodical auctions or in inter-periodical trades within the market when 
participants have free permits for sale. As trades can only occur with the government 
as  the initial seller, financial resources will be relocated from the private to the public 
sector and can fund further research and development of RES or subsidies for new 
green power plant capacities. If the price increase of allowances does not exceed the 
value that is still contained in the electricity prices, the costs for the community do not 
rise, while the rent for energy suppliers shrinks. The social costs of climate change 
caused by carbon emissions will be internalised. The allowances price is  thus market 
based and not only a theoretical construct. Additionally emitters have no incentive to 
bank allowances. Further effects are highly positive and will enable policy decisions 
that can yield in additional carbon savings at almost zero cost: If the exogenously 
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produced RES capacity does not count for the whole economy in comparison to the 
business-as-usual environment, emitters face constant conditions. The achievement of 
savings results in the initial MAC and the damage cost curve, where the remaining 
demanded conventional energy amount has decreased. The general public pays the 
REFIT and the producers will not be rewarded by the possibility to charge the positive 
effect of lower carbon prices as their producer rent.
Literature on auctioning generally endorses the practice of withdrawal of a part of the 
initially planned amount to be auctioned, with the exception of some minor 
uncertainties regarding the legal feasibility. If one participator loses his right to pollute 
the air, is this a dispossession of a property or common law?
Posser and Altenschmidt (2005) state that the property law governing allowances 
cannot be clearly defined. If the government cuts  allowances to create a shortage, it 
is  legally questionable and may be contrary to EC treaties on property rights. The 
energy utility always requires a sufficient amount of allowances in order to operate its 
production unit, the power plant.
Martini and Gebauer (2007) share these concerns in terms of the protection for 
reliance on existing laws, where only a grandfathering allocation can address to the 
issue of property rights, because it is  based on the emission experienced in the past. 
Nevertheless, a certain reduction in the amount of allowances can be realised. It is 
not discriminating against individuals if it is a global percentage cut.
Tietenberg (2003) argues that the ETS as "the system is to protect the economic 
value of the resource, not the resource itself" (see p. 403). Therefore, in the American 
emission trading, the right to emit one unit is not a property right, but remains a 
collective good. Thus, a future reduction without compensation is possible.
It is important to refer to the EC treaties (96/92/EC and 2003/54/EC) that limit 
national solo efforts and underlines the importance of European co-ordination when 
planning to cut emissions under the pre-period implemented level. A single member 
state like Germany cannot decide to withdraw certificates if not based on a common 
agreement with the other member states.
Mennel and Sturm (2009) stress  the problem of energy efficiency, if an ETS is  the 
single policy to be applied. The policy maker should undertake policies with a certain 
regulation, where it is relevant to the (ETS-)system: e.g. technology-specific taxes or 
a shortage of CO2 permits. Zenke and Schäfer (2005) concentrate on how to revoke 
redundant certificates from the market if more savings are generated within the 
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sector or exclusively to large proportions of the sector by the subsidised RES. The 
European Community treaties  for property rights  protection therefore underline the 
limitation of such an approach and provide restrictions on a change to the cap once it 
is  set. Magen (2009) criticises the emissions market as a whole, stating that it is  "not 
free" in respect of how it should be for a market good, but this market design opens 
at least the possibility for the policy maker to change the cap ex post, thus when the 
trading period already started.
To summarise the literature, one can argue that non-utilisation of permits due to 
reduced production output, like the substitution of conventional energy through RES, 
should lead to an adjustment of the quantity of allowances. The crowding out of 
conventional energy producing capacities through the new exogenous green capacity 
renders permits  redundant. At least in the next period, a further shortage in the same 
proportion is recommended and intra-periodic adjustment must be avoided, 
especially to guarantee the property rights of permit holders.
Magen (2009) supports this argument stating that the trade of emission rights is not 
and was never completely free, if for burning fuels  in a power plant, (i) a 
governmental authorisation is required and can be refused, and (ii) once in operation, 
permits for air pollution are essential for energy production. Thus, the plant operator 
must own enough permits to demonstrate compliance with the legal restraints 
coupled to the authorisation. The government on the other hand, should ensure that 
it maintains enough permits so that all authorised operators can burn fuels for power 
production as legalised through the governmental authorisation.
The EU-ETS, legally implemented in the German Decree for Emissions Trading 
(TEHG), is a core environmental regulation like operation authorisations, thus the 
legislative is legally obligated to protect the collective goods of clean air and the 
environment. As an implication, through German basic constitutional law, it is 
obligated to utilise every legal option to cut emissions and thus intensify the 
protection of the environment.
At least in the long run, the demand for electricity is elastic, thus a higher price has  to 
be preferred from an ecological point of view. The EU itself, as established in the 
constitution, should strengthen efforts to establish free markets and competition for 
different types  of energies. Currently, REFITs help less competitive energies with high 
emissions  savings to become cheaper than they really are and help to obtain EU-wide 
free energy markets  from different sources (Gunst, 2005). Thus, the EU-ETS alone 
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does not yet have the power to protect the climate. It may however transform into a 
powerful instrument through the setting of a cap that creates a shortage of permits. 
Enlarged REFIT investments can help to allow a further emissions cut.
The national levels, due to the EU-ETS design options, are provided with a certain 
possibility that is not yet exploited in terms of decreasing the quantity of permits. 
Kruger and Pizer (2004) emphasise the three levels of the ETS: first is  the 
European burden-sharing agreement, followed by the national level and then the 
emitter level. The last two levels are designed by EU members, and the CDM (Clean 
Development Mechanism) and JI (joint implementation) activities in particular are 
instruments to reduce GHG outside the national territory and reduce permit prices. 
The ratio of both instruments  at the level of the whole carbon saving obligations can 
vary and is set by each member state on its own. On the other hand, the instrument 
can, but does  not necessarily have to be used if other policies, like the REFIT for 
RES, put pressure on prices, cf. Criqui and Kitous, A. (2003)17. Thus, the EU 
members already have an instrument to regulate their permit quantity reductions at 
least within a small range.18
The German NAP provides an approach for this purpose. For example, if an energy 
utility shuts down a power plant, it triggers  the mandatory duty to withdraw the 
certificates linked to this specific production capacity. In this case, the new REFIT 
capacities induce the theoretical shutdown of a percentage of conventional capacities 
and there should be no reason to not withdraw the certificates as the withdrawal is 
obligated after a full shutdown.
Determining the right economy-wide quantity of pollution can have a purely rational 
basis  that corresponds to economic factors. Such justification is possible but not 
advisable, because other (ethical) factors  must be considered. The legal options that 
may propose a reduction policy should be clear and have to be realised within the final 
set. The ETS is the measure to control carbon emissions through quantification, while 
the exact amount of the cap on the allowed emissions is a question of scientific and 
political nature, see Rahmeyer (2008).
As shown in this section, a shortage of allowances created through policy measures 
will raise the permit prices up to the ex ante anticipated price, which is part of the 
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17  The authors simulated diverse scenarios with and without CDM and calculate a cost-shrinking 
effect, but neither take into account transaction costs, nor use empirical data to prove the predictions.
18  If proposing the non-usage of CDM and JI, one has to mention technical consequences. The 
political intentions of the two instruments will not be evaluated.
consumer bill, without incurring any extra costs for the consumer. For the industry, 
the cost of abatement will be equal to the expected scenario before the exogenous 
shock. The policy maker can force additional carbon savings through a further 
shortage in the quantity of certificates.
2.7 Conclusions
The design of the EU-ETS makes it a strong instrument to control emissions and 
reduce them to a cap set by the policy maker. Without an over allocation of 
allowances to market participants, the cap will be attained. The joint implementation 
of support regimes for RES, such as the REFIT for example, does not change the 
system's outcome, but can put some pressure or reduce the stress on the linked 
variables.
The costs of a standards  approach ETS system were described in the equations from 
(4) to (8) as a cost-minimising Lagrange function where participants seek to reduce 
their individual costs  due to their individual MAC. The costs of abatement and the 
permit price per unit become equal at the optimum.
Depending on the single emitter cost curve in the optimum, for sellers  the costs  were 
equivalent to avoiding costs and the saved emission quantity, namely the redundant 
allowance certificates could be sold to the market, or for buyers  the individual costs 
result in buying permits at the market price. Both buyer and seller, calculated with the 
same price for emission allowances, choose their individual level of abatement. Thus, 
most research is focused on the economic efficiency of cost minimisation in order to 
achieve the cap.
If the cap is considered as exogenously given and system participants are forced to 
attain the objective, the approach makes sense. Optimisation of the system does not 
change the amount of carbon savings. If the adjustment of the system conditions can 
reduce the costs without negative impacts on the environment, the saved financial 
resources can be spent elsewhere and the total economic burden of the instrument 
can be limited.
In the context of the ETS debate, the fact is often missed that the trading scheme 
does not increase the share of RES produced energy in total production when it is 
the only policy measure applied. Support regimes can increase investment in RES 
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power plants. If newly installed capacities of green energies and their output are 
growing faster than total energy consumption and faster than expected (meaning 
covered in NAP) when setting the cap, it can lead to displacement in the structure of 
permit holders.
Energy utilities are obligated to feed-in RES-produced energy first. This does not 
lead directly to free emission permits and the total amount of allowances is not 
affected. Nevertheless, a part of the conventional energy production output is 
redundant and a minor percentage reduction of carbon emissions is still necessary. If 
the total cap remains constant, this leads to free certificates. It seems that there is no 
ecological advantage, but there are cost-shrinking effects for emitters.
Through the substitution of conventionally produced energy, market demand 
decreases lead to lower prices of allowances and especially "dirty" technologies or 
other sectors can even (i) raise their absolute emissions or in percentage per unit of 
output, or (ii) the production output can increase while maintaining the initially 
planned emission reduction, i.e. the cap. Economically this effect is  desirable and 
leads to the shown cost-shrinking effect or production increase and therefore results 
in prosperity gains.
The high social costs of air pollution and a possible "role model" of the innovator 
(here: Germany) to other nations are often not taken into account when evaluating or 
enhancing the ETS design. But a faster development of RES provides political 
leeway to cut emissions faster now and in the future.
The emission cap is not at all exogenous, because endogenous factors influence the 
cap for the next period. The joint implementation of ETS and RES support regimes is 
a difficult policy.
The recommendations to the policy maker resulting from the analysis in this chapter 
are as follows:
• The REFIT is part of the EU-ETS parameters, but due to a gap between 
expectations and real production output of green energies, the RES power plant 
production places pressure on the well-balanced system. REFIT-supported RES 
power plants  and/or their carbon saving potential should be separated from the 
EU-ETS and the NAPs.
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• When this occurs, conventional power plant capacities become redundant. This 
is  because the new installed capacities are exogenous. The production 
authorisation for a disused power plant should also be withdrawn in parts if the 
plant is not completely shut down. The withdrawal of the authorisation should be 
linked to the withdrawal of emission allowances.
• Full auctioning can also support the enforcement of a shortage of permits. This 
results in additional emission savings by an intensive use of technological 
innovations that are above the emission reduction scenario that was anticipated 
before the period started. 
• The cap is exogenous for the system participants, but system conditions can 
have a strong influence. Thus, the setting of a cap is determined endogenously 
through, for example, the intensity of the support for RES and the further 
application, implementation and enhancement.
• A side benefit is the cost-shrinking effect of the technology through the higher 
demand for RES and the resulting learning curve. If RES technologies become 
more efficient, a shift of the MAC curve may be the result of technological 
innovations and lower costs. It remains unclear, if the German the industry can 
profit from learning effects in global markets.
• Benefits gained by Germany‘s  position as a role model and its role as the 
innovator are yet to be realised. Questions arise and remain open about 
employment effects and the real estimated economic costs  in consideration of 
social costs and competitive advantages of single players and economies.
The illustrated effects  could have an enhancing effect if simultaneous RES support 
regimes would be accepted not as a cost-intensive instrument separate from the 
EU-ETS, but as one that optimises the future conditions of the emission trading 
schemes of the European Union. The targeted support regimes for selected 
technologies at selected places or regions would lead to cost-minimising use of 
expenditure, higher outputs and lower costs per unit of produced energy. Here, the 
quantification of the potential remains open at this point and requires deeper 
research in the following chapters.
What can be mentioned is the missing pragmatism to calculate the full effects 
through RES capacities. The non-integration of (exogenous made) RES capacities in 
the carbon saving obligations of the (conventional) energy sector would be the first 
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step for the future to bring to fruition unrealised intra-system emission reductions with 
a simple mechanism: at the moment, real market prices are to low to force further 
emission reductions. When separating green energy capacities not covered by the 
initial NAP, emission reductions  would have been done within the initial framework 
before the extended RES installations. That part of energy production that is 
substituted through green energies  and the linked carbon emission allowances 
should be withdrawn, namely the allocation of permits should be decreased. The 
allowed emission quantity decreases, and the cap now has stronger, more stringent 
conditions. The permit price for the single emitter would increase up to the initial level 
that was planned when designing the NAP and the EU-ETS. As a positive effect, the 
absolute reductions increase with the effect of social cost savings and a positive rent 
for the whole economy.
It is an unpopular result for EU-ETS participants, especially for the energy sector, as 
they would lose their economic advantage, while the community and the environment 
would profit highly from additional carbon savings at zero costs in relation to the 
original NAP. Ecologically, it would enable an enormous step forward in European 
climate saving policies.
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3. Promotion of renewable energies: Follow the sun
When using natural resources, water, wind and the sun are volatile inputs. Rivers 
can't be dammed where no rivers  flow, wind blows with higher intensities in certain 
regions and has its  seasons, and the sun shines during the day and due to the day 
length and the intensity of radiation to a greater extent in summer than in winter. 
Planning the sources for the electricity mix of the future, one has to take into account 
geographical and physical conditions to maximise the earnings from RES.
Under the mentioned conditions, as a selected example and thought experiment, 
Germany could have reached obligations set by the Kyoto Protocol earlier if German 
solar investments  had been relocated to where the sun shines almost continuously. If 
going strictly south from the territory of Germany, Sicily as one of the most southern 
points in Europe offers additional benefits of emission savings and energy 
production. Just the sun radiation surplus to the German average should raise the 
sun power plants earnings by up to 85%. Solar energies  do not have the best 
geographical fit when installed in Germany.
However, in 2008, German solar power plants accounted for 20% of the financial 
benefits through support mechanisms such as  the German REFIT "EEG" for 
renewable energies, while the share of green energy produced was no more than 
4.8%. Although from an economic point of view the promotion system for solar 
energies seems inefficient nevertheless it is appreciated to be an innovative and 
powerful instrument and was adopted by many other countries.
This  chapter is a thought experiment and an example to underline the need for clear 
objectives and guidelines in policies  that aim to support green energies. It does not 
aim to be a comparison of diverse European national regulations, but a theoretical 
calculation of what it would be the additional or extra load of solar power plants as 
one selected technology. Solar energies receive one fifth of all RES promotions and 
only accounts for approximately 5% of the renewable energy production. Thus, the 
focus of the thought experiment is on photovoltaic and its efficiency.
Germany promotes solar energies; however the sun is shinning on a higher intensive 
level elsewhere. Thus, the thought experiment should not evaluate support 
mechanisms, but be an argument to support Europe-wide coordinated support 
systems to enhance the green energy harvest through a better fit of the place (the 
geological location) and the technology. Because a single European market for 
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emission permits already exists, energy production from RES would be decentralised 
and thus a significant boost in production capacity could be realised. European 
countries are far from being independent of fossil fuels. If every region were to 
produce RES energy from the best fitting technology, it is  recommend to use the 
electricity at the place of production. While the transportation of electricity is 
characterised by severe losses, the decentralised energy production still seems to be 
favourable. In the case example of solar power plants, the best-suited regions would 
be in Spain, Italy or Greece. These countries  frequently face scarcity of power supply 
and the expansion of solar energy usage could help these countries to guarantee 
supply reliability. It has to be mentioned that also a massive expansion of solar power 
plants e.g. in Sicily is  only a redesign of the electricity mix and will substitute other 
power plants that produce locally, in particular fossil fuels  like coals and gas. The 
production capacity from solar power plants can be absorbed at the place of its 
production without the need to transport the electricity to the mainland or even other 
countries.
To have a reliable calculation, further application of new technologies or innovations, 
modifications of the legal framework or changes in the financial return on RES 
investments will not be taken into account. The 2008 levels, legal regulations and 
data serve as a basis  to make visible (dis)advantages of national support regimes of 
RES in general and selected, positively discriminated technologies. The selected 
year was on the edge between having Germany as a strong innovator in green 
energies application and other countries copying the legal framework in order to 
close the gap.
Firstly, the analysis underlines the importance of renewable energies being financially 
supported and how and why policy makers can justify subsidies  for selected 
technologies because of social costs  of carbon emissions. The second point is  that 
the place, the geographical location of the installation, does in fact matter and 
physics set the limit: the chosen approach for expected final yield shrinks the 
additional benefits of the theoretical relocated south solar investments  to a lower 
value than the accepted +85%. In closing, the conclusion provides political 
recommendations for the design of further subsidies of solar energies in Europe.
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3.1 Introduction
Developed countries like those of the European Union and their matured economies 
in particular must swiftly reduce their CO2 emissions in large proportions. For 
member states  of the EU, especially the old EU-1519,20 members, it is not simply a 
question of meeting the 20% reduction goal in line with the Kyoto Protocol or the 30% 
reduction in line with the Copenhagen agreements, but one of the negative impact on 
further growth if they do not act now. The UK government initiated review by Stern 
(2006) states that the costs of natural extremes and the negative long-term impact on 
growth will be much higher for countries that do not act immediately. CO2 and other 
climate gases cause global warming, the so-called greenhouse effect. "Warming and 
sea level rise would continue for centuries due to the time scales associated with 
climate processes and feedbacks, even if GHG concentrations  were to be stabilised" 
(IPPC, 2007, p. 48).
An important milestone in European action for climate protection has been passed by 
the European Council: the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets and subsequent decrees for an 
obligatory reduction of 20% of CO2 emissions and a 20% share of renewable 
energies used in total energy production by the year 2020. Thus the question is  not if, 
but how the aims of the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets can be reached and what political 
measures are necessary, see EU Commission (2008).
Due to the neutrality of the location of the emissions, the problem in question is how 
to reduce CO2 emission best. RES are one piece of the puzzle, photovoltaics are 
another. Highly effective solar cells  use the almost unlimited potential of solar 
radiance to produce clean energy without any CO2 emissions, but this approach is 
cost-intensive. Until today, it has not been possible to produce a kilowatt-hour of solar 
electricity at the same price as the cheapest conventional energies. The challenge is 
to decrease the costs of consumption of one unit of green energy on the one hand, 
and to increase the earnings of the investor on the other hand through cheaper 
installation costs of new power plants. Further implementation of Europe wide CO2 
certificate markets would allow improved regulation and thus make it easier to 
intensify the application of certain technologies in areas in which they are most 
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19  Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the UK.
20  Old EU members have stricter reduction goals, new EU members are often facing a partly 
de-in-dustrialising, thus their economies have other conditions, see chapter 4 for a further analysis.
effective. The varied geographical conditions of different countries result in different 
needs in terms of energy production and these must be taken into account.
Each member state must reach the European goal and Germany in particular must 
commit to restructuring the energy mix with the intention of increasing the share of 
renewable energies through subsidies; this approach must aim not only to produce 
energy, but also reduce CO2 emissions, see Klobasa and Ragwitz (2005).
The thought experiment of this chapter estimates the amount of solar power that 
could theoretically be produced if German private investments  resulting from 
governmental action between 2000 and 2007 were diverted to Italy. The two 
countries were chosen due to very similar conditions in the legal framework, but very 
different radiation intensities. Italy copied the German EEG, but some years after the 
solar promotion regime started in Germany. If going directly south, crossing the Alps, 
Germans come to Italy and should bring with them their solar power plants. What 
hinders them from investing south, or conversely, if they did so, what could they earn 
in addition? The following calculation considers the capacity of photovoltaics that 
could already be installed today and thus what the theoretical additional harvest of 
electricity and surplus of CO2 savings  and the additional return on investment could 
have been in the German-Italian collaboration.
In section 3.2 the theoretical framework of social costs due to environmental damage 
from carbon emissions is discussed, with a focus on price solutions  such as emission 
taxes. This discourse will help to legitimate and to justify a REFIT and to evaluate the 
right balance of the amount paid. Only if the system itself can be identified as 
ecologically and/or economically worthwhile, can one go ahead and talk about 
adjustments and future designs of promotion regimes. Further, the subsidy system 
for solar power plants in Germany and Italy, in its function as a kind of environmental 
Pigou tax, caused by a national clearance system, shall be explained briefly as an 
example of how promotions of RES work and what the conditions are for new power 
plants. The comparison of the two selected countries does not encompass the case 
for all European Union members. The aim is  not to compare and to evaluate diverse 
promotion systems, as this would require need a much broader and deeper analysis. 
The selected countries serve to answer the theoretical question, if a thought 
experiment like that done in the following, is realistic or requires further policy 
adjustments. Furthermore, the comparison of only two countries and one technology 
will show a fundamental effect on the energy harvest, here, the efficiency of electricity 
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production. If this one example, which is rather small in its outcome, is able to show 
an increase in electricity production, the coordination of RES promotion all over 
Europe should result in even higher benefits: If the result of the thought experiment is 
positive for solar energy, other technologies and support regimes should face similar 
challenges. Germany promoted solar energy and high investments were done in 
photovoltaics. Other countries with higher solar radiation act less ambitious. To give 
an example, France is still continuing nuclear power as the preferred technology, 
even though it has the Atlantic coast and other areas with a high potential for wind 
power. There are even more conceivable scenarios as  the selected in this chapter. 
The theoretical question of interest is not to figure the total potential of RES 
supported investments, but to illustrate that there is  a potential and, regarding the 
example, to what extent. The results will finally bring up further questions and 
recommendations.
The mechanisms of RES promotion are also important in order to understand how 
policy makers can justify the high costs associated with promoting solar energy as a 
privileged technology. The particular intentions of German support regimes for 
renewable energies are to gain research and development support through market 
demand. The political objectives are identified as a) to trigger changes in social 
behaviour (Bartle and Vass, 2007), and b) the optimisation of subsidies (Staiß, 
Schmidt and Musiol, 2007). Both will be discussed in the following.
Secondly, the question of what would occur if Germany had invested in 
extra-territorial solar plants will be considered. On one of the biggest and 
southernmost European islands, Sicily, solar irradiation should promise a surplus in 
solar harvest of up to 85% in comparison to the German harvest. Why not take 
advantage of higher irradiation and a higher expected electricity production of solar 
cells? In 2008 the installed capacity in the whole of Italy was only 2% of that in 
Germany. Are there any natural or technological obstacles hindering the realisation of 
Italy’s solar energy potential? To calculate the physically limited solar harvest, 
modifications of the conventional method for the expected annual yield in Italy will be 
presented in section 3.3.
Thirdly, the results in section 3.4 summarise the cost and benefit surpluses of the 
theoretical German solar investments in Sicily and 3.5 makes political 
recommendations for the design of further solar energy subsidies.
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3.2 Linking the social costs of carbon emission to RES support regimes
This chapter is  linked to the environmental economic question of the internalisation and 
minimisation of both the social costs  of CO2 emissions  and the higher production costs 
of generating electricity from renewable energies: what is the best practice to reduce 
CO2 exhaust by growing renewable energy investments? Policy makers seek to design 
support systems that internalise the costs within national markets. The social costs of 
CO2 emissions are broadly discussed.
Pigou (1912, 1932) first described the inequality of the private use of air pollution and 
the social costs: "It is true, and this matter is of growing importance, of resources 
devoted to the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys: for this smoke in large 
towns inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community in respect of health, of injury to 
buildings and vegetables, of expenses of washing clothes and cleaning rooms, of 
expenses for the provision of extra artificial light, and in many other ways.” (Pigou, 
1912, p. 159) He indicated this circumstance and its economic-ecological 
consequences as an externality that is  not correctly priced into the market. Pigou 
proposed a tax equal to the ecological damages caused by emissions. He mentioned 
the pollution generator and the victim, where the state is  forced to undertake corrective 
actions under these circumstances. Market participants will not be able to shirk 
payment the governmental tax and mitigation will occur where it is most efficient.
The concern over direct emissions as the cause of pollution and damages to the 
environment is  further discussed within the scope of social costs of emissions (Crocker, 
1966), negative impacts  on prospective growth (Bovenberg and Smulders 1995) and 
external costs of electricity production and CO2 in modern economies (Krewitt and 
Schlomann, 2006). It is important to question even the best political actions  and the 
impact of CO2 certificates on the channelling and reduction of emissions  as a choice of 
prices (taxes) for emission or quantities (=certificates) (Weitzman, 1974), where 
environmental taxes should be the price of the damages (Segerson, 1988). 
There are different ways in which renewable energies can be supported. One example 
is  the feed-in tariff for renewable energies (REFITs), which is  often adopted in 
combination with a clearance system. This approach leads to private decentralised 
investments in renewable energies. The general design of a REFIT system guarantees 
investors a fixed price for every kilowatt-hour produced and access to the national grid: 
local grid providers must then absorb the energy. A national clearance system allocates 
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the system costs to all consumers of electricity: any REFIT with a clearance is in itself 
an instrument that internalises  the higher costs  of renewable energies. That means the 
environmental costs of power production due to emissions are shifted to the 
consumers. But, as described by Segerson (1988), due to the surcharge for all 
consumers, it is similar to an energy tax in terms of the uncertainty of environmental 
damages. All consumers pay the investment incentives, which can be identified as a 
kind of Pigou tax: for the consumers, the results are costs in proportion to the absolute 
waste from their consumption, namely the pollution by the energy production. The 
consumer paid Pigou tax is  equal to the income of the investors. They choose the most 
profitable technique and their benefit is the REFIT. This  is  equal to the sum of tax 
payments.
Feed-in tariffs are adopted in a broad range of countries; within the European Union in 
15 of the 2721 member states, as well as  in Switzerland. All REFITs  have in common 
the support of technology without direct subsidies  to producers of technical equipment 
and systems. Large solar farms can profit from REFITs, but often small-sized private 
power plants are the beneficiaries of a higher tariff. According to the analysis for the EU 
by Jäger-Waldau (2008), REFITs are highly effective in terms of market stimulation if a 
positive return on investment is reached in a period of 10 to 12 years and if the private 
investors have direct access to local grid connectivity. The author notices  that his 
previously described efficiency conditions  for market stimulations are fulfilled well by 
the design of the German REFIT. It appears to be clear, through the legal conditions, 
that in 2007 80% of the European photovoltaic capacity was installed in Germany.
Produced solar energy is climate-neutral; the production of 1 kWh does not create any 
greenhouse gas  emissions once the plant is in operation. The German Federal 
Government announced an extension of renewable energies of up to 59% in order to 
reach the aim of emission savings of 20% as officially announced by Nitsch (2008) on 
behalf of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety (BMU). Hence, the photovoltaics' contribution to environmental 
protection targets is more important than the production of energy itself. Without 
renewable energies, the total German CO2 emissions would be 15% higher, but as 
stated by Böhme and Dürschmidt (2008), the share of gross electricity production in 
2007 was only approximately 6.7%. For the further analysis, these two shares 
demonstrate on the one hand the contribution of RES to the CO2 reduction obligations. 
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21 2008 data; the EU consisted of 27 member states.
Through the RES carbon savings, other sectors have less pressure to save emissions 
and meeting the NAP target will become cheaper. On the other hand, again, the 
absolute emissions will not decrease below the cap, and the RES emission savings 
only represent a permit redistribution with a shift to other sectors.
It is difficult to price the social costs of carbon emissions. The initial place of pollution 
can be local, but the aftermath or impact can be global. The time perspective makes 
this task even more difficult. As described by Pigou (1932), the damages through air 
pollution cannot be immediately measured, but the long-term impacts affected by the 
uncertainties  of long periods and the preferences of today’s consumption make a long 
run measure difficult. The problem thus arises  of how the so called Pigou tax (Pigou, 
1912) for environmental waste can internalise the social costs of carbon damages. The 
optimum is  reached when the tax, social costs of carbon emissions, and marginal 
abatement costs are equal. Because of the higher absorption potential of a cleaner 
environment, it is easier and cheaper to pollute instead of abate emissions. Vice versa, 
in case of higher pollution, it is simple and inexpensive to avoaid and therefore save 
one single unit of emissions. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) add the specifics of 
pollution abatement knowledge as a public good and not that new innovations raise the 
use of pollution abatement technology and "private agents do not internalise the 
adverse effect of pollution an the aggregate stock of natural capital". Polluters will not 
decrease the pollution of their plants unless  the use of the environment (the air) has a 
price. If one prices the pollution, the owners  of the plants have two options: one is 
doing business as  usual and paying tax for the emitted pollution quantity, as long as  it 
is  not economically worthwhile to reduce emissions. The other option is  reducing the 
pollution by updating their manufacturing processes and their technology right from the 
start to prevent emissions and thus tax payments. Between the two scenarios, every 
single emitter will have a point, at which pollution will cost more than avoiding 
emissions, which will encourage innovation towards a cleaner production process.
One can calculate the social costs per ton CO2 as the aftermath of climate change. The 
problem is however to examine exactly what "costs" are: only direct costs, which tend 
to be very low or also long term costs in terms of global warming and the 
consequences for animals, nature and humans? Man-made warming pushes nature to 
extremes, reduces the biodiversity and changes  the natural conditions for living. It is 
thus a question of socially accepted costs, bearing in mind that there are also some 
positive effects  of climate change such as lower mortality of people through cold 
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winters or longer crop periods in Northern Europe. In the end, few deny the negative 
impacts  of emissions, but the (current) price of carbon emissions has to be decided. If, 
as  suggested by Krewitt and Schlomann (2006)22, the costs are €70 per ton of CO2 
emissions, the previously explained substitution of conventional electricity leads to 
avoided social costs of 5.5 cents  per kWh of produced solar electricity. In another 
dimension, the price for conventional energy from coal must increase by 8 cents per 
kWh.
If the costs of CO2 are known then the next question to answer is, what is the 
information worth. If REFITs per kWh are equal to the social costs  of carbon emissions 
caused by the production of a energy unit, the optimum is  reached in accordance with 
the ideas of Pigou.
The problem of determining CO2 savings in kilowatt per hour is the uncertainty about 
which kind of energy is used for production, but also which conventional plants are 
going to be substituted. It is  important to take into account that, during the production 
process, also for green energies, burning fuel cause gas exhaust and carbon emission. 
For example, the typical Spenke production process23 of pure silicon, raw material for a 
high share of solar cells, creates  high energy outputs that degrade the balance of solar 
energy. New procedures decrease energy consumption for the production and at the 
same time the degree of efficiency of the produced solar cell is increasing. Krewitt and 
Schlomann (2006) expect a significant decrease in CO2 emissions and that the 
calculated CO2 emissions per solar kilowatt-hour are expected to halve from 99g 
(2000) to 54g (2030). Considering the above explanation it appears clear that it is not 
acceptable to determine saved CO2 equivalents with expectations for future power 
production. There are too many uncertainties with regard to the innovation of newly 
installed (conventional) power plants and unjustified assumptions in the scenarios. It is 
difficult to reliably calculate the absolute value of GHG savings by photovoltaics. 
Nevertheless it seems to make sense to take emissions caused by production and 
erection of solar power plants into account and divide these emissions by the expected 
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22  €70 are the middle bound of the estimated consequences of one ton of CO2 emission on climate 
change, where the lower bound is approximately €15 and the upper bound is €280.
23  Spenke process: the so-called production technique by Siemens is the industrial standard, 
introduced by Spenke (1956) in the Siemens laboratories: trichlorsilane and hydrogen molecules are 
triggered in a heat reactor, the result is poly-crystalline silicon. Trichlorsilane is itself a higher order 
intermediate good, for its production of silica sand and coke fuse to produce raw silicon at 2000 °C, 
the next processing is conditioning with hydrogen chloride.
solar harvest for an assumed life span of 20 years, which is also the paying-period for 
many national REFITs.24
The German REFIT serves here as the example for a deeper analysis of the 
state-of-the-art promotion of renewable energies. Early German dominance in the 
installed capacity of solar power plants  appears to be linked to its role as an early 
innovator as other countries did not have a similar promotion system as early as 
Germany. In the year 2000, German's legislature passed a law to combine various prior 
laws and decrees to stimulate RES investments and to reorganise the grid access and 
the feed-in.
The "Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz" (EEG)25 for renewable energies covers amounts 
of feed-in tariffs, duration of subsidies payments, free access to and priority in national 
grids, and the positive discrimination of certain technologies. Only plants located in 
Germany can apply for subsidies. In this  context, positively discriminated by §§23-33 
EEG are e.g. photovoltaics and other less efficient, but highly desired, often new and 
expected to be advantageous in the future, technologies.26
It is important to consider that subsidies paid to green energy producers are 
non-government27  payments. The paid REFIT subsidies are incorporated into the 
earnings of the power plant owners, the producers of eligible energy receive 
guaranteed compensations from the local grid carrier, while the additional costs above 
market price are a surcharge on the bills paid by all consumers.28  A nation-wide 
clearance charges the proportionate costs  internally on every kilowatt per hour sold, 
whether produced renewably or conventionally. The entire financing of both renewable 
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24 The expected lifetime however should be much higher. The German REFIT is already recompensed 
for an average of 20.5 years, in the year of erection plus 20 years; see EEG, 2008, §18, Par. 2. 
Through this extension the calculated CO2 emissions per kilowatt-hour should be reduced by an 
additional  amount of 2.5%. Renken and Häberlin, (1999) report on early test plants in Switzerland that 
have been in operation for 30 years without showing a significant degradation of annual solar harvest.
25 While the feed in the grid is covered by §16 EEG, the legal  foundation for the general grid access is 
regulated in the former decree StromNZV; for biogases and renewable fuel classifications see also 
BiomassV.
26 The highest tariff is for the privileged solar energy technology, see also BSW (2008): the electricity 
produced by solar power plants has a share of about 4.6% of all  renewable energies, while the share 
of REFIT compensation (according to EEG §§ 6-11) is around 20%.
27 See the judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, C-379/98, 2001, I-2099, 
PreussenElektra: because the obligation to feed-in renewable energies is not granted directly by the 
state and "does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) of the Treaty."
28 Exceptions are made for industries with a high quantified consumption of electricity.
energy plant erection29  and feed-in tariffs  comes from the private sector and 
consumers. Subsidies  mean a reallocation within the market that is a steering effect of 
the EEG. The electricity price increase is thus a kind of environmental tax and should 
further aim to reduce energy consumption.
The EEG is not only a support of a current technology, but also promotes employment 
and R&D in this  sector. The knowledge allows companies to enter global markets as 
innovators. The German photovoltaic industry in 2007 for example consisted of 43,000 
employees, a turnover of about € 5.7b (BSW, 2008) and an international market share 
of around 30% (Dürrschmidt and Van Mark 2006); all of which in turn led to an increase 
in R&D and acceleration of the learning curve. Nevertheless, it must be stated that 
during this time the prices did not decrease in proportion to the innovative progressions 
undertaken at the same time (Forst et al., 2006).30  An issue, which becomes highly 
important when the REFIT will be set.
With the Italian Conto Energia II31, Italy can be named as an adopter of the EEG where 
numerous  national and regional laws were replaced with the intention of supporting 
renewable energies. Some local laws in addition to those at the national level are still 
legal with respect to the national decree32, but policy makers learned from the failure of 
the former decree. Local political regimes can no longer avoid solar power plants, but 
still provide minor influence.33
When considering the details there are further differences to the German law, for 
example the payment for newly installed plants is adjusted annually in accordance with 
the directive DM 19/02/2007, Art. 6-9, and the legislators focused at a very early stage 
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29 The federal owned KfW bank announced different promotions for private investments in renewable 
energies, as e.g. interest-reduced credits for grid connected solar power plants with an output of up to 
50 kW e.g. the so called "100.000-roof-programme" (2000-2003). Since 2004 the programme has 
continued with similar promotions. The KfW is organised as a private sector bank.
30 Caused by high market demand firms sold with increasing margins. In addition, shortages in silicon 
production led to increasing panel prices between 2004 and 2006, while converter prices were 
shrinking.
31 DM 19/02/2007, following a former law, the "Conto Energia I", DM 28/07/05 and 06/02/06.
32  E.g. for simplification, the simple building notice is at local administration instead of an official 
building permit. Even the protection of historical architecture expired in certain cases and if the erected 
power plant is for example roof integrated, regional decrees are allowed for regional architectural 
compliance or limitation to certain areas.
33 The limit of a supported capacity of 100 MW was reached in the first month after declaration of the 
national law, according Pasquini  and Vacca (2006). Thus in 2009 the national authority GSE noticed 
and this led to an increase in new investments instead of boosting it up.
on the hierarchical feed-in tariff with positive discrimination for certain technologies, 
such as totally or partially integrated roof solar power plants. This led to a significantly 
higher demand in Italy for the less profitable technology of roof-integrated plants, for 
example, for which there is no (relevant) market in Germany. In Italy, after the 
amendment to the Conto Energia II, 26% of the newly installed capacity in 2008 was 
architecturally integrated, mostly roof-integrated, as discussed by Montanino (2008).
The grid carrier has the obligation to feed-in electricity produced by power plants below 
1 MW capacity. As discussed above, other regulations like the former decree of green 
certificates apply, which forces the grid carrier to absorb a mandatory quota of 
renewably produced electricity but also means a limit in terms of absorption obligations. 
The Italian REFIT is more flexible: the green energy certificate quota applies also to 
extra-territorial areas. If the German EEG were adjusted in the same way, the 
calculation done in the next chapter would no longer be hypothetical. The fundamental 
elements have been laid to open Italy as  the German granary for the solar harvest, but 
some legal issues remain unsolved and the structure must be modified:
1. The Conto Energia II specifies high commission for produced electricity, but is limited 
through DM 19/02/2007, §13, Par.1, to a maximum capacity of about 1200 MW, which 
is  only a little more than the sum of newly installed solar power plants in just one year 
in Germany. Thus Italy does not take advantage of its full sun potential and limits 
itself.34
2. The state-of-the-art design of many national REFITs actually led to a higher share of 
small private investments. The Italian market shares already changed dramatically in 
the first year after the declaration of the Conto Energia II; the average size of newly 
installed plants shrank while their sum grew as measured by GSE in 2009. For 
maximum efficiency, solar parks appear to be the better solution.
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34  Spain, with similar radiation conditions did not implement such a limitation before 2009 and can 
count newly installed capacities of almost 2000 MW in the year 2007, as measured by state authority 
CNE 2008.
3.3 The solar harvest and its limitations through physical conditions
The calculation of the solar harvest, the final yield YF, would be completed here, if the 
general calculation would take into consideration only the performance of the plant 
capacity and the irradiation. The load capacity is  the conversation factor of the 
irradiation input [W] to the output [W] per time unit [h]. For the final yield, multiply the 
global radiation Eeg in Watt by the plant load factor K to get the final yield YF in 
kilowatt-hours:
  (1) YF [kWh] = Eeg[W]·K
The left side of the equation is the calculated yield, expressed in generated 
kilowatt-hours. The production results from the right side of the equation, in the 
intensity of use of one capacity load unit K. In the basic calculation, the simple 
multiplication of irradiation per load factor capacity K results in the annual harvest. 
Further modifications are required to take into account other factors of influence like 
temperature or technical or geographical conditions. The deviations of all these factors 
from perfect conditions lead to percentage correction factors  of the capacity and a 
decrease of expected solar harvest.
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Figure 8: Index for expected final yield, traditional approach, Hannover = 100 
       Source: own calculation according PV-GIS.
(1) YF  = Eeg·K
For such a simple calculation we must of course obtain standard test conditions 
(STC)35. In addition, there are some parameters  with unclear effects. What impact on 
the solar harvest do, for example, topography, air pollution or general losses have?
The first calculation resulting from (1) indicates  that the increase in efficiency of the 
solar harvest should be about 72% when installed in Palermo, relative to a plant in 
Hannover, as shown in Figure 8.
The chosen approach in the following modifies the conventional calculation method 
due to geological and meteorological conditions but also refers to the technology used. 
Factors, preconditions and parameters  will be discussed and evaluated for the analysis 
to ensure that the gap between the real harvest and expectation are marginal: the 
physics are the limitation for the economics and thus limit the return on investment. 
Hence, the most common state-of-the art technology will be considered. The reader 
can gain more in-depth technical information in appendix I, which allows further own 
modifications  within on-going technological development for individual calculations  of 
the resulting final yield for specific locations.
Temperature losses: The performance of silicon-based solar panels is  dependent on its 
inner heating. The warmer the cells, the weaker the absorption potential in accordance 
with the surrounding temperature and the power of solar radiation. For comparisons, 
the cell temperature coefficient is measured in relation to the STC. Through this 
generalisation any aberration above 25°Celsius leads to a negative and any below this 
mark to a positive performance effect. The question thus arises whether solar panels 
are as effective in the warmer south as  in the colder north. Temperature losses appear 
to be the factor that influences the differences in macro comparisons  of regional yields 
most.
The temperature in the cell is linked to the environmental conditions, but can also be 
regulated in a certain spread by the cell design. To approximate the annual 
temperature loss for a specific location, the measured surrounding temperature TS has 
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35 Generally we cannot have these special conditions outside any laboratory: STC force an inner cell 
temperature of exactly 25° C, a radiance of 1000 W/m2 and an air mass of about 1.5. The STC serve 
to compare different module types from different producers. For different geographical locations one 
has to take into account the specific environmental  conditions that can differ in fundamental 
dimensions.
to be corrected. A surplus of ∆°Kelvin36=7 would be sufficient for further calculations 
due to the often missing data on day length temperatures.37
The kind of installation is  also important, especially the cooling on the back side of the 
panels: the correction factor due to installation is TI, with ∆°Kelvin=10 for on-roof plants 
and ∆°Kelvin=2038 for roof-integrated plants.
The radiance intensity in watt is  the most important factor when calculating regional 
differences for expected yields and is also responsible for heating the panels. The cell 
temperature39 follows the radiation curve over the day and year and thus leads to a 
heat surplus of ∆°Kelvin=0.03·W.
The producers  of solar panels are intensifying research for a better design of 
temperature management in the cell40 that results in a smaller temperature correction 
factor. Locations  exposed to warmth and sun will benefit in particular, the advantage for 
Sicily for example continues to increase.
The calculation is thus modified by the temperature correction factor KT as follows:
  (2) YF[kWh] = Eeg[W]·K·KT   ; 
          where KT = 1 - 0.005 (7 + TS + TI + Eeg ·0.03)
Converter losses: Solar power plants need a converter. Silicon-made solar cells 
operate as  semiconductors and absorb photons, which are light quantums. These 
particles are the smallest energetically loaded elements of light. Through the 
absorption of photons in the solar cell it is possible to harness the solar energy. The 
flow of the photons is  the direct current of electricity and will be converted into an 
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36  Kelvin is equivalent to Celsius according to the scale, but does not depend on the dew point of 
water as zero level, thus it is more reliable and is used unit-less in the mathematical application.
37  One has to pay attention to the seasonal path of the sun and diverse lengths of days. Solar 
electricity will be produced over the day, foremost in spring, summer and early autumn. Discrepancies 
in the day lengths caused by north-south positioning will not be taken into account, but micro climates, 
influenced by e.g. vegetation or buildings can dramatically differ as shown by Renken and Häberlin 
(1999).
38 STC are most equal  to installations in the plain or with triangle brackets on flat roofs, while on-roof 
panels have a higher inner temperature.
39 There is no generalised correlation for the cell heating. The laboratory experiments and field studies 
by the named authors, but also Bett et al  (2008) refer to heating per ∆W/m2=100 between ∆°Kelvin=4 
and ∆°Kelvin=5,3. Not all types of cells are affected in equal measure.
40 Heating will decrease through extension of surface, better air flow or new materials.
alternate current at the converter side. The converter-charged electricity can be fed into 
the national grid.
The converter causes losses in operation because of permanent power fluctuations. 
Other reasons for converter losses  are heat, inadequate capacity or frequent voltage 
fluctuation. In the following an analysis will account for a loss  of 3%, which is  the lower 
bound for the average loss of state-of-the-art converters.41
The calculation is thus modified by the converter losses correction factor KC as follows:
  (3) YF[kWh] = Eeg[W]·K·KT·KC   ;
          where Kc = 1 - 0.03 
General losses: There are other factors that have either a positive or negative influence 
on the solar harvest such as aerosols and topography. Please refer to the technical 
appendix for further details. To summarise all these effects, in the following a general 
correction factor of 0.04 will be introduced to the calculation. Thus conditions that are 
highly determined by local conditions but equally distributed for all power plants in 
general are included.
The calculation is thus modified by the general losses factor KL as follows:
  (4) YF[kWh] = Eeg[W]·K·KT·KC·KL   ;
          where KL = 1 - 0.04 
Radiation angle: Solar cells can produce electricity through photon absorption only if 
the light energy penetrates them. The light itself is a component of two kinds of 
radiance: direct normal radiation42, light which comes directly from the sun, and diffuse 
radiation, which is broadly dispersed through reflections and mirroring. Both types of 
radiance when used in conjunction are the so-called global solar radiation and the 
measuring unit for calculation of the expected yield. In the near future, photovoltaics 
must be compared with concentrated solar heat, a technique that uses direct normal 
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41 As an exception, that modern converters often beat, the absolute factor influence will increase. See 
Market survey and regular tests by e.g. Photon, 12/2008, 66-72.
42 For maximum use of the direct normal radiation, solar panels have to be installed at a 90° angle to 
the sun light radiance. The angle of installation grows less the further south the position is, on the 
equator the angle is 0° to the ground.
radiation.43 This technique has  an impact on the direct comparison of the global solar 
radiation and is  using the two decoded components named above. In the following the 
separation of radiance into two types and the detailed explanation of radiances types is 
neglected, because the intention of the thought experiment is to analyse the efficiency 
of photovoltaics in different areas and not conduct an evaluation of techniques.
The structure of power plants is too different to adopt an additional correction factor 
and investors will seek to erect cells at the best angle. Minor losses due to an incorrect 
installation angle appear to be marginal and will be included in the general correction 
factor explained previously.
Module efficiency: The module efficiency is important where space is  a limiting factor. 
The following analysis will be calculated using average module efficiency.44 Plants that 
were newly erected in 2008 were constructed with the same shares of mono- and 
poly-crystalline cells. This technology mix promises an overall module efficiency, the 
input-output-ratio of radiation to energy production, of about 15%. However due to a 
rising share of the technologically less efficient, but less expensive, thin film modules45 
the average efficiency decreased to about 12.75%.46 For the installation on a plain area 
this signifies the need for approximately 8 m2 to install a nominal capacity of 1 kW.
The calculation can be modified for the expected yield per square metre, YF/m2, which 
is  important for individual investment calculations where the ground has a price that 
must be taken into account:
  (5) YF/m2[kWh] = Eeg[W]·K·KT·KC·KL·KG    ;
      where KG = 1 - 0.875
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43  In southern Europe the direct irradiation is on a very high level that allows the operation of 
concentrated solar heat plants. Solar radiance is bundled to a very high concentration to heat a carrier 
like oil. The accumulated heat can be converted into electricity. The advantage is a certain possibility 
to save heat for later use in the carrier. Energy production costs are low.
44 The module efficiency is not the same as the cell  efficiency that has higher rates but is not relevant 
in practice. For realised power plants it is very important to know the needed plain because installation 
does not imply the installation of only cells, but modules.
45 Forst et. al (2006) mentioned a 93% market share for mono- and poly-crystalline panels.
46  This is a market typical  condition for solar power plants. The basis are markets that offer 
poly-crystalline cells, e.g. BP 3170, Umweltfreundliche Haustechnik GmbH, Göttingen, Germany 2008.
Prices: Given the question, what is the expected return on investment, one has to 
estimate the price. Due to the use of the 2008 database, the total costs are fixed for 
that year. For the erection of a solar power plant with a capacity of 1 kW, approximately 
€4400 of capital were required for an on-roof installation, while an amount of about 
€4200 was required for the installation of a plant on top of a plain roof or the ground.47
The calculation formula (1) for the final yield has been modified by additional factor, 
with the results  of the corrected formulas (4) for the plant‘s  capacity, respectively one 
square meter of used ground for installation (5):
  (4)       YF[kWh] = Eeg[W]·K·KT[°K]·KC·KL
 or (5) YF/m2[kWh] = Eeg[W]·K·KT[°K]·KC·KL·KG
      where the price is fixed, P = PkW = P2008
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47 The global  financial  crisis led to a price dampening effect: it is unknown if this impact is only for the 
short term or for the long-term also. Further, before analysts noticed an annual price decrease 
between 6-8%, see e.g. WEST LB Research (2009). The market is changed to a buyers’ market, 
according to Zindler and McCrone (2008).
Figure 9: Index of expected final yield, modified approach, Hannover = 100.
     Source: own calculation according PV-GIS.
(1)YF  = Eeg·K (4)YF  corrected
Taking into account the modified calculation formula for the mentioned cities with 
their individual annual average of irradiation, the advantage of a position in the south 
remains, but decreases dramatically, see Figure 9. Palermo as the southernmost city 
still has the highest solar harvest, but the surplus  shrinks to only about 37% in 
comparison to 72% when using the traditional approach. Some factors are equally 
influencing the yield and are not affected by regional conditions. Those, all technical 
based, are important too, if using the calculation to compare different technologies. 
Here, the basis technology does not change. On the contrary, two factors vary 
significantly. It is the irradiation, as was mentioned when comparing locations using 
the simple approach (1) with STC. Taking into account physical conditions of the 
surrounding, temperatures have a huge, if not the highest, influence on the solar 
harvest and reduce the theoretical potential of southern regions  in the generation of 
solar energies. Nevertheless, these areas are still favourable and cut costs and raise 
the energy harvest, which will be discussed further in 3.4.
To summarise here: The simple thought experiment underlines as an example what 
already could have been reached if RES promotions had been organised on a 
Europe-wide level.
3.4 Results and implications of the calculations
The application of the Italian Conto Energia II in comparison to the German EEG 
raises the following question as a thought experiment: what would have been the 
additional benefits for Italy, if using the same parameters for the RES promotion 
regimes as in the German EEG? What are the additional CO2 savings, energy 
surplus and return on investment for the accumulated investments equal to those 
made in Germany between 2000 and 2007?
The factors and their influence on solar harvest have been introduced and discussed 
above. In the following these factors will be drawn together and statistical data from 
Germany will be used to merge the different years  into one table and show the sum 
of solar energy investments that occurred after the declaration of the EEG. The 
figures will be a little higher than the calculation presented in this chapter: this  can be 
interpreted as a sign of conservatism in calculations.
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Exactly the same amount of investments as Germany's total will be converted for 
Italy. The calculation follows the determination of Staiß, Schmidt and Musiol (2007) 
that 1 kWh of solar energy accounts  for a saving of about 787g CO2 equivalent.48 
The CO2 savings are calculated in accordance with the cross section analysis of 
Klobasa and Ragwitz (2005) that assumes solar electricity substitutes for 50% 
natural gas  and 50% mineral coal plants.49 Solar power is not a very secure resource 
as it is  produced following the cycle of the sun, but conversely, a key advantage is 
that this cycle more or less reflects  the typical power consumption curve: peak 
periods during the day time and summer (air conditioning in offices) are often 
covered by the high performance of solar power plants at the same time. Due to a 
continuous lack of accumulators, electricity is  not storable and has to be consumed in 
the moment of production; as a result solar energy cannot yet substitute conventional 
base load plants in general, but during peaks it can substitute gas and coal peak-load 
power plants.
Firstly, for the purpose of the analysis, only areas with an average annual radiance of 
at least 1750 kWh are recommended for on-roof plant installation that can be found 
particularly in Sicily, but also to a lesser extent on the mainland of Italy (especially 
Apulia, but also Calabria and Campania) and in the south of Sardinia. No technology 
processes that occurred after 2008 will be taken into account, the status quo will be 
fixed for cost prices and the degree of efficiency.
Secondly and importantly for a deeper analysis, arrays will be included: tracking 
systems that adjust panel orientation over the day and annually track of the sun. 
Such arrays have a strong positive influence on the final yield. Nevertheless such 
systems are neither cheap nor dedicated nor financially feasible. However, the 
advantage is obvious. The solar panel is always orientated to the sun and the direct 
normal radiation can thus be optimally used ensuring the potential to reach the 
maximum yield at any time. The benefits  are especially present when the direct 
normal radiation is high.
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48  CO2 equivalents are a theoretical  measuring unit, which not only take into account direct CO2 
emissions, but also other emissions that are released into the atmosphere and boost the greenhouse 
effect: CH4, Methane, and N20, nitrous oxide. They are converted for better comparison according to 
scientific standards to show their effect as if they were CO2. This method is globally accepted and 
adjusted, to have equality of national emissions analysis.
49 The CO2 savings are not calculated explicitly, some observed studies also contain initial  operation 
losses of substituted plants.
Thirdly, the calculation will be completed for the areas exposed to the sun, where 
additionally the Italian power supplier ENEL could invest in solar farms instead of 
erecting new nuclear power plants, according to an economic plan after the year 
2000. The plan was budgeted as a 24 billion EUR investment. A national referendum 
put a final stop to the nuclear power plant plan in 2011. Is solar energy an alternative 
investment? What would be the production cost for one kilowatt-hour in the 2008 
thought experiment? The issue of grid parity, the circumstance of equal prices for 
conventional and RES electricity, or one specific energy source, has to be in the 
focus of the analysis: Would or will the grid parity be reached now or in the near 
future, if the solar power plants are shifted south?
1) Table 4 shows all German investments for the erection of new solar power plants 
between the first declaration of the EEG in 2000 and 2007. These values will be 
compared with the theoretical harvest of Italy if investments would reach an equal 
level.
Values are estimated from an analysis conducted for the German Federal Ministry of 
Environment. For a better valuation of investments  made, amounts are adjusted by 
the annual inflation rate and thus  show the real presence equivalent for 2008. The 
total German solar energy harvest of the year 2007 was approximately 3458 GWh, 
produced by the installed power plant capacity of 3753 MW between Rhine and 
Oder. This accounts for CO2 savings of around 2,400,000 tonnes in comparison to 
conventionally produced energy, according to the approach shown above.
	 	 	 new installed	 	 total electricity	 	 Real turnover from construc-
	 	 	 capacity (MW)	 	 production (GWh) 	 	 tion of solar power pants      
2000        42        22        343 Mio. €
2001        78        74        507 Mio. €
2002        80      146        575 Mio. €
2003      150      271        709 Mio. €
2004      610      515      2430 Mio. €
2005      863    1240      3183 Mio. €
2006      830    2178      3888 Mio. €
2007    1100    3458      4782 Mio. €
Total    3753        16417 Mio. €
Table 4: Global annual irradiation and solar harvest; source: own calculation according 
to data of BMU, 2001-2008 and ECB, 2009.
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General technical conditions are the same for each location and thus can be 
eliminated from the calculation with relative, but not absolute comparisons: losses by 
the 
converter, soldering joints, cables etc. and the degree of efficiency.50
The only correction factor that is  always very important is the temperature, which as 
explained before, minimises the degree of efficiency. The positions of the locations 
have been taken typically for the chosen regions.51 Roof-integrated power plants will 
not be included because they do not account for a high market share.52
2) If German EEG supports  were converted to Sicily, the expected production cost 
per kilowatt-hour would be about 19 cents:




kind of power plant 







final yield expected per 
squaremeter (5)
final yield expected 
per-capacity factor (4)
generation costs/kWh
W 1100 1750 1750
% 4% 4% 4%
°C 8.0 15.0 15.0
1 = on ground 
and 2-axis, 10 = 
on roof
10 10 1
°C 41.3 72.6 63.6
% 16.50% 29.75% 25.25%
% 12.75% 12,75% 12.75%
% 2.00% 2,00% 2.00%
kWh 110.2 147.5 208.7
kWh 864.1 1,156.6 1,636.8
25.46 ct 19.02 ct 16.49 ct
Table 5: Expected yield, own calculation according the technical conditions of 
chapter 3 in (4) and (5); see apendix 1 for detailed technical assumption.
82
50  Newly developed solar panel generations are more efficient, but production costs are higher and 
thus the realisable capacity can be smaller with newer technologies where investment is steady. 
Technological progresses will influence the yield per installed capacity of 1 kW or reduce the required 
ground area. The learning curve favours later investments and influences the profitability positively, but 
is not taken into account in the calculation due to many uncertainties.
51 Single location positions can differ, but not only positively: higher temperatures or less radiance are 
examples of negative aberrations.
52  For individual investment calculations however, the higher heating of on-roof installations with a 
surplus of 10 degrees in comparison to on ground installations has to be taken into account. That 
seems to make sense if the recommendation for or against support of on-roof plants or solar parks is 
intended.
Table 5 shows three example to calculate the expected yield per year in Hannover 
and Palermo, as well as in Palermo using tracking systems. Multiply the expected 
yield for the expected lifetime of 20 years and divide the installation costs through the 
total harvest, the generation costs is about 25,5 ct in Hannover, and in Palermo about 
19 ct with on roof installation and 16,5 ct using tracking systems.
The additional solar harvest would provide an energy amount of 860 GWh and a 
surplus in CO2 emission savings of 665,000 tonnes and thus for the investors, the 
additional return would be approximately €370 million per year. Because the lower 
costs are significant reasons for the installation of huge on-ground solar farms or 
even the use of tracking systems, the harvest could be enlarged if it was the intention 
of the (local) policy maker. The investment sum thus leads to a higher installable 
capacity and lower costs for every produced unit of solar energy.
Similar results are gained when using 2-axis tracking systems. The use of these 
systems could cut the electricity production price down to 16.5 ct for one generated 
unit of electricity due to continual re-adjustment of the panels in relation to their 
ideal to the sun. For an unchanged investment sum, the installable capacity would 
slightly decrease. The higher costs53  of a tracking system decrease the installable 
capacity and its load factor. However the harvest would increase by 20% for a 
comparable investment sum. Hence tracking systems become a very economical 
alternative.
3) The public discussions  in policy and the Italian society were very controversial for 
and against the nuclear power investments planed by ENEL. Finally, the plan was 
rejected. The enormous planned investment sum of about €24 b could be, as an 
alternative, invested in solar parks with tracking systems. As a result, the expected 
production costs over a 20-years life span for one kilowatt-hour would be around 12.2 
cents.54  This is  highly compatible for the Italian power market and for the end 
consumer in particular. Prices in 2008 were already far higher, future price increases 
not considered.
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53 The calculated costs for 1 kW for on-roof are 4400 EUR, for tracking systems 5400 EUR.
54 The investments of ENEL in nuclear power plants have never produced any electricity and thus the 
production costs, as the opportunity costs that are announced by 4.3 cents per kWh, have to be taken 
into account.
3.5 Conclusions and recommendations of the thought experiment
As described by Nitsch (2008), the German EEG was  designed to stimulate the 
market and force cost reductions through market growth. The conclusion of chapter 3 
underlines the success of the REFIT. Moreover, the new installations and the market 
demand for RES pushed R&D in solar power plants, and an increasing learning 
curve is expected. But further, it is  proved that investments  in other European regions 
would be more lucrative and efficient. Italy can produce a higher solar harvest in the 
regions of the islands of Sicily and Sardinia and on the southern mainland (Apulia, 
Calabria, Campania) when having the same installed capacity of phovoltaics power 
plants. Even without the REFIT, grid parity can be reached in the south of Europe. A 
scenario with a system of decentralised solar power plants as established in 
Germany by the EEG would lead to an increase in total efficiency of about 25%. If the 
investment sum of 2008 would be divided into the expected solar power harvest of 
one kilowatt-hour, it could be produced for 19.02 cents, while the average market 
price for end consumer in 2006 was approximately 21.08 cents with an upward 
tendency, as accounted by Goerten and Clement (2006).
The results are a realistic scenario. For a single European market, countries or even 
regions have to compete. Technologies will be more efficient in one place than in 
another. The transportation of electricity is expensive and power losses may be 
another negative aspect and are a strong argument to use produced electricity at its 
place of production. Within the near future, the redesign of the electricity mix 
substitutes in particular fossil fuels like gas and coals. The amount of produces solar 
energy for example is  far away from being a reliable source for energy exports 
extra-territorial. PV can help to reduce the use of other peak-load plants. European 
open markets should allow the crediting of RES linked carbon savings in national 
accounts if the plant itself is located elsewhere in the EU. The cost-shrinking effect 
for the end consumer has been demonstrated above.
Through better heat management, losses can be reduced in the near future and thus 
particularly benefits  locations  with high surrounding temperatures and intensive 
radiance. The advantages of Italy's location will continue to grow.
It is  difficult to complete a monetary valuation of the EEG programme. Surveys 
conducted by Frondel, Ritter and Schmidt. (2008a and 2008b) estimate subsidies of 
108,000 to 205,000 EUR for each employee in the German solar sector. The analysis 
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considers the REFIT transfer payments  paid for the past and those estimated for the 
future. The amount is then divided by the number of employees. The chosen 
approach calculates a life cycle balance, but remains with a fiscal result without 
taking into account external social costs of CO2 emissions and thus the survey differs 
from the approach of this section.
It is important not only to act as the innovator of techniques, but also for policies. 
Wiekert (2008) expects a stagnant German market and thus the domestic companies 
are forced to enter foreign markets. The EEG itself is a successfully exported and 
accepted model for many countries across Europe and the world. The German EEG 
is generally adopted with only small adjustments made to meet local needs.
While the European Commission (1996) declared within Directive 96/92/EC that 
Europe-wide energy markets  would be open as the goal for 2007, discrimination by 
national supporting systems for renewable energies remained legal to avoid a 
concentration of investors at the most profitable REFIT. Thus, following the results of 
the calculations completed here, the efficient implementation of solar power plants for 
example, was not achieved.
Under the condition of an European wide single market with clearing mechanisms, 
Germany could have accounted for an additional reduction of about 1.2 million 
tonnes of CO2 per year, if German investments had been accumulated over the years 
and invested 2008 in solar parks with tracking systems located in the Sicilian area.
This  correlates with two thirds  of the 2005 emissions from the production branch 
ground transportation and transport in pipelines or further is even 0.1 million tonnes 
more than from shipping55. It also implies a potential avoidance of social costs 
accrued through CO2 emissions of approximately €84 million. Measured by the total 
energy-induced CO2 emissions of Germany in 2006 at about 819 million tonnes56 per 
year, the additional contribution of total GHG savings would be approximately 0.15%. 
In relation to the obligations  as stipulated by the UN Kyoto Protocol57, this would 
account for a saving of around 0.5% of total CO2 equivalent saving obligations, whilst 
the additional amount of power supply of 1519 GWh accounts for only 0.25% of 
85
55 Destatis (German Federal Statistical Office), Document 85111-0001, 2008.
56 Energy caused CO2 equivalents, as analysed by Böhme and Dürrschmidt (2008).
57 The obligations in CO2 savings according the Kyoto Protocol for Germany account for 257 million 
tonnes of carbon equivalent emissions by 2012 in relation to the base year of 1990.
gross annual electricity production.58  The United Nations protocol provides the 
framework that allows such projects as  proposed in the calculation. Kyoto Protocol 
Annex-A countries, such as Germany and Italy can stipulate "Joint Implementation" 
and count additional CO2 savings  extra-territorially, but not within other Annex-A 
countries, as done intra-territorially as compliance of the contractual terms.
The objectives of the policy makers respecting the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets and the 
subsequent treaty goals  would be more rapidly reached if Europe acted as a single 
player. Member states in the south should now, in particular, accept photovoltaics as 
one component of their future energy mix and one piece of the puzzle to reach their 
climate protection goals. A path-goal-strategy must implement a REFIT similar to the 
German model for market stimulation, and intra-EU concentration of technologies at 
the place of highest efficiency is recommended. The effects have been shown in the 
analysis and the figures in this  chapter. This approach would reduce CO2 emissions 
faster and thus the European Union could apply more pressure on other states 
worldwide to intensify their contribution and efforts in preventing global warming.
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58 2006, datasource: Böhme and Dürrschmidt (2008).
4. Energy Efficiency - The influence of climate change policies
Energy efficiency is more than just energy saving: it depends not only on current 
energy use in relation to economic production in goods and services. Energy 
efficiency is only growing in real terms if energy use is decreasing while 
simultaneously, affluence and population remain constant, are growing or at least 
shrink less. In a nutshell: energy efficiency increases only if there are other driving 
factors of influence besides production and population.
The following analysis shows that energy use is  not only dependent on economic 
growth, but that policy measures can influence energy consumption and its  efficiency, 
too. However, there is  only a limited ability to increase energy efficiency with policy 
measures.
The European Union tries to use the limited scope of action to pursue ambitious 
climate protection policies and requires member states through the 20-20-20 by 2020 
targets  to raise energy efficiency also in order to reduce greenhouse gas  emissions. 
The EU commission is  understanding a raise of energy efficiency is  equivalent to the 
achieving of 20% savings in energy use (European commission, 2008 and 2011). 
The decrease of primary energy use is one of the headline targets of the European 
climate change policy strategy.
The reduction of primary energy accounts for the third component of the 20-20-20 by 
2020 targets. In contrast to the increase in the share of RES or the reduction of 
carbon emissions, the decrease of energy use is less specified. First mentioned only 
as a side effect of the achievement of the emission reductions and the increase in 
RES capacities  (see e.g. European Commission, 2008), it has increasingly become 
an independent objective. In 2014, the European Commission answered a request by 
the European Council to explain the necessity for the reduction of primary energy 
use: The EU-member states have to propose concrete actions to increase energy 
efficiency and therefore reduce their primary energy use by 20%. One intention 
besides a lower energy intensity is  also a decoupling of growth and energy use. The 
Commission emphasises further that the EU-ETS in particular makes an important 
contribution to higher energy efficiency.
The two goals are closely related: The burden sharing agreement is  the basis  of the 
EU-ETS, and the individual countries' goals are supposed to have an influence on 
energy use, too. It was agreed that the common EU Kyoto obligation overall GHG 
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reduction output is  redistributed among its  member states in the Burden-Sharing 
Agreement (BSA): The BSA reduction targets  for the individual members differ and 
lead thus to heterogenous obligations. Diverse countries have diverse obligations 
and while some have to decrease their emissions some countries  can remain their 
level of emissions or are even allowed to expand them. Hence it is possible that both 
effects (absolute emissions, BSA participation) point into contrary directions. From a 
panel data analysis, it can be inferred that the obligations of the BSA exercise 
pressure on EU member states for prompt action to enhance energy efficiency and 
reduce the linked energy consumption.
4.1 Energy efficiency policies - an introduction
Besides the implementation of green power plants to increase the share of 
renewable energy sources in total energy production, and the reduction of CO2 
emissions, energy efficiency is  the third component of the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets 
in the European Energy Concept (European Commission, 2008). The chapter 4.1 will 
answer the political component of energy efficiency policies, while the detailed 
explanation of the (technological) terms follows in chapter 4.2.
The twin goals of reduction of energy usage through absolute savings  and better 
utilisation of available energy through technical innovation are both closely bound to 
the increase in energy efficiency. Consequently, this is  an important contributor to 
emission reductions and will also bring other advantages: "Energy saving is without 
doubt the quickest, most effective and most cost-effective manner for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions." (European Commission, 2005). If energy is not being 
used or even produced, it causes neither emissions nor resource wastage. At the first 
glance, this policy seems to go against the fundamentals of the European Union, the 
Treaties of Rome (1957) and the Maastricht Treaties (1992), which postulated 
(economic) growth and continued development as part of the main objectives for the 
European future. Energy savings and growth seem to be in contradiction to each 
other. But within the texts of the treaties, there are other objectives to consider, often 
linked with the legal basis: the prosperity of Europe has to be in accordance with a 
framework of environmental protection for people, animals, ground and air. 
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Therefore, member states, their people and industries, should decrease their energy 
consumption.
Energy use is a good proxy for the progress towards higher energy efficiency, even in 
a period of economic decline it should shrink more than the economy itself. To put it 
simple, the deviation of both rates to each other is  the (technological) increase in 
energy efficiency. This  asymmetric development is possible due to the fact that 
energy efficiency and production growth are not necessarily subject to the same rate 
of innovation. Thus, the growth rate of technical efficiency should be higher than the 
increase in production. The energy input-output ratio decreases, as the energy use in 
the production process  is decreasing while the output for every individual unit of 
energy increases.
Efficiency is a theoretical term, hence its meaning, the effectiveness of measures and 
actions to reach a given target, cannot be measured directly. As one can measure an 
efficiency target through the effective use of (given) input factors, or the effective 
production of a (set) output, energy efficiency is calculated as the ratio of the present 
national economy's  primary energy inputs to its outputs, measured by GDP. The term 
is  thus a good approach to indicate cost and environmentally efficient use of the 
energy resources.
Individual measures do not have to directly improve technological energy efficiency 
but could also reduce underlying energy consumption or improve energy utilisation, 
thus raising the efficiency factor of the energy used. Energy use itself must also be 
reduced: the amount of energy required to produce a certain GDP, for example the 
sum of oil equivalents  needed to produce €1000 of goods and services. This may be 
accomplished through innovation processes for the manufacturing processes, 
technological advances in electricity production and attitude changes. Measures to 
increase energy efficiency are organised in four areas: appliance standards, financial 
incentive programmes, information and voluntary programmes and management of 
governmental energy use (see Gillingham et al., 2006). Nevertheless, consumer 
behaviour and cultural aspects of energy use are a fifth important factor and can be 
influenced by education and financial incentives, which is often not the focus of 
polices (c.f. Geller et al., 2006).
But does the term energy use remain theoretical and unmeasurable and is  energy 
input only correlated to the economic output GDP? Which other factors are driving 
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energy usage? Can policy measures influence the efficient use of energy and if so, to 
what extent?
4.1.1 Long term relations of emissions and growth
Long-term trends show that energy efficiency is consistently increasing (for EU-27, 
EFTA, EU-Candidate-States, OECD). Some economists see in this a connection to 
the economic development and have described this fact in the established literature, 
which is  quoted below: In times of increasing economic growth, energy use 
increases, too, but to a smaller extent. Decreases in energy use are often associated 
with weakened or negative economic growth rates. The efficient use of every single 
unit of energy input is  higher in periods of economic growth. In most cases, this 
relationship has been described by the analysis of emerging or transition economies, 
which lack the economic maturity of Western Europe.
Zhou et al. (2008) analysed nine Asian nations and the US and determined that 
income and development status  dictate how energy consumption and economic 
growth relate to each other: Empirical findings show that previously highly developed 
states occasionally even experience a positive economic effect by reductions of 
energy inputs. Indeed, the authors determined that there must be other variables 
involved and that shocks lead to structural breaks. Dinda and Coondoo (2006) argue 
that, especially for Western Europe, but for other developed countries as well, a 
reduction in emissions and energy use will have a long-term59 negative effect on 
incomes. They argue that, in the long run, that European rates of growth of income 
and emissions are at a stationarity point. Short run shocks to the rate of emission 
growth will lead to a corresponding shock to the growth rate of income in the next 
period, with a resulting "reverse causality for Western Europe" (p. 175) of emission to 
income, while in other countries a "bi-directional causality between income and 
emission" or "an income to emission causality" (p. 177) was observed.
Soytas et al. (2007) offers evidence which contradicts  the above study. They observe 
that reductions in energy use produce a neutral effect on the growth of the US 
economy - "the relevant emission reduction policy variable is  energy consumption", 
"there does not appear to be a causal relation between energy use and income, the 
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59 The time frame of their study is from 1960-1990 and the effect is stronger in Western Europe than in 
Eastern Europe.
US may consider reducing energy consumption as a serious environmental policy 
that does not harm long run growth prospects." (p. 487). 
Similar observations of weak relation between GDP growth and energy use have 
been made in other national studies, with an increasing tendency to decouple energy 
usage from economic growth; for example in Turkey (Halicioglu, 2009), Portugal 
(Tang and Shahbaz, 2011), Spain (Guerra and Sanchob, 2010), or, for the long-term, 
in a 100-year analysis  of Austria, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States 
(Warr et al, 2010). These results emphasise the necessity of energy efficiency 
increases for members of the EU and comparable states, if emission and economic 
growth goals are to be met at the same time. For the following analysis the 
importance is obviously to test for changes in energy use: are they based only on 
changes in production output or on the influence of other factors or are they due to 
specific conditions of national economies?
4.1.2 Influences of policy measures on emissions
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted during the annual UNFCCC meeting in Kyoto in 
1997. The goal of the protocol is  to cover different GHGs, with a particular focus on 
CO2, and reduce global emissions in 2012 by 5,3% below the level of 1990. It was 
decided that the binding implementation would start when at least a) 55 countries 
had ratified the protocol, and b) the signatory countries would have an aggregated 
share of 55% of all global GHG emissions. Thus, the protocol finally became 
mandatory at international level with Russia's binding ratification in 2005. Developed 
countries, listed as Annex-A countries, have to bear the main burden, while emerging 
and developing countries were considered Annex-B countries. Annex-A countries are 
allowed to fulfil a part of their obligations  in Annex-B countries  by transferring 
technologies  and other climate saving measures  in the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI). The expenditures for emission 
savings would be outsourced and made in developing countries which is, to put it 
neutrally, cost effective and integrates less  developed countries in the market for 
GHG. Additionally, their manufacturing capacities will become cleaner at an early 
stage of their economic developing process.
From the literature from 4.1.1, the influence of diverse factors on energy use seems 
to be obvious  and a shift from a strong correlation between energy use, emission and 
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economic growth to a decoupling occurs. Though the descriptive data of the studies 
quoted above exhibit a positive effect on emission savings after the Kyoto Protocol, 
most analyses focus on ratification excluding, however, the individual target 
achievement of the participating country. For example,in the EU, all members  ratified 
the protocol. In an econometric analysis, a participation dummy based on ratification 
does not provide any information. The EU implemented the Burden-Sharing 
Agreement to redistribute its overall Kyoto Protocol obligations  to its members, where 
each country has an individual reduction target.
Most literature that discuss the potential influence of international climate change 
obligations focus on the effect of the Kyoto Protocol ratification or its signatory; 
however, while the focus in this chapter is on the political pressure and its  intensity 
expressed in the level of achievement of a country's obligation.
Hence, an important question is what contributions have been made by factors linked 
to the Kyoto Protocol obligations after 1997? How can one identify policies that aim 
to force emission reductions  (trading schemes, appliance standards) and a 
restructuring of economies through implementation of RES technologies? What 
variables drive energy use and energy efficiency and how do they have to be 
considered in the further empirical analysis? To identify the parameters, a literature 
review helps to find the factors  of influence of the Kyoto Protocol and climate change 
policies.
Johnstone et al. (2009) propose the number of patent application as  a suitable proxy 
for innovation. The observations  in data from 1978 to 2003 show a strong influence 
of public policies on the development of renewable energies, with a boost in the late 
1990s.
Grunewald and Martínez-Zarzoso (2009) observe a significant influence on carbon 
emissions through the effect of the Kyoto Protocol ratification. Further, they try to 
instrument the dummy variable of the Kyoto ratification with the number of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects to measure the effect on pollution 
avoidance. The authors describe their approach to overcome a possible endogeneity 
problem of ratification and absolute emission level.
CDM help less developed countries to update their production capacities with help 
from abroad. Firms from developed countries  transfer technology and help less 
developed countries to pollute less. In theory, the effect on emission savings is  huge 
due to the fact that the previous plants had heavy pollution. Of course, a small share 
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of carbon saving projects and their emission saving potential is quantified. Under 
emission trading schemes, the CDM allows industrialised nations and private 
corporations to limit emissions reductions, to develop climate protection projects  or to 
transfer emission reducing technologies to less developed nations and then receive 
credit for the calculated emissions reductions. Hence, if allowing CDM, the projects 
are already part of the carbon emissions and need not be counted twice. Counting 
the realised CDM projects may help to identify the reduction measures that are to be 
outsourced offshore. In some cases, unfortunately, a possible consequence of 
post-Kyoto policies  might be nations undertaking their own climate protection efforts 
but forbidding corporations to take part in the CDM. Doubtless some of the efforts 
undertaken by corporations  would have been policy measures  which would have 
increased energy efficiency.
Jaffe and Stavins  (1994) describe a problem in which markets cannot reach optimal 
solutions for energy efficiency, as they are hindered by the market failure of the 
missing price for all environmental damages which are a consequence of energy use 
and unusually high discount rates for consumers due to uncertainties in energy price 
developments.60 Social costs  will therefore not be covered by the energy prices and 
thus governmental policy should establish incentives and regulations to raise energy 
efficiency to the highest technically possible level, which would otherwise not be 
accomplished by the market. The identification of these influences upon energy 
efficiency is important in order to guide and ensure the success  of policy measures 
and confirms the need for action; natural innovation processes  and rising energy 
prices alone will not increase energy efficiency.61
The current analysis  shall determine whether the implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol in the BSA and other exogenous factors have a significant influence on the 
decrease in energy use. Is  the pressure of international agreements large enough for 
policy measures to be effective?
The World Energy Council (2008) mentions  the effects of strengthened efforts by 
almost all OECD nations after the Kyoto protocol negotiations to raise energy 
efficiency, but is lacking a descriptive analysis. 
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60  Consumers are concerned only about their own costs, not about any associated social  costs of 
energy production or consumption such as emissions and environmental damage.
61 Electricity is a price elastic  good, however, it is a logical  consequence of physics, that in the short 
run one cannot change to a more efficient technology, but in the medium run production capacities can 
be partly shut down, and in consequences decrease the output.
Mazzanti and Musolesi (2009) compared long periods  before and after the Kyoto 
negotiations and found that especially commitment decides if one country is 
successfully reducing its abatement: countries that had faced exogenous shocks e.g. 
oil crisis, had already rebuilt their economies in or before the 1990s  and thus could 
more easily achieve their energy reduction targets. The authors found differences 
between  countries with regards  to their success with climate change policies. This 
underlines the importance of a deeper analysis, since within a very homogenous 
group of countries such as the EU the Kyoto protocol ratification is an insufficient 
parameter and other, more specific, variables are able to better demonstrate the 
influence of individual carbon-saving obligations and its political pressure it carries.
Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) confirm the effect of decreasing carbon emission 
upon ratification of the Kyoto protocol. The authors analyse the overall carbon 
footprint of countries and determine it as being unchanged with carbon leakage due 
to e.g. outsourcing of production.
Grunewald and Martínes-Zarzoso (2012) use a dummy for Kyoto protocol ratification. 
For those countries, which ratified the protocol, the effect on carbon emission seems 
to be a decrease of 24,5% in comparison to non-ratification.
The cited literature agrees that the Kyoto protocol ratification has an influence on 
environmental impact, but that do so other factors. These factors  seem to have an 
influence on the intensity of energy use or carbon emissions. Uncertain is, as yet, 
how one should go about defining differences within a group of ratified countries. The 
Kyoto protocol ratification may be correlated to the level of development of an 
economy or the dependency on fossil fuel burns. Thus, while the effect of a 
ratification dummy can be measured, it does not distinguish between countries which 
have not achieved their individual obligation targets from those that already have. It is 
as yet unclear as to what extent the individual pressure itself influences the 
environmental impact.
If no causal relationship through energy climate change policies and individual 
climate change targets, e.g. BSA obligations, on energy efficiency can be confirmed 
and other factors such as  growth or innovation potential are found to be explanatory 
variables, this still would not mean the collapse of international climate policy, but if 
other factors have a bigger influence on emission savings and energy efficiency and 
policy measures might be improved further. Thus, future policies might focus more on 
R&D support or subsidies for developing and growing industries, with energy 
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efficiency increasing as a side effect. If the Kyoto Protocol and its obligations have no 
influence on energy inputs  and/or energy use is not changing, this must be seen as a 
warning signal that climate policy has mistaken priorities or that the established goals 
of global agreements are weak or too lax.
To give an answer to the various issues raised here, the rest of the chapter is 
organised as follows: section 4.2 focuses on the concept of energy efficiency and 
seeks to identify other possible factors which influence energy use besides GDP by 
reference to the established literature. If these influences can be identified, it will be 
easier to compare and evaluate different approaches. Factors which decrease the 
energy use and help increase energy efficiency will be identified. Section 4.3 creates 
an empirical model analysing panel data of 25 European countries over a 
thirteen-year period. Based on these considerations, theoretical aspects of the model 
and the results will be discussed. The conclusion in 4.4 closes with the finding that 
growth is not the only factor to influence energy use, but that policies have an 
influence, too.
4.2 Energy efficiency, energy savings and growth - the theoretical aspects
At first, it appears quite simple to define energy efficiency:
energy efficiency is the ratio of primary energy usage to output. 
The definition is insufficient, however, as it only describes the status  quo. The 
input-output ratio is based on the present. Thus, while it can be used to compare 
changes over time, the definition does not define the optimal energy efficiency. To 
justify the analysis and the following recommendations, one has to clarify why one 
should care about energy efficiency. What does it mean to optimise energy efficiency 
and under which circumstances are the maximum conditions reached? Nevertheless, 
in order to specifically determine optimal energy efficiency, it must first be made clear 
what exactly characterises optimal and whether, for example, a technical, social or 
economic optimum is the focus.
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) characterise energy efficiency and its optimum with the 
necessity to close the energy efficiency gap between actual and optimal energy use. 
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They identify five notions of optimality, from the base of a business-as-usual scenario 
(see p. 808), two economic and two social optimising potentials, and finally a 
hypothetical potential:
- the hypothetical potential is  characterised by having eliminated all market failures 
in energy markets and market barriers, even those were the costs  of removal 
extent the benefits. Thus, the hypothetical potential seems to be impossible to 
reach or even not desirable.
The authors recommend going one step back to reach a potential on a lower level 
where economic potential and social potential may overlap or be incompatible, 
depending on the focus of policies.
Economic potentials, which consider only energy markets, are:
- the economists' economic potential, which is reached after eliminating market 
failures in the market for energy efficient technologies,
- or the technologists' economic potential, if furthermore eliminating e.g. discount 
rates due to uncertainty and overcome inertia, which are described as 
non-market failures.
Social optimums, which analyse overall benefits, are:
- the narrow social optimum, which can be reached after eliminating market 
failures, whose elimination cost less  then the created benefit for the general 
public pass a test social benefit
- and the true social optimum brings additional efficiency through environmental 
externalities;
Jaffe and Stavins conclude that many literature sources correspond to what they 
label "technologists' economic potential. That is, they assume that the resolution of 
the energy paradox must be that the simplest calculations are correct and that a host 
of market failures explain observed behavior." (p.809) The right measures of energy 
efficiency are to be assumed.
The reduction of energy use will be the objective of further polices and is one of the 
main objectives of the EU climate change directives. The goal of the current analysis 
in this chapter is to examine whether energy use is dependent not only on GDP, but 
on other factors as well. This requires, at first, a clarification of terms: energy 
efficiency is concerned with the relationship between input and output, and if the 
energy intensity per unit output decreases energy efficiency increases.
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Belzer (2014) describes the limitation of the terms energy intensity and energy 
efficiency and the close relationship of both to energy use: Energy efficiency 
expresses the output in way of products  or activities, which are produced with a given 
quantity of energy input. The efficiency improves in real terms when the output 
increases and the input remains unchanged.
The inverse of that is the energy intensity, which measures the input needed to 
produce a specific amount of output. Using less energy for the same output reduces 
the intensity.
Both concepts place energy inputs and GDP output in relation to each other. Shifts in 
efficiency or intensity may result in inflation, structural or behavioural changes, which 
may be difficult to measure. This  could be a reason as to why the EU has agreed to a 
reduction of primary energy use as the equivalent of an increase in energy intensity. 
Energy use is  also set as the dependent variable for the further analysis. Which 
factors can be identified besides GDP that influence changes in energy use, energy 
efficiency and energy intensity?
There is  not a common consensus  that energy use analysis does refer to only a 
single input (energy use) and a single output (GDP). However, if a multiple factor 
approach is chosen, are there two or more factors  on the input, on the output, or on 
both sides of the input-output equation?
The following literatures are chosen to underline the selection of the variables in the 
further regression analyses, where energy use is taken as the regressand. The 
regressors will be chosen to explain energy use changes and its influencing factors. 
In the following, multiple and single factor models  are discussed. The main results of 
various analyses cause the selection of the used variables in the regression analysis 
of 4.3. An alternative to a simple regression analysis seems to be one of the 
stochastic frontier methods, which take into account a chain analysis to measure 
energy efficiency as a benchmark across countries: 4.2.1 will discuss the linear 
programming (non-parametric) approach of the Data Envelope Analysis as a multiple 
factor model, in the section of single factor models in 4.2.2, the econometric 
(parametric) approach of the stochastic frontier analysis has to be mentioned, before 
spanning the regression model.
97
4.2.1 Multiple factor models
To evaluate and decide on a single or multiple factor output model, one has to 
discuss in brief the common concepts surrounding the issue. The general meaning of 
energy efficiency in the sense of measuring the effectiveness of energy use seems to 
favour the single factor approach. Statistics  often count oil equivalents, for example, 
as the only input, and GDP as the related output factor. One has to confirm the 
practicability of that simple method in practice to compare both methodologies.
If reviewing literature concerning two factor analyses, the Data Envelope Analysis 
(DEA) cannot be ignored as there is  a huge variety of different applied studies. DEA 
is  a popular multiple input-output approach and serves as a general comparison of 
the efficient frontier analysis. This technique transfers the value asset approach that 
is  well known through the financial controlling process of the production sector, to 
other factors, services and goods, which do not directly have a positive value, e.g. 
marketing activities, or even negative value, e.g. waste products in the manufacturing 
process.
DEA was developed to analyse business processes and their diverse input factors 
with the purpose of cost minimisation (see Shuttleworth, 2005). When used in energy 
efficiency studies, DEA allows released CO2 emissions to be included as a negative 
output, in addition to the positive output GDP. For inputs, not only energy usage can 
be considered, but also e.g. goods and labour, allowing for a significant substitution 
effect. Taking nations as units of industrial production enables comparison of their 
heterogeneous input structures. Using a point scale, nations of differing development 
status can be compared, even when the input factors, especially physical labour, 
natural resources and technologies are quite divergent.
At first glance, the DEA seems to have many arguments in favour of it. However, the 
advantages diminish when examining various studies, e.g. the cross-comparative 
study of Zhou, Ang and Poh (2007): the authors  assemble almost 100 studies and 
confirm concerns that the various studies, due to the wide choice of the top five 
factors, can only be compared with difficulty. They conclude that this is caused by 
distortions through the multiple number of input factors. Therefore one should be 
cautious when considering the DEA approach.
Another example, a study by Mandal and Madheswaran (2010), emphasises these 
limitations: the authors include environmental regulations as a factor, thus making 
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their study difficult to compare with others. This is a further demonstration of the wide 
use of DEA methodology. While it should be an advantage, it can complicate 
comparisons with other studies. The studies  mentioned can measure, evaluate and 
describe changes and development of selected variables well - but only on an 
isolated basis, and are hardly comparable to others in the field of environmental 
economics.
The question arises as to whether the DEA is useful in analysing the influence of the 
EU BSA policies on energy efficiency as one of the three main components of the 
20-20-20 by 2020 targets. The reduction of energy use by 20% is a single goal. As a 
consequence, using a DEA approach would not clearly identify the factors of 
influence on a decrease in sole energy use. A single factor model approach seems to 
be too specific for the question of interest of this study and is better suited to defining 
further policy recommendations. The difficulties to compare different DEA 
approaches prevent to use them for an exploratory study, but can help to evaluate 
potential factors of influence on energy use as well.
4.2.2 Single factor models
An empirical model to analyse changes in energy efficiency or rather energy use has 
to be simple and comparable. It has to test, which factors are important for policy 
measures: unless environmental effects, not simple optimisations, are placed in the 
foreground, DEA will produce a distorted depiction of energy efficiency. It thus 
appears reasonable to return to standardised values of energy efficiency. In this 
case, there is a single output to be concerned with, namely GDP. As input basis 
primary energy units  can be used, calculated in their oil equivalents: a decreased 
energy use then becomes synonymous with an increase in energy efficiency. These 
values can then be used reliably in flexible economic analyses. Other factors which 
influence the energy consumption besides  GDP have to be considered if one moves 
away from simple ceteris  paribus conditions and adopts a more flexible approach 
taking into account environmental, economic and social conditions, as well as 
(technological) development and policies.
Similar to these considerations, there are different analyses of energy use and the 
factors that influence it. Filippini and Hunt (2011) are doing a calculation of the 
underlying energy efficiency as a combination of different factors using a stochastic 
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demand frontier approach. The main findings are that energy use is  not only driven 
by improvements in energy efficiency. Following the authors' approach and their 
results, it is thus redundant to calculate complicated long-chain underlying energy 
efficiency, as  the analysis can be reversed. The technological development of energy 
efficiency should be included in the empirical model through another adequate factor.
Choosing the single output model, for a further analysis  it is important to understand 
at which exact locations energy consumption might be lowered and the energy 
effectiveness raised, and moreover, what other factors  influence energy 
consumption. An increase in energy efficiency is not only the result of the saving of 
energy but also the retention of productive output under limited, i.e. fixed or reduced 
input factors, the increasing of output under constant consumption or a mix of both, 
see Gunn (1997). A reduction of energy intensity does not necessarily lead to a loss 
of wealth, as energy is a limited resource and energy not used as a result of 
conservation can be redirected to other consumers, thus leading to new production 
and growing affluence, see Costanza (1980).
Here, though, there is  a danger of a rebound effect, or Jevons' paradox, as described 
by Jevons  (1866) for coal burn in England for new steam machines: more efficient 
fuel burning technologies and a lower energy use for every individual production unit 
did not decrease England's coal usage, but increased the overall consumption. 
Jevons' contribution is the basis for all further approaches, which explain the paradox 
that a more efficient use of resources, e.g. electricity or air pollution, enables others 
to use more energy or pollute more. The energy or permit price decreases, 
respectively prices increase less, at one place or sector and leads to higher energy 
consumption or pollution at another place or sector.
In the context of the analysis done here, increases in global energy efficiency could 
be undone when cost savings due to lower energy use result in extra released 
capital, which is then used for new investments or assets that use energy. The end 
result of this process is actually a higher total energy usage of all assets. Due to the 
fact that energy prices are continuously increasing, for the further analysis, the 
rebound effect will not be taken into account: some emitter might act as  before, not 
changing their processes and fuel burning, but the expansion of fuel burnings is 
causing high costs. The allowances price is  only a little part of energy inputs cost and 
even at a permit price of zero, higher energy use is  causing higher costs. In the end, 
every single emitter will try to decrease its energy use but maybe with less pressure.
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If it is possible to instead use the cost reductions as a result of lower permit price to 
cover the costs  of developing renewable energies this  rebound effect can be averted 
and energy intensity sustainably reduced, see Diesendorf (2007). One can conclude 
that conventional and green energies would become cost equivalent: Therefore 
individual cost minimisation would signify not fuel switching but a more efficient use 
of every single unit of energy input through technological innovation.
The climate protection policies of the EU address the issue with several approaches. 
Following the roadmap of the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets, decrees for a three step 
policy (European Commission, 2008) are suggested, which might raise energy 
efficiency both directly and indirectly. For the single factor model, the following three 
steps of the climate change policies should be mentioned:
Step 1 leads to a reduction of GHG emissions of 20%.62 A part of these savings  will 
be achieved by a Europe-wide emissions-trading scheme (EU-ETS). The EU-ETS is 
responsible for the greatest percentage of the savings, as  those industrial branches 
not affected must only achieve a 10% reduction in comparison to the year 2005. 
Efficiency increases are politically desirable, and are especially expected in the fields 
of electricity production and heavy industry.
Step 2, in which at least 20% of total energy production must be produced by 
renewable energy sources, will be cost-intensive. Decentralised energy production as 
a mix with different sources is  often not cost-competitive with conventional energy 
sources, or is  still not reaching the stage of cost equivalency (see e.g. Blazejczak et 
al., 2010). The higher costs of these renewable energy investments  are passed on to 
consumers by national clearance systems, in order to decrease the competitive 
disadvantages of renewable energies (through feed-in tariffs, etc. - see e.g. Traber 
and Kemfert, 2009).
Step 3 is not yet directly stipulated in the treaty, but will be a consequence of steps 1 
and 2, as energy efficiency is raised by a minimum of 20%, corresponding to a 
decrease in energy consumption by 20%: Using this goal, the first two objectives can 
be reached more quickly, while the energy efficiency targets can be determined, in 
terms of both energy and cost efficiency. Europe-wide compliance with the efficiency 
goals  can then be better monitored, as precise figures can be uniformly tested. As 
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62 A reduction of about 30% will be accepted by the EU for their GHG saving obligations, when there 
will be an international agreement for a further emission cut with other developed countries.
energy efficiency has a strong influence on the other two steps through side effects, 
one should conclude the non-compliance should be sanctioned somehow.
In theory, the trap of the aforementioned rebound effect should be averted by steps 2 
and 3. Early state policies to achieve these goals  in the framework of the EU-ETS, 
which require both energy efficiency and RES investments, were, in reality, quite 
modest. Schleich, Rogge and Betz (2009) found a number of EU-ETS national 
allocation plans not supporting newly planned investments in the energy sector (for 
example, in new plants  that do not require high degrees of energy usage). The 
incentives were increased through the customisation of the allocation rules for 
emissions permits, with the EU requiring that "member states  should commit to use 
at least 20% of their auctioning income for this  purpose" (European Commission, 
2008, p. 6): measures, to increase the more efficient use of energy where market 
incentives will not have a substantial effect.
4.2.3 The environmental Kuznets curve
The question of interest for the current analysis is the effectivity of policy measures 
on energy use as a result of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol obligations. 
This  raises the question of how realistic the set objectives of the European Union 
climate change protection policies are and whether they can realistically be fulfilled. 
Thus, for the EU, as a common economic area, the state of economic evolution must 
be evaluated.
A very important theory about the further development of emissions  is the 
Environmental Kuznets  Curve (EKC). It is  based on the theory of Kuznets (1955) 
about the development of a country, which follows a natural cycle of rapid growth and 
linked growth of inequality. In theory, after a certain level of affluence, named the 
income, inequality will decrease if the country continues to experience economy 
growth. The EKC describes the interrelated trend of growth and damage caused to 
the environment as a concave curve, with an exact turning point where the 
correlation between growth and emissions turns from positive to negative: a higher 
output to the right of the turning point is associated with lower emissions and vice 
versa.
This  theory is  highly controversial and various  analyses consider a squared income 
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dynamic panel approach 
testing simultaneously 
emissions, growth and 
energy
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stochastic frontier analysis 
to test influence of 
underlying energy efficiency 
on energy use
no energy intensity is a good 
proxy for energy efficiency in 
EU-countries
Table 6: Literature review I of analysis used as a basis of the empirical model of chapter 4.
point exists, it can help to identify country groups with homogenous development and 
/ or economic conditions.
Table 6 summarises the most important sources  of the following literature review 
including some of the studies already cited. All the sources provide further input for 
the variables of the applied model in 4.3. It gives a scheme of the panel data analysis 
in the following chapter and the linkages of each of the studies to the general 
Kuznets discussions.
According to de Bruyn et al. (1998), the long-term trend in developed nations, of an 
association between growing emissions and times of economic growth is  not 
clearcut: once GDP is  on a high level and only growing moderately, high-level 
technical innovations compensate for growth in emissions. However, this cannot be 
conclusively measured. The authors describe individual differences in nations 
Kuznets curves, in which in general increasing incomes lead to increasing emissions 
until, at a certain level, emissions again decrease while incomes continue to rise.63
This  emphasises the examination by Soytas et al. (2007) regarding the causes of 
CO2 emissions in the USA, whereby long-term energy consumption has an effect on 
overall emissions, while changes in income have only a short-term effect. The 
authors found a Kuznets  relation for income and energy consumption, but not for 
income and emission. Thus economic growth and emissions are not directly 
correlated and a reduction in emissions does not necessarily cause a lower growth 
rate. They close with the recommendation that sustainable environmental policy 
should focus on measures to lower emissions through reductions in energy intensity. 
Stern (2004) does not discard the EKC theory, but confirms that by adopting 
innovative technologies, poorer countries show the same effects, with only a short 
time lag at a lower income level. Geller et al. (2006) empirically prove a decoupling of 
growth and rising energy usage, as more efficient technologies show meaningful 
substitution effects: end consumers use more electricity, instead of producing the 
power themselves, and power production through the utility sector has a higher 
degree of efficiency.
At first glance, the findings of Ciarreta and Zarraga (2010) appear to contradict these 
results, showing a positive correlation between energy consumption and GDP 
growth. Their dataset described the period 1970 - 2003. While the effect over the 
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63  Kuznets theory is based on the differences between countries, but also concerns the standard 
deviation in homogeneity over a time period analysis in a single country.
long term is indisputable, at least in the short run no effect can be demonstrated. 
Thus the analysis fits the data.
The controversial discussion of the EKC can hardly be summarised, as the literature 
does not clearly decide for or against the Kuznets  curve theory. In every case, all the 
analyses show the interest in and the presence of other factors besides GDP, which 
may influence energy use.
Dasgupta et al. (2002) try an evaluation of the theory without testing it empirically. 
They propose to take into account the technological development, international 
cooperation, and the higher accumulation of capital nowadays, which allows even 
less developed countries  to follow a growth path without extending damages to the 
environment. Thus, the Kuznets curve is expected either not to exist, become flatter, 
or have the turning point shifted left which means that growth is  coupled with a lower 
or negative marginal growth rate of emissions with the consequence that high income 
economies are having a lower increase of GDP in relation to the growth of emissions 
(or energy consumption) than low income economies have.
Another crucial point to address is  the concentration of most applied Kuznets 
analyses on CO₂ and/or other ecological damages. As shown in chapter 2, theses 
damages are difficult to determine and to value. The Kuznets curve may describe 
theoretical turning points of nations' GDP where higher emissions cause a decrease 
in economic development, but the relation itself remains unclear. All citied studies  can 
explain well the factors which influence energy consumption respectively emissions 
apart from their positive or negative assumption regarding the Kuznets hypothesis. 
The factors must to be considered in a further analysis.
The conclusion from the above literature review (see table 6 for an overview) is that 
an applied econometric model should demonstrate the influence of various factors on 
energy use on the one hand, and on the other, that the relation between 
environmental impacts, carbon emissions or energy consumption and GDP is not as 
close as postulated by the environmental Kuznets  hypothesis. In addition to factors 
like affluence or growth, other influences have to be taken into account, for example 
the influences of the obligations of the BSA obligations on energy efficiency (e.g. 
through policy measures, new compliance standards, or regulations) or pressure on 
policy makers through the emission level of the economy.
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4.2.4 Modelling the key factors population, affluence, technology
Energy efficiency begins much earlier than polices do, however. While policies are 
unable to directly regulate the energy consumption and efficiency increases by the 
end consumer, measures can be enacted at many levels to reduce energy intensity, 
including the possibility of raising the energy efficiency over the entire life cycle of a 
product, beginning with the product design.
Despite this, Graedel (1994) suggests that energy consumption of goods is not 
drastically decreasing. Only small improvements  are made during the manufacturing 
process and along the penalty costs  producers are faced with, whereas the life-cycle 
energy use of goods consumed by costumers are much higher. Thus, more efficient 
technology could lead to energy savings, which would be a multiple thereof. But the 
consumer price of the kilowatt-hour must be extraordinarily high for the modified 
goods to be accepted by the market, otherwise consumers are not willing to spend 
money on new products to replace old ones that are still usable. Consumers are not 
very rational. In this Graedel supplements Ross (1989), who finds large possible 
savings in industrial finishing, as well as Gibbons and Blair (1991): by a permanent 
lowering of energy consumption, goods with high initial investment costs  are 
advantageous over the long-term.
Another contribution by Graedel (1996) adds to the discussion the research of the 
"biological ecologists", transferring their concepts of species and nature to apply to 
goods in an economy, too. An analysis ties the system's initial growth to the cost of 
resources while later quality improvements are brought on by optimisations in 
resource management. The type and potential of energy efficiency increases are 
then dependent on the development status of the economic system, whether 
undeveloped ("biological") or completely developed ("industrial"). This view reaffirms 
the theory that technically developed countries can reduce energy intensity especially 
through technological innovation.
As mentioned above, policy makers  can, if necessary, directly affect consumers and 
producers by the possible implementation of regulations and restrictions, or indirectly 
through taxes or energy prices. There are expected interdependencies, as depicted 
in two possible examples: If policy makers  enact regulations forbidding high energy 
consumption, producers will be forced to change their processes, which may cause 
product prices to increase. Consumers cannot avoid paying for the higher initial 
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investment costs, but because of the higher standards, their consumption will decline 
over the long-term, bringing cost advantages.
On the other hand, higher energy costs  can force consumers to demand products 
with lower energy requirements. Consumers demands  are creating market pressure 
on producers to offer only more efficient products. This means that energy efficiency 
can also increase because of market participants. Energy markets, as the primary 
sector for fuel burnings, are not all perfectly competitive: market equilibrium will be 
disturbed by single events  which can also be caused by powerful players who are 
exploiting advantages for themselves, for example through implementation of 
innovative technology, reduction of institutional transaction costs, and subsidies. 
Especially industrial market participants, but private households, too, can thus 
achieve the cost advantages sought and thereby attain increased energy efficiency 
(Diesendorf, 2007).
A very important contribution in the context of additional factors of influence besides 
GDP is made by York et al. (2003). They examine three different analytical methods, 
beginning with IPAT, coming to ImPACT and closing with STIRPAT. The IPAT is based 
on Ehrlich and Holdren's (1971) approach of a multiplicative conjunction of only three 
key factors: (P)=population, (A)=affluence64 and (T)=technology on (I)=the ecological 
impacts, e.g. emissions or energy use:
 (1) Ii = β1 Pi β2 Ai β3 Ti β4 ei 
The ImPACT reconceptualises IPAT with disaggregated factors that take into account 
other influences that have an impact on the key factors. Finally, the STIRPAT is 
developed to easily identify the respective factors as elasticities. They are all in 
logarithmic form, except for the dummy variables, and additional factors are allowed. 
They can easily be added and interpreted. See (2) for the basic model of the 
STIRPAT approach where the authors suggest that T, and all other factors  that are 
not population P or affluence A, should be captured in the residual term ei,t, cf. York 
et al (2003, p. 354):
 (2) log I = β1(log Ai,t) + β2(log Pi,t) + ei,t
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64 Represented by per capita consumption or production, thus the most used proxy for affluence is 
GDP per capita with the assumption that consumption is increasing in relation to the output growth.
The popular STIRPAT approach is  a basic instrument for a broad range of applied 
analyses. Its intuitive combination of factors  underlines the influence of diverse 
different factors on the ecological impact.
The following model in section 4.3 is linked to this literature. A regression analysis will 
follow the IPAT approach of Ehrlich and Holdren (1971) and the more recent 
modifications (ImPACT, STIRPAT) point the way to add other factors of influence on 
the ecological impact to improve the model results.
4.2.5 Additional factors affecting energy efficiency
The remaining question is  which other factors have to be considered in an empirical 
model. Liddle (2004) focuses on demographic dynamics and environmental impacts 
on per capita road energy use: the key findings are to reject the variable of energy 
prices, if for example gasoline prices have an influence on the quantity used but 
prices are also endogenous. Hofman and Labar (2007) analyse energy use 
depending on sectoral changes.
Literature on the impact of emission-saving policies  is rare, but there are a few 
studies about the Kyoto Protocol ratification. The study by Tamazian, Chousa and 
Vadlamannati (2009) chooses dummy variables for protocol ratification and being a 
signatory, which have a significant association with CO2 emissions at the 1% 
confidence level. Further factors  are current GDP growth and trade. While GDP 
growth is  positively related to emissions, trade has a negative impact on pollution; 
high emission manufacturing seems to be outsourced and could be the reason for 
the environmental Kuznets theory; lagged GDP growth seems to be without 
significant influence on energy consumption.
As already shown by the reviewed studies, the main factors for the analysis are set, 
namely energy consumption and affluence, respectively the often used proxy variable 
GDP. It seems to be an indisputable fact that a model can be explained to a large 
extent by these factors. The question remains, what other factors should be under 
consideration? The general technological level is suggested as well as  the intensity 
of production. Some authors focus on the industrial structure or the rate of labour 
intensity, and last but not least general factors  like structural data of geographical or 
physical conditions of a country, e.g. information about the specifications of climate, 
population density or extent of landmass are included.
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This  combination of factors can be examined with the help of a panel. The question 
remains whether policies have an influence on the increase in energy efficiency, and 
whether the consequences and obligations due to the 20-20-20 by 2020 targets and 
the BSA obligations are strong enough to put pressure on energy consumption of 
consumers and producers. Do the CO2-emissions reduction commitments have an 
additional influence on changes in energy use and energy efficiency? Besides other 
factors, how much do increases in energy consumption correlate to economic 
growth, and how should one judge the influence of policy commitments on emission 
reductions? Are they effective and if so, how strong is their effect?
Since the focus of interest of this study is on factors that influence the increase in 
energy efficiency, the literature discussed above frames the model, namely the 
factors that have to be considered. The further regression model should test for 
present economic growth and BSA obligations, while the Kuznets theory and its 
contribution to the model remains  unclear and will be skipped in this analysis. The 
implementation of other factors may better explain the significant correlations and 
can be explained directly.
Reliable measured data has to be identified to show the percentage growth rates or 
first deviations  to easily indicate the correlation between measures  aiming to 
decrease energy use. This will be done in the following section. The design of the 
model will add independent variables that are already chosen by different authors to 
test for influences on environmental impact.
The decomposition of different factors contributes answers to the question of the 
interactions of energy efficiency in terms of the usage-bound related energy 
consumption in relation to growth, population and other economic conditions, as well 
as development of technological efficiency. Thus, the model helps to explain if and to 
what extent energy efficiency is under the control of the policy makers.
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4.3 Policies influences on energy efficiency - the empirical model
The EU member states are highly developed countries, which are homogenous 
insofar as they are, in comparison with emerging economies for example, relatively 
culturally and demographically equal. This homogeneity is also reinforced by the 
European Community Treaties  which propose the alignment of living conditions 
across the EU in all areas where comparable living, economic and social conditions 
are not yet reached. The influence of these treaties also expresses itself through 
production standards and regulations, which must be adhered to by each national 
economy. This results  in a convergence process, exhibited by the decreasing 
heterogeneity of the examined group.
However, the unified EU laws do not cover all fields of policies. In particular, energy 
markets  are still seen as the responsibility of national policy, as long as the member 
states are not willing to abandon their sovereign right of energy grids. But the EU 
influence also makes itself noticed here, for example through accepted regulations 
and commitments such as  the EU's burden-sharing of the Kyoto Protocol's emission 
reduction commitments. The so-called burden-sharing agreement (European 
Council, 1998) distributes the reduction burdens across  the member states, taking 
into consideration such factors as status quo power plants, industry structure, energy 
mix and expected economic growth rates. In this way each member state has its  own 
emission reduction commitments, while at the same time the communal policy 
measures are adopted, leading to equality in energy usage rates and the share of 
RES in overall energy production.65,66
Table 7 shows the literatures which describe the variables used in the empirical 
analysis in the following section, and can be divided into two groups. The first group 
of papers observes energy use or a similar variable as the dependent variable, this 
includes the studies by Filipini and Hunt (2011), Hofman and Labar (2007), and 
Liddle (2004). They provide important contributions in the identification of the factors 
of influence and their significance. The study of Tamazian et al. (2009) makes use of 
a double approach and takes firstly energy consumption, secondly emissions as the 
dependent variable. Thus, in contrary to the first group of papers, the variables 
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65  The Kyoto Protocol itself was first agreed upon in 2002 (see European Council, 2002), though a 
number of the measures had been previously adopted.
66 See European Commission (2005): recommendation for sustainable energy efficiency policies.
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energy use and the ecological impact, namely emissions as a side product of energy 
use, are linked in one model.
Similarly, the analyses that take emissions as the dependent variable link energy 
consumption and energy use as the effect of time-lagged emissions or energy 
consumption and are one of the independent variables, such as the study by 
Grunewald and Martínez-Zarzoso (2009) or York at al. (2003).
The analysis  of Johnstone et al. (2009) gives evidence of another important variable. 
This  analysis examines the relation between the promotion of renewable energy and 
the number of patent applications. The result is important because it determines that 
patents express  which level of technology a country has reached. This proxy will be 
used in the following analysis.
4.3.1 Dataset and variables
The examination in this section focuses on the EU states as a largely homogeneous 
area with partly heterogeneous national specificities from north to south, e.g. 
geographical conditions, from west to east, e.g. political and economic conditions 
after the fall of the Berlin wall, and between countries, e.g. nuclear power plants in 
France or the economy extremely focused on the tertiary sector in Luxembourg.
The dataset used in this analysis is limited to the years between 1998 and 2010 
without any gaps, thus the data is  characterised as a balanced panel. In 1997 the 
Kyoto Protocol was (informally) adopted, as the European Union obligated itself to 
enact the protocol even if no international ratification process took place. Individual 
commitments for the post-Kyoto period were quickly agreed upon. Thus it is assumed 
that after 1998 national governments immediately began enacting policy measures to 
reach the emission targets, which are obligated to be reached by the year 2012.
It was supposed that, in order to have economically efficient goals, the "pressure" on 
the governments  to act is counted analog to the emissions of the Kyoto Protocol 
indicated GHGs. Thus, emissions will indicate not only the emissions  amount, but 
also the target achievement. Every country has an individual Kyoto target, which for 
itself is the index base of 100 for the emission index. Through this standardisation, 
the index comparison becomes easier. The index represents the country's  target 
emission level. High values, above 100, describe the meeting of the target, the target 
range. The higher the value, the better the emission reduction achievement. Low 
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values on the other hands are within the section that represents  underperformance. 
An index value of 100 indicates the accurate meeting of the goal. Through this, 
emission reductions in relation to the individual Kyoto obligations are easily indicated, 
and the target achievement across countries is understandable at a glance.
The variable underlines the necessity for the enactment of policies for values below 
100, which index the 2012 Kyoto Protocol allowed emissions. In the case of 
over-achieving member states' targets, national governments may decide for 
passivity in the field of environmental politics and let things slide, and the index will 
have values above 100.
The dataset ends in 2010, as afterwards only incomplete data is available. The same 
applies to the data collected before 1998, but also in the case of available data, in 
any event, before 1997 there was no coordinated action in the EU to reduce 
emissions. Efficiency increases in energy usage were based on improvement of 
competitive capabilities to reduce input factor costs, and were only loosely directed 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics: minimum and maximum of country means, with mean and 
standard deviation for the pooled country means, own calculation according the dataset.
Factor Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Energy use
(Energy use per capita in oil equivalents.)
GDP




(Index of present Kyoto gas emissions)
BSA-Dummy
(presence of pressure to reduce emissions 
according EU Burden-Sharing Agreement)
Patent applications
(Number of applications per million inhabitants.)
Technological efficiency
(Energy conversion as input-output-relation of 
primary energy.)
3,715.70 1,503.60 1,565.80 9,207.60
20,314 14,374 1,400 80,800
19,508,300 22,738,300 427,700 82,541,000
108.63 22.93 63.60 154.00
0.42 0.49 0 1
2,130.24 4,583.43 0.67 23,907.20
0.71 0.12 0.29 0.96
toward environmental protection. Taking into account data for 1997 and earlier will 
not improve the main implication of the model and could only measure the changes 
in energy use and efficiency before and after the Kyoto Protocol application. Instead 
it could threaten the objective results of correlations between variables in the Kyoto 
era as distort the load of the factors.
In total 25 of the current 28 EU countries were considered: Cyprus and Malta have 
no emission reduction targets, and Croatia became a new member of the European 
Union in 2013. All three are thus  unimportant for the purposes  of this study. The 
current dataset contains up to N=325 observations for each of the described 
variables. The variances show in some cases a broad range (see table 8 for 
descriptive statistics) for the mean of different countries. When comparing, for 
example, the emissions have a spread of country-specific means from 63.60 up to 
154.00, which is an indicator of heterogeneous conditions for governmental efforts  on 
emission-saving policies. Population, too, is very heterogeneous with small countries, 
e.g. Luxembourg (427,700) and huge countries, e.g. Germany (82,541,000). The 
absolute values cannot indicate common trends such as  general trends in population 
growth such as the decline of the population in some countries, or technological 
development of energy efficiency that might have a global trend of a higher 
conversion rate of primary energy inputs. Heterogeneous countries in the relatively 
homogenous group of EU member states require one to test different model 
specifications for the empirical analysis and the question is whether group- or 
time-specific errors are more influential than the comparison of growth. Under the 
assumption that differences-in-differences methods show trends in the rates of 
change which do not depend on the level of (technological) development or structural 
conditions, this approach might be advantageous, and must be tested as well.
As the literature review (see table 6 for an overview) could not identify a clear result 
for whether EKC should be applied or not, and if it should, whether the turning point 
was out of reach, the analysis  here will ignore the proof of the theory, so the squared 
values of GDP will not be taken into account. For the independent variables, general 
factors like population, technological level and GDP are considered, as well as 
physical efficiency of energy use and the emissions  of Kyoto gases, which will be the 
parts  of the model that are interpreted as the political impacts. Other factors rarely 
improve the model, e.g. structural data of the labour market, characteristics  of energy 
production, and energy prices. Climate conditions are omitted as it is not clear 
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whether cold winters (heating) or hot summers (cooling) have a larger contribution to 
the climate footprint. However, during the model designing process they were tested 
and the results will be mentioned later on.
4.3.2 Explaining the empirical model
As explained before, the model in this  chapter will follow the Ehrlich and Holdren 
(1971) approach and its recent modifications (1) and (2) to measure the ecological 
impact of selected influencing factors.
The European Union's efficiency goal to decrease the energy use by 20% would 
imply a decrease in GDP, if not identifying other influencing factors. The STIRPAT 
approach allows other variables, but every additional factor needs a justification to be 
added to the model.
The stochastic frontier analysis  of Filippini and Hunt (2011) discusses energy 
consumption as  a product of structural conditions of an economy as well as 
technological development. The authors are testing the impact of different factors on 
energy consumption:
 (3) Eit = E (Pit, Yit, Ci, At, ISHit, SSHit, Dt, EFit)
Following their model design, the use of energy (E = energy consumption) is driven 
by diverse factors such as production (Y = GDP), economic sector share (ISH = 
industry and SSH = services), but also country-specific variables (e.g. C = climate, A 
= area size) and a series of time dummies (D) for effects that have an equal, but 
unobservable influence on all observed countries (awareness  of climate change, 
international oil prices, shocks), and the (end consumer) price of electricity (P) as 
well as the underlying energy efficiency (EF). All factors are in natural logarithms, 
with the exception of sectoral shares  of production and dummies. The authors 
assume that their model already adequately captures group-specific effects by 
including different dummies and country specific variables, so that a fixed effects 
model is not necessary.
They specify their general assumption in a panel log-log functional form:
 (4) eit = α + αyyit + αppit + δtDt + αCDCi + αaat + αIISHit + αSSSHit + vit + uit
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Filippini and Hunt define the error term as a variable that represents energy 
efficiency. They further decompose it into two residual terms: vit assembles 
unmeasured factors that influence energy efficiency, in particular energy intensity, 
while uit captures the so-called underlying energy efficiency as  a self-calculated 
benchmark in relation to the most efficient country in the dataset. The so computed 
error term uit tends to zero for most European countries. Thus energy efficiency only 
marginally deviates from the remaining error term vit.. The authors conclude that 
energy intensity is a good proxy for energy efficiency.67
Fillippini and Hunt use stochastic frontier analysis, which does not necessarily have 
to be applied. If one is calculating the influence of diverse factors on energy 
efficiency, but energy use seems to be an adequate substitute, one can abandon this 
approach and directly interpret the influence of the variables on energy use. For 
European countries, it seems to be reasonable to add technological efficiency, 
political influence and economical development as influencing factors in a regression 
analysis, due to the fact that the efficiency error term uit seems to contain to less 
information for the selected countries in the own analysis:
For the design of the model in this chapter, the authors' arguments have to be taken 
into consideration as well as their introduced variables, which as  a consequence 
should improve the model and allows a better application of different model designs 
because the error term does not contain information that is  fundamental for the 
model and the further implications. The ecological impact is explained as the energy 
use and will be interpreted as the energy efficiency, following the earlier discussion in 
this  chapter. Therefore, every resource can be used only once and used energy 
inputs are tantamount to a waste of resources. A low value of energy inputs means 
high energy efficiency and is environmentally less burden some than a high value. As 
energy efficiency is in the focus of EU climate change policies, the energy use 
variable is  the applied indicator of energy efficiency and it is  exactly the variable that 
should be controlled by the EU policies and regulations. The influences of factors like 
population, production, and others, such as policy measures, can explain changes 
over time in energy use. An additional advantage of the approach is that energy 
efficiency is  removed from the error term. The remaining error term no longer 
contains information which is related to explanatory variables, but only unobserved 
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67 The conclusion cannot be generalised but seems to be acceptable for most EU countries, while not 
absolutely homogenous for all member states: Greece and Italy have a marginally higher deviation.
variables like country-specific influences of cultural or geographical factors, or 
globally occurring shocks. This should lead to an improvement of the model results 
and conclusions. Energy efficiency is  divided into two variables: the dependent 
variable energy represents  the factor that can be influenced directly through changes 
in behaviour and production quantity, for example. The technological impact of 
energy efficiency is related in the long term to production capacities of primary 
energy and general aspects of other assets that use energy for production, heating or 
transportation. It is changing over the time and is captured in an individual 
independent variable, see below the explanation of the variables.
To test the set of hypotheses above, a panel dataset is used and take into account 
various variables: these of (2) enhanced by variables for BSA, technological level, 
efficiency and behavioural influencing factors such as the level of emissions.
The regression model in this chapter applies the following equation:
 (5) log(ENERGYUSE)i,t = β1log(GDPi,t) + β2log(POPi,t)
           + β3log(EMISSIONi,t) + β4(BSAi,t)
           + β5log(PATENTSi,t) + β6log(TECH-EFFICIENCYi,t) + ui,t
where i = 1, ..., 25 indexes the cross sectional unit (country), and t = 1998, …, 2010 
indexes the time (year). The dependent variable ENERGYUSE measures energy use 
per capita in oil equivalents. Explanatory variables are GDP (the per capita national 
gross domestic product), POP (total population in the selected country), EMISSION 
(the present emission target level of GHG specified in the Kyoto Protocol, where a 
value of 100 indicates compliance with the Kyoto Protocol obligations, a value below 
100 the failure to meet the goal, while a value above 100 indicates emissions in the 
target range and Kyoto goal over-achievement), BSA as a dummy variable 
(indicating present emissions still above the Burden-Sharing Agreement targets  with 
"1"), PATENTS (the number of patent applications of a country), and 
TECH-EFFICIENCY (losses in the energy conversion process, measured as the raw 
energy input in relation to the raw energy output, which can be used for production, 
heating and transportation).
The explanatory variables beyond the influences of the BSA obligations  are control 
variables, which can be directly measured and explain and isolate causal relations. 
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These variables are often included in the cited literature. Their influence on energy 
use has already been confirmed. Not take them into account will decrease the 
precision of the coefficient estimates.
As the STIRPAT proposes in (2), the model (5) also considers affluence (namely the 
proxy GDP) and population. Technology will be captured in the patent applications as 
a proxy for the level of technological development of an economy. The ecological 
impact is  measured as the dependent output variable energy use, as shown in (4), 
and the proxy for energy efficiency: high values of energy intensity indicate a less 
efficient input-output ratio of energy and the use of every individual unit of energy is 
not very efficient. Low values imply a high capacity factor of energy, i.e. the degree of 
efficiency is  high as  the ratio between energy input (oil equivalents used) and the 
output of produced goods and services (GDP) is high.
The model is expected to show evidence of a significant influence of the presented 
variables on energy use. The evidence of the implications of equation (4) clarifies 
that the deviation of ENERGYUSE is that part of the change in energy efficiency 
which results  from changes in the quantity of the production output (GDP) and 
population growth (POP), but is  also influenced by other additional factors like 
political pressure (BSA), general efficiency increases (TECH-EFFICIENCY) due to 
innovation, technological level (PATENTS), and lastly from unobserved influences of 
variables like changes in behaviour and cultural aspects, covered by the error term.
4.3.3 The model parameters in detail
The most important difference from other analyses  and the contribution of the model 
chosen here, is  that the influence of the percentage decrease in energy intensity will 
be shown and explained in detail. The question of interest is which measures would 
cause to increase by 20%, the goal for all EU member states. In other words, which 
variables cause decreases in energy use while the output (GDP) remains on a 
steady growth path? When using the natural logarithms of the variables, the 
association between an exogenous variable and the endogenous variable, the 
coefficient of the explanatory variable, can be read as a direct elasticity under ceteris 
paribus conditions.
To use the data this way, it is important to know the details of each of the selected 
variables, their interpretations and resulting implications for the chosen scenario.
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The dependent variable ENERGYUSE is  the energy consumption in an economy as 
calculated by Eurostat: energy use measures net domestic energy use per capita. It 
is  the combined usage of coal, electricity, oil, natural gas and renewable sources. 
Secondary sources (e.g. non-fuel energies) are reflected by their oil equivalents. 
Using the per capita energy consumption reflects not only the level of energy 
efficiency, but also the relative importance: high energy uses tend to show the most 
potential for further improvements in energy efficiency. The variable ENERGY USE is 
the main objective of EU energy efficiency policies and helps to evaluate the 
ecological efficiency. For example, a low value of energy input means high energy 
efficiency, ceteris paribus. Economic activities that use less energy are more efficient 
in terms of the utilisation rate of the input factor energy.
The chosen explanatory variables in detail are as follows:
GDP is a measurement per capita in EUR in current prices, again provided by 
Eurostat. A per capita value reflects  the affluence and the differentiated development 
levels  of the examined countries, and allows to infer, whether countries with higher 
GDPs exhibit different energy intensities than those with lower GDPs. In the 
aforementioned IPAT model it is one of the key factors.
POP is the measure of total population. The database is  provided by the World Bank. 
According to Ehrlich and Holdren (1971), who suggested the basic IPAT framework, 
environmental damage, including GHG emissions, is  dependent on population size 
and growth. Following this theory, if the population increases, ceteris paribus, 
emissions must also increase. Population is  an important control variable. A huge 
variety of studies have analysed the effect of population levels and growth on 
environmental impacts.
EMISSION is a behavioural variable. It expresses emission levels, where high levels 
force policy makers to intensive actions  against high levels of energy use. The index 
showing emissions in relation to the Kyoto base year 1990. The higher the index, the 
lower the absolute emissions. The index is  based on the GHG indicated as national 
target with the actual base year as base = 100, where the CO2 equivalents are based 
on the 1990 output levels. Also if the emission exhaust of energy use is to decrease 
through modern technologies, it is likely to risk some endogeneity of emission and 
other variables. Thus, the direction of causality is unclear and has to be discussed 
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further in the application of the regression analysis and through the relevant test 
procedures.
BSA is a participation dummy variable, indicating whether a country's  present 
emissions are below (=0) or above (=1) the calculated annual emission level needed 
to reach the final BSA allowed redistributed Kyoto gases in absolute emitted tonnes 
of CO₂. If countries are not complying with the contractual commitments  regarding 
the emission reductions, the BSA obligations  put pressure (=1) on policy makers' 
environmental policies. Countries indicated with "0" can even increase their 
emissions without incurring any punitive action. The use of a dummy should 
underline the effect of BSA through an underlying time series analysis with respect to 
only those individuals having the specific treatment.
This  dummy variable represents  BSA compliance. It can thus be seen as  generating 
political pressure for the enactment of measures increasing energy efficiency. With 
the resolution from autumn 1997, the EU states were made aware of the necessity of 
binding and sustainable emission reductions. The reduction goals were jointly 
determined and, in accordance with the treaty, have to be reached between 2008 
and 2012. The EU has committed itself to reducing its emissions by 20% by 2020 
and by 30% in bilateral accords with other industrialised countries.68  These accords 
aim to force countries  such as Canada, Australia, the USA and other large polluters 
to ratify Kyoto or similar agreements, but also to signal to emerging countries such as 
India, Russia, China, Brazil or South Africa that, by signing these comprehensive 
international agreements, the EU is strongly committed to climate protection goals.
The dummy variable BSA risks some endogeneity especially with EMISSIONS. It is 
important to mention that the BSA obligations  were set and will not be changed within 
the period of interest. Some countries can even expand emissions. Hence it is 
possible that both effects  (emissions, BSA dummy) point into contrary directions. 
Thus, the danger of endogeneity exists, but should be only weak or not resist. The 
direction of correlation should be equal for both variables.
Within the burden-sharing agreement, the old EU-15 countries have individual targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol and a collective 8% reduction goal, and the Eastern 
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68  This issue is also analysed by Eichhammer et al. (2006): the EU preferred a linear yearly goal 
progression, enabling deviations between national implementations and replacing final goals with 
annual benchmarks, making country comparisons difficult.
European Union member states are required to reduce their Kyoto emissions 
according their individual Kyoto Protocol targets ranging from 6% to 8%.
PATENTS is a Eurostat data figure, counting the number of patent applications  at the 
European Patent Office (EPO) per million inhabitants. The registration of European 
patents can be interpreted as  an indicator of the technological level, research 
intensity and innovation potential of the EU members, see e.g. Johnstone et al. 
(2009)69. Countries with a high number of patent applications conduct intensive 
research. New technologies are more quickly brought to market and can then be the 
basis of further technologies and research. Thus this variable is an expression of the 
accommodation capability for new, technologically complex processes or techniques. 
In countries  with a high number of patent applications these attributes are also more 
highly valued than in countries with a limited number of patent applications.
TECH-EFFICIENCY is  the technological efficiency in the transformation process of 
energy. The input-output ratio shows conversion losses of the raw energy 
consumption between transformation input and transformation output. A value close 
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69 This concept represents a cumulative effect, because the number is also affected by various policies 
(e.g. R&D subsidies, appliances standards, etc.).





















































Note: Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Variables indicated with *, ** and *** show significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 9: Model results
to 1 signifies a high efficiency and reduction of wastage of raw energy inputs in the 
energy conversion. It is favourable to reduce losses and make a higher share of 
every individual unit of energy usable for production, heating and transportation.
As mentioned previously, the panel data consist of observations over 13 years of 25 
countries. Logically, there are several reasons to build a Fixed Effects (FE) model 
since, with I=25 countries over N=13 years, it is  questionable if the necessary length 
of time periods is present to construct an adequate Ordinary Least Square (OLS) or 
Random Effects (RE) model, which is  also known as a generalised least square 
model (GLS). Thus, general model test statistics to opt for one of the different model 
designs are identical for OLS and RE to test for or against FE.
To validate the selection of the model for the dataset, OLS, RE and FE models were 
applied and compared, see table 9. A fourth model will be applied in the further 
discussion about the test statistic. It is the first differences method (FD) and will be 
advantageous if autocorrelation occurs, which would be problematic. The FD 
estimator recalculates the model variables by regressing changes on changes and 
uses OLS, especially if growth rates  and not levels have the potential to accelerate 
their influence on the dependent variable. Distortions  due to time-invariant effects will 
be eliminated. Individual heterogeneity as well as group-specific, time-variant group 
effects do not distort the estimators. Dummies  and proxy variables that identify levels 
of development, for example, will not be affected of first differences and are 
considered with the absolute figures in logarithmic form or the constant dummy 
values for the reference year.
4.3.4 OLS model
The simple OLS model has to be tested first. Only a few variables are significant on 
the 0.99 confidence level (POP and PATENTS), and the BSA dummy on the 0.95 
level. The adjusted squared residuals  are at 0.72. That might go along with 
autocorrelation, which is also indicated by a low Durbin-Watson value of d=0.12. 
According Durbin and Watson (1950, 1951), statistical evidence on positive 
autocorrelation of the error terms exists if the calculated value d is  below a lower 
bound dL or above an upper bound dU, while the range of inconclusive results spans 
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from dL to dU.70 Values of d=0 indicate for positive autocorrelation with a coefficient of 
p=1 and d=4 for negative autocorrelation with p=1.
Additionally, in a direct comparison between OLS and FE, applying the 
Breusch-Pagan test for homoskedasticity of the estimators71, a low p-value of 
2.518e-284 counts against the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS model is 
adequate, hence the alternative of the FE model is preferred.
4.3.5 RE model
Secondly, the RE model has to be calculated and compared before definitively opting 
for the FE model.
The considered variables are significant at the 0.01 significance level, except for the 
TECH-EFFICIENCY (0.05 significance) and PATENTS coefficients (0.1 significance). 
The BSA dummy is not significant at any of those significance levels. The 
mathematical sign of the GDP variable has changed in comparison to the OLS model 
from negative to positive.
All significant variables have the expected sign. The ENERGY USE is increasing if 
affluence (GDP output) is growing ceteris paribus, or the PATENTS variable, as a 
proxy for high intensity of research and development (R&D) is increasing.
A rising population (POP) seems to decrease the per capita energy use and may 
indicate a better usage of energy intensive infrastructure and home appliances. Less 
populated countries  can use their own infrastructure less efficient: the average 
utilisation rate is lower.
A higher technological TECH-EFFICIENCY of energy input conversion is  negatively 
correlated with ENERGY USE. The utilisation factor of energy may increase due to 
technology, and affect also the amount of the negative by-product air pollution. The 
EMISSION variable, which is interpreted as a behaviour variable, and its levels have 
a negative impact on energy consumption. The lower the index, the stronger the 
pressure on the policy maker to drastically reduce energy use. If EMISSION 
increases but still shows values far below 100, the pressure on the policy maker to 
strengthen efforts to decrease the energy intensity is  higher than before. As the value 
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70 For negative autocorrelation, the corresponding test is 4-d < dL for statistical  evidence, 4-d > dU for 
non evidence, and dL < (4−d) < dU for inconclusive results.
71 Breusch and Pagan (1979) developed a test to estimate if the variance of the residuals is dependent 
on the values of the independent variables.
gets closer to 100, the pressure lessens and energy consumption reductions can 
occur in a much slower ongoing process.
The sum of the squared residuals in the RE model is  high with a value of 24.428. The 
standard error of the regression (0.277) is also high, especially in comparison to the 
further application of a FE or FD model. This may be the result of a potentially 
inconsistent estimator.
4.3.6 The FE model
The FE model tries to solve the potential problem of inconsistent estimators in the 
OLS and RE models, which can occur due to correlation between the independent 
variables and individual heterogeneity. Since a FE model is supposed to control for 
the heterogeneity of country-specific characteristics, the unitary pooled error term uit 
of equation (5) is  decomposed in the unit-specific time-invariant component αi, and 
the observation (country) specific error εi,t.Time effects capture as a proxy all 
variables that are unobserved, but common across countries while they vary over 
time:
 (6) log(ENERGYUSE)i,t = β1log(GDPi,t) + β2log(POPi,t)
          + β3log(EMISSIONi,t) + β4(BSAi,t)
          + β5log(PATENTSi,t) + β6log(TECH-EFFICIENCYi,t) + αi + εi,t
In case of autocorrelation in the FE model, time effects may not be included in the 
group or general error term and thus the evidence of the results for some or all 
examined variables risk to tend to zero. The design of the model chosen here reveals 
indicators of autocorrelation, but first of all the question of model selection has to be 
solved.
The RE model in 4.3.5 failed the Hausman-test on endogeneity of the variables due 
to unobserved individual factors  (cf. Hausman, 1978). The null hypothesis of 
consistent estimators will be rejected with p=1.114e-06, hence the alternative 
hypothesis for correlation between explanatory variables and the error term is 
accepted. The test therefore points towards the FE model.
In the FE model, the White-test (cf. White, 1980) is the corresponding routine to the 
Breusch-Pagan-test in the RE model. It again concerns fixed effects: the null 
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hypothesis that groups have a common intercept, e.g. the same country-specific 
error, can be rejected with p=2.455e-214. Thus, the use of the FE model is 
adequately supported. The conclusion is  underlined by a high significance of the 
F(30,294)-test with the p-value close to 0. Especially for applied studies, Baltagi and 
Raj (1992) propose in their literature review of econometric tests to use the F-test for 
random individual effects.
The adjusted R-squared is considerably high at 0.992. One of the characteristics of 
the FE model approach are group specific dummies to calculate the time-invariant 
individual effects. The use of dummies leads to a loss in degrees of freedom, as each 
dummy is  considered as its own variable: in the applied model N=25 countries. On 
the other hand, the dummies  can improve the ratio of explained variance of the 
model.
The variance of the residual seems to be autocorrelated over time, as the DW value 
for the estimated FE model is  d=0.918, which is  far from the range of uncertainty 
without statistical evidence (in the range of inconclusive values  for the FE sample, 
dL=1.7786 to dU=1,8549, according to the extended Durbin-Watson-tables by Savin 
and White (1977)72) and the proof of not being positive autocorrelated (if d>dU).
Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982) extend the discussion about the 
exact interpretation of the Durbin Watson test to FE-models with the affirmation of 
Durbin and Watson (1971), that the DW test seems to be the most powerful test, but 
added to the discussion one crucial point. For a case like above, where positive serial 
correlation cannot be rejected, it remains unclear if autocorrelation is really a crucial 
issue to address or can remain in the model. They developed additional tables for FE 
models  with the result that positive autocorrelation cannot be generally rejected if d < 
dU. In that case, the authors propose to test if the residuals form a random walk. 
Eigen-vector routine based tables for lower (RPL) and upper (RPU) bounds for the 
random walk give evidence on the serial correlation of the estimators, if d < RPL. In 
the examined model, d was calculated as  0.918, thus d > RPL=0.588. Hence it does 
not clearly underline this finding, but it is relatively close to RPL, and far away from du, 
thus it is highly probable that the residuals are following a random walk, the variables 
are correlated over time and may continuously grow or decrease, and the mean 
value is not in a steady state but changing over time. For that special case, in a 
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72 The original  Durbin-Watson tables were calculated for 15 to 100 observations and a maximum of 5 
regressors due to the lack of adequate computing power in the 1950s.
further analysis, Sargan and Bhargava (1983) propose to use first differences FD 
estimators.
With the implementation of robust standard errors, a methodology can be found to 
face the latent hazard of autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity. The standard FE 
model was modified using robust standard errors  according to Newey and West 
(1987). The Newey-West standard errors provide a covariance matrix estimator to 
replace parameters  that harm the standard assumption of regression analysis in time 
series models. Therefore they are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
and are favoured over other popular robust standard errors in econometrics, such as 
White (1980). As in the FE model, and also in the other model applications presented 
in the analysis  here, Newey-West corrected values show marginal variations and can 
improve the significance. The method is adopted for all model calculations.
4.3.7.1 The FD model
Under the random walk theory, an autocorrelated FE model has to be rejected. The 
following first differences (FD) equation will estimate efficient parameters. Group 
specific effects in αi will be removed from the model: they are constant over time with 
a zero variance. Time-variant variables remain in the model as  before, if they are not 
exposed as indices73 and can be interpreted as levels of technological development 
(PATENTS and TECH-EFFICIENCY), or are dummies (BSA). For ENERGY-USE, 
GDP, POP and the EMISSION variable, log-differences eliminate differences  in the 
stage of development, but register only changes over time, making countries more 
easily comparable:
# (7)# ∆log(ENERGYUSEi,t) = β1∆log(GDPi,t) + β6∆log(POPi,t) + 
             + β3∆log(EMISSIONi,t) + β4(BSAi,t)
             + β5log(PATENTSi,t) + β6log(TECH-EFFICIENCYi,t) + ui,t
As said before, variables  to measure levels of development, here the proxy variables 
PATENTS and TECH-EFFICIENCY for technology, will just be put in logarithmic form, 
while it is  reasonable to take first differences  of the logarithms for GDP output, 
EMISSION and POP, because the correlation of the growth rates calculated in this 
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73 For PATENTS and TECH-EFFICIENCY absolute levels are in the focus, not changes-in-changes.
way with (the rate of change of the) energy use is on a percentage basis. Policy 
measures can try to influence directly the further growth conditions, which are 
correlated with the present energy use. Technological development with the proxy 
PATENTS and the underlying TECH-EFFICIENCY, the technological development 
level of raw energy conversion, are more related to the long term and represent the 
physical conditions of assets, the infrastructure and the sectoral mix of an economy.
The influence on politics of the BSA obligations is a) interpreted as  a dummy variable 
(BSA), and b) as a behaviour influencing variable EMISSION, which is an index and 
interprets values lower than 100 as not achieving the burden-sharing agreement 
redistributes Kyoto Protocol GHG emission obligations. An additional BSA 
participation dummy which is equal to "1" implies pressures on policy makers to 
decrease emissions, while an increasing index indicates the absolute pressure, 
where higher values imply a lower pressure or, if EMISSION > 100, as  the 
burden-sharing agreement obligations are already fulfilled, can even allow countries 
to increase the present emissions.
The chosen FD model shows an adjusted R-squared of 0.477. The portion which is 
not explained by the variables 0.523 can be attributed to unobserved influences of 
cultural or political conditions, price effects, shocks and climate extremes, and 
measurement errors of the data sources. The standard tests already applied in the 
OLS, RE and FE models underlined the need for the first differences  design. Finally, 
the chosen model has to be tested for causality. Granger (1969) specified causality 
as an estimator of an endogenous variable y with respect to the exogenous variable 
x, which will be improved by including lagged variables Yt-1, ….. Yt-s.74 The Granger 
causality theorem requires time series methods to be applied, like the FD model. 
Through differentiation of the FE model, the group-specific effects  were eliminated, 
thus the correlation of variables should be independent of group-specific influences in 
the levels. The F-test in the FD model already determined the correlation. A Wald test 
(Wald, 1943) can control for the omission of a variable of significance, as  the 
H0-hypothesis represents a zero value of the regression coefficient of the observed 
variable. For the given model, the proof of the Wald test gives the same significances 
for the variables as the standard F-test. The F-test for testing the relations  between 
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74 Kirchgässner (1981) pointed out, that the Granger test requires modified stationary residuals that 
can cause multicollinearity. Taking differences or growth rates reduce the problem.
the exogenous variables and the error terms has the required power with F(6, 293) 
and a p-value of about 7.86e-40.
The DW value of about d=1.783, again, cannot clearly confirm the absence of 
autocorrelation. But it is already in the range of inconclusive test results  and rather 
close to the dU value in the original Durbin-Watson-tables, thus autocorrelation cannot 
be clearly excluded. But as the DW value is very close to the dU value, it can be 
assumed that autocorrelation is not high, if it exists. Further such small differences 
might be explainable by errors in measurement.75
4.3.7.2 The FD model significances - results
The coefficients  display the expected values, but one has changed in comparison to 
all former applied models: BSA has a negative association, even though the 
coefficient is not significant. Energy efficiency is not directly depicted in this  model, 
but is  reflected by the auxiliary variable ENERGYUSE as a decrease in energy use 
ceteris paribus is equivalent to an increase in energy efficiency. Appropriately, energy 
consumption falls  if a) the EMISSION output increases76, or b) the underlying 
technological TECH-EFFICIENCY, the conversion of raw energy, namely the 
utilisation rate of every individual unit of energy, is increasing, and there seems to be 
c) a slightly negative association with POP, the population, which is obviously under 
ceteris paribus conditions through a better use of energy using infrastructure and 
home appliances, even though this variable shows a non-significance.
Energy use rises if a) energy use due to a higher production output (GDP) is 
expanding, or b) PATENTS are positively correlated with a growing energy use.
The non-significance of POP and BSA need further investigation. Especially POP 
seems to be an important and fundamental control variable: population is one of 
the main factors  in the STIRPAT model as well as of the approach of Ehrlich and 
Holdren (1971).
The existing literature focuses on analysing the correlation between energy use and 
GDP in relation to the level of development of different countries and permits. The 
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75  The Durbin-Watson-values for the FD sample of k=6 and n=300 are calculated as the following 
lower and upper bound: dL = 1.7700 dU = 1.8516.
76 Due to the design of the model, a negative correlation between the fulfilment of the Kyoto obligation 
and the energy use indicates there is no need to reduce the energy use as long as the Kyoto goals are 
already reached and the index is above 100.
analyses of European industrialised economies have results  deviating from the 
expected values, for example the influence of the tertiary sector.
There are more other factors showing statistical non-significance, which is  observed 
for the share of renewable energies or fossil fuels in overall electricity production, 
population density, or the share of the tertiary or industrial sector as well as a 
combination of both. Thus, these variables are unaccounted in the computation of the 
above model. Nevertheless, the non-significance has to be mentioned below to 
assure the reader that the absence of the variables can be legitimated. If the number 
of variables is changed, the quality criterions Akaike (AIC)77, Schwarz (BIC)78  and 
Hannan-Quinn79, all more sensitive than the adjusted R-squared value, do not 
improve. There seems to be no need to add the named factors. In contrast, POP, and 
to a smaller extent BSA, too, have a positive impact on the criterion, while the 
direction of influence still remains  unclear. These control variables are often used in 
other literature, too, as  mentioned before. The findings underline the general 
importance of stressing other factors besides GDP that have an influence on energy 
use, while affluence and population remain the main factors driving energy use and 
thus energy efficiency.
Population effects, represented as population growth in the FD model from above, 
have a non-significant influence with a coefficient of -0.352. A study by 
Martinez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) could not confirm the influence of population changes 
in Europe, which is barely growing, or even shrinking, and the impact on energy 
efficiency could not be determined, requiring a more complex examination.
The influence of the pressure through the BSA redistributed Kyoto Protocol 
obligations is observed to be significant at the 0.99 confidence level, characterised by 
a coefficient of -0.645. Using a dummy variable for all countries, which are under 
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77 Under the assumption, that models can only be close to the unknown reality, Akaike describes the 
loss of information due to the chosen estimation model  function as a multi-dimensional  distance to the 
always more complex truth. Akaike (1974) describes the application of An Information Criterion, as the 
basic principles of AIC are founded by Akaike (1973) in a formal adoption (the 1973 source is not 
readily available and published as a symposium article). The model  with the smallest AIC should be 
chosen and seems to indicate the model closest to reality when considering the data.
78  AIC favours models with many variables, the BIC criterion by Schwarz (1978) is deriving the 
estimators in a Bayesian a-posteriori, exponential form, thus BIC penalises models with many 
explanatory variables more and accepts the models as quasi-truth. Again, the model with the smallest 
BIC fits best with reality, while models with small samples face the threat of being underfitted.
79  The criterion of Hannan-Quinn (1979) is a modification of AIC using a squared residual term to 
correct the bias in favour of huge samples by Akaike, without penalising these samples exceedingly. 
The authors propose their attempt to "provide some compromise" (p. 195) between AIC and BIC. As 
before, small values are better.
pressure to reduce their emissions more or less drastically, the results show a lower 
correlation of about 0.0034, but non-significance. On the one hand, both results  are 
in agreement, but on the other hand contrary to Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso 
(2009) and Tamazian et al. (2009). Both studies found a significant effect (0.1 
significance level) of the Kyoto Protocol ratification, but are merely testing a dummy 
variable relation. Tamazian et al. (2009) split the Kyoto effect into two dummies: 
protocol ratification and signatory. They find a significant correlation between 
ratification and CO2 emissions, and suggest that the signatory is insignificant due to 
missing obligations to cut emissions. Countries  which did not specify any reduction 
goals  will not reduce their emissions. Again, the question arises, if the driving factor 
for emission reductions is to find in the political decision-making and not in 
international treaties, but the Kyoto Protocol is  one or the only homogenous 
framework that can be identified to compare countries‘ efforts in global climate 
change policies.
Affluence and population are the effects, besides technology, that are the basic 
variables in the STIRPAT model and explain the highest share of influences  on 
ecological impacts, while time and other effects are subsumed in an aggregated error 
term. The applied FD model follows this  approach, with GDP (coefficient 0.134) and 
PATENTS (coefficient 0.002) being significant at the 0.01 level, and at the 0.1 
significance level the TECH-EFFICIENCY (as  expected by the definition of the raw 
energy input-output ratio) with a coefficient of -0.01. POP has a coefficient of -0.352 
but due to non-significance the effect is unclear.
The significance of GDP growth is, as  expected, high. However, the explanation of 
the reasons for this appears to have some uncertainties, as in the studies cited in 
chapter 4.2. It is unclear to what extent GDP influences energy use and if there is an 
underlying Kuznets  curve, or whether economic growth and energy use are 
decoupled. Core European countries  such as Germany, France and the Benelux 
countries have reached a high economic level and grow only moderately. They can 
reduce their energy intensity at this high level through innovation, while new member 
states, e.g. Romania and Bulgaria are at the other end of the scale. These countries 
are renewing their production capacity, and in this convergence process can 
quantitatively reduce their energy intensities, see e.g. Eurostat (2010), Saikku et al. 
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(1998), Cornillie and Fankhauser (2004)80. As a consequence, one should be 
cautious about the interpretation of the correlation of European countries GDP and 
energy intensity or energy efficiency and the consequence for the ecological impacts. 
But to declare that GDP growth is  pushing the demand for energy, neither the growth 
intensity nor the development level are taken into account to find a correction factor 
or even the level of maturity of an economy or its structure.
As table 9 shows by the results of the applied model, it is economically and 
ecologically worthwhile to calculate additional factors  directly in a single model to 
specify the relations and influences on the dependent variable that indicate the 
ecological effect of measures.
First, the positive sign of PATENTS with a coefficient of 0.002 seems to be the wrong 
way round and is at first surprising. The influence is insignificant in FE calculations, 
but it seems unclear as it is significant when using OLS, RE and FD estimators. To 
explain the positive sign, it is suspected that a higher share of research and 
development activities  is associated with industry, which is quite energy-intensive, or 
with the convergence effect in the Eastern European member states with a higher 
pressure to innovate. If one goes deeper into the sector specifics of the German 
patents, for example, it is  striking that the characteristics of new patents in highly 
developed countries can at least partly represent services, including some 
energy-intensive activities  like the construction sector, waste disposal, and cleaning 
services, but also the railway sector, transportation and airports, and heating, cooling 
and lighting in offices, hotels, restaurants and related other assets having high 
energy consumption. Innovation in energy saving technologies is not as common in 
the service sector as it is in the industrial sector (see Schlomann et al., 2009). 
Instruments that lead to a reduction in environmental pollution and encourage 
innovations in (production) technologies often focus on the industrial sector, e.g. the 
EU-ETS for carbon savings in the heavy industry branches. Hofman and Labar 
(2007) emphasise that the influence of the tertiary sector is not as  important as the 
technological changes  in the industrial sector, which lead to energy savings in much 
higher quantities. To conclude from the above, it seems clear that patents have a 
minor, but significant influence on energy use, while the correlations between energy 
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80  The authors confirm the general trend, but also detect differences. The energy intensity drops 
especially quickly if privatisation and the opening of markets occur and competition increases quickly.
consumption, industrial sector and tertiary sector remains unclear and without 
significance.
The literature cited in this chapter to some extent includes other factors to measure 
influences on emissions or energy use. While developing the model and processing 
different tests, a non-significant impact was shown for the named factors. The 
remaining factors from above were neither affected substantively in their coefficients 
or their significances, nor were the tests for the basic model fundamentally altered. 
Small changes do not legitimate the consideration of other influences  when there is 
no positive result for the proof of the hypotheses of this analysis.
4.3.7.3 FD model with Chow test
Using the test routine of Chow (1960) for structural breaks, the non-significance of 
POP and BSA can be explained, as two sub-groups of the dataset have different 
explanations for the independent variables. Using another dummy variable not yet 
considered, it will be tested whether there is a structural disparity  that can explain 
different conditions for the influence of factors. For the dataset used here, it seems 
obviously a good idea to separate the old and the new EU member states.
The old EU-15 have a different industrial and social structure and are faced with 
other challenges than the new, often former Warsaw Pact members. The former have 
to fight against rising budget deficits and costs of the welfare state, while the latter 
have to reform their economies and rebuild a new industrial structure.
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coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
EU-new POP  1.125990 0.756559    1.488 0.1378
EU-new EMISSION -1.706140 0.118881 -14.350 1.49e-35***
EU-new BSA -0.023148 0.011672   -1.983 0.0483**
EU-15 POP -1.958450 0.879533   -2.227 0.0267**
EU-15 EMISSION  1.220440 0.125767    9.704 1.98e-19***
EU-15 BSA  0.027013 0.012558    2.151 0.0323**
Note: Variables indicated with *, ** and *** show significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 10: Chow test, main results
Testing the FD-model with the Chow test considering an EU-15 DUMMY (Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and UK), the hypothesis of a structural break 
along the dummy has to be accepted, see model 5 in appendix 2.
The further results clearly support the above done discussion and the consideration 
of POP and the BSA dummy in the base model, see table 10.
The new EU members have, with the exception of Slovenia, BSA obligation 
respectively Kyoto targets far above present emissions. Thus, they could even 
increase their GHG emissions without any consequences regarding the common EU 
climate change decrees. They can remain on a growth path of their new economies 
and rebuild the old branches. Heavy  industry and the replacement of heavily polluting 
coal power plants with new, highly efficient power plants are even saving more 
emissions than the newly built industrial plants will emit. The significant coefficient of 
the BSA dummy for the new EU members  is based only on a very few observations 
counting "1" for Slovenia; the more meaningful EMISSION variable, indexing the 
emissions, has a negative sign as  the correlation of less emissions comes with a 
decrease of energy consumption.
The EU-15 members, on the other hand, have to fight against increasing emissions. 
The pressure on policy makers to act vigorously against pollution is higher, as  the 
present emissions of Kyoto gases are far away from the BSA obligation targets. The 
dependency between BSA and ENERGYUSE is  positive and shows that the energy 
consumption of a country is higher if the allowed goal is not yet fulfilled. The negative 
sign of EMISSION seems to be contrary to these findings, but it implies  the tendency 
to become negligent in fighting for emission reduction when coming closer to the 
BSA respectively Kyoto protocol obligation targets. For the industrialised EU-15 
members the rate of change of emissions is higher when closer to or above the BSA 
target.
Closing the discussion about the Chow test results  here, the influence of POP, the 
population, has to be mentioned with the result that matured EU-15 members have a 
significant, negative correlation with ENERGYUSE (-1.958) while the new EU 
member states show a positive, but not significant correlation. This can be explained 
through the demographic structures of the old member states. Most countries  are 
experiencing only marginal population growth or even face a negative development 
of population. Thus, the infrastructure will be used lavishly, for example through 
133
bigger flats, which imply the need for more energy for heating or cooling. If population 
is growing, the existing structures will have a higher utilisation rate and less wastage.
4.3.8 Other factors
Other factors, which were considered in the cited literature were tested but led to 
results that are not in line with the theoretical considerations:
There is no significance observable for the tertiary or industrial sector. If the share of 
industry or services  in total production of goods and services (GDP) is  taken into 
account, it shows the same result of non-significance. Both factors  should indicate 
differing development levels of the examined countries, and allow one to infer 
whether countries with larger tertiary sector exhibit different energy intensities than 
those with a lower share. The analysis by Hofmann and Labar (2007) showed similar 
results with non-significance for the industrial, but significance for the tertiary sector. 
While they are studying China, they conclude a general (positive) effect of services 
on energy efficiency if an economy is not already matured, while industrial 
development may be closely related to innovation in less energy-intensive 
manufacturing processes at a lower development level. For European countries, 
which have only marginal changes in the sector share, and no large shift, Schleich et 
al. (2006) criticise the fact that the service sector is often less integrated in the 
national allocation plans and, as a negative consequence, the emissions  can be only 
poorly controlled and the sector needs other incentives to save energy if not affected 
with some delay through increasing prices on electricity and the elasticity on 
consumption.
The regional availability of goods and labour is  also dependent on the population 
density. In heavily populated areas the infrastructure for transport of goods and 
services is often better and the organisation of goods, logistics and supply chains 
more flexible. Unfortunately the factor has no significance. The idea of a direct 
influence of urban structures, which, due to structural considerations, require the 
provisioning of more energy into the urban environment, fails. An attempt to explain 
these findings can be found in Martínez-Zarzoso (2009): the author analyses 
country-groups of different development levels  and observes a non-significant 
influence of population on emissions for most OECD countries, and no change of the 
estimated coefficients  of the explanatory variables, with respect to the finding, that in 
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low- and middle-low-income countries the influence of population (growth) seems to 
be higher.
The closely related variables of the shares on total energy production of fossil fuels 
and renewable energies  show neither a better fit of the base model nor are they 
significant. Of course, if increasing the green energy installations, the demand for 
fossil fuel decreases. But if there is more energy available in the market, the price 
effect upon electricity, an elastically priced good, must also be considered. In the 
case that the new power generating capacity does not replace older plants but just 
raises the total production capacity, energy will become cheaper and the effect on 
energy efficiency can, as a possible consequence, be negative. In general, 
renewable energies could, as it was noted earlier (merit-order effect, see chapter 2 
for comparison), reduce electricity prices in response to market conditions and 
thereby work against energy efficiency goals  (e.g. rebound effects, see above). In 
addition, it appears  that the usage of fossil fuels does not increase energy intensity 
per se: it measures  the burning of fossil fuels such as gas, coal and oil. Here we are 
asking, "How large is the share of fossil fuels on the entire energy consumption?" 
This  is not just the share remaining after the subtraction of renewable energies. 
Especially nuclear energy, with relatively low CO2 emissions, produces a large 
amount of the electricity in some EU countries. Nuclear power plants have a very 
special control system characteristic and the gear of them is not very variable: they 
cannot be combined with other plants  to serve as a flexible source of energy and will 
often be operated in base-load duty. The addition of the fossil fuel variable might 
indicate if an increase in the usage rate of primary energy units is caused by changes 
in energy efficiency. Coal and gas  power turbines can be started more easily and 
controlled as peak-load power plants.
Another factor to take into consideration are the conditions of labour markets. Testing 
the influence of the labour participation rate indicates the intensity of the production 
of goods and services in the observed economies. A large workforce can be 
interpreted as the country having sufficient population in the employable age and/or 
the unemployment rate being low. In reverse, if the labour participation is low, a 
relatively small part of the population has to be highly productive and innovative to 
supply and facilitate young and old, as well as unemployed parts of the population, 
with their earnings  and tax payments. Unfortunately, neither the significance was not 
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given for any of the four panel data models applied here, nor were criteria like BIC, 
AIC or Hannan-Quinn improved.
The model does not completely explain the dependent variable. It is obvious that 
additional influencing factors can be found, which may also have considerable 
influence on energy intensity but are not even tested here due to lack of data or as 
they are of no interest for the here conducted analysis and the topic of this thesis. 
First of all the price of fossil fuels: energy has a finite price elasticity - demand lowers 
as prices increase. However, industrial purchase price information is quite 
fragmentary and priced in Dollars, while data used in the model, though available for 
the entire time period, is priced in Euro. It would thus not be meaningful to use this as 
a factor, as it may lead to distortions, as Eurostat's convergence course is unknown 
and exchange rate fluctuations over the years can lead to difficulties of a direct 
comparison. In addition, energy consumption is dependent on a country's  climate. 
This  can be explained by Europe's  great expanse, with a Mediterranean climate in 
the south, a temperate climate in Central Europe, and continental influenced climate 
in the east. The investigation has not yet controlled for these particular influences 
(see e.g. de Cian et al., 1997).
If concentrating on the factors that can be influenced by the policy maker with the aim 
to redesign the conditions of energy use through appliance standards, incentives and 
prohibition of unfavourable techniques, the applied model is an approach to explain 
the driving factors  with feasible and usable results. The interpretation of the 
discussed models will follow in the next chapter.
4.4 Model results and recommendations
Energy efficiency is more than just energy saving. It is clear that the rate of change in 
energy use accompanies first and foremost GDP growth. There is only a limited 
ability to decrease energy use and thus increase energy efficiency with policy 
measures like such as the pressure to fulfil Kyoto Protocol obligations through the 
redistributed BSA targets. But also other factors such as underlying energy efficiency 
and technological development have some influence.
The interdependence between emissions (and environmental damage) and 
population observed by Ehrlich and Holden (1971) can be decoupled. As shown in 
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the literature review above, the environmental Kuznets  curve theory is in the focus for 
a huge variety of analyses by ecological economists. The EKC theory determines the 
exact turning point where growth and emission reverse their relationship: further 
growth no longer causes environmental damages, for example growth of emissions, 
but even leads to lower emissions. Most authors testing for the correlation of the two 
factors come to different results, however, when summarising, it can be shown that 
on the one hand, the relationship is not clear, and on the other hand, other factors 
have to be examined to find a better fit of the chosen models, as their impact is 
uncertain. The biggest obstacle seems to be the turning points, which are at very 
high levels almost out of reach for any country in the near future. In the analysis done 
in this chapter, the EKC concept was not considered for the model design. 
Nevertheless, one has  to keep in mind the positive relation between growth and 
emissions.
It has been shown that the EU member states have different structures regarding 
their economies. There are structural breaks between the old EU-15 and the new EU 
members for the variables POP and EMISSION, in particular the BSA dummy 
variable. Old, matured economies seem to be challenged by other economic and 
social conditions. The analysis shows that the climate change policy objectives for 
the new EU members seem to be in most cases too lax and even allow the 
expansion of emission pollution quantity, and might be further reduced to generate 
relevant and real savings of emissions. Through a stricter involvement of all EU 
member states, the EU as a whole could generate much higher savings of GHG 
emissions.
The addition of further variables shows that policy measures can, however, have a 
significant influence on the energy use, even if the effect is  small. The obligations set 
by the EU create pressure for action, which significantly affects the energy use 
related energy efficiency. It is not proven whether expectations of policy measures 
alone lead to innovations in modern environmental technology and economical 
resource consumption, or whether concrete laws and regulations must be enacted so 
that market participants  take an active part in climate protection actions. While this 
was not the purpose of the examination, it is nonetheless assumed that the 
interaction of high expectations regarding probable policy actions and stringent 
regulation can contribute significantly towards compliance with the Kyoto obligations, 
respectively the redistributed BSA obligations.
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The European Union is pursuing ambitious climate protection policies and requires 
member states to raise energy efficiency in order to also reduce GHG emissions. The 
effectiveness was tested in the aforementioned model and cannot be dismissed. The 
influence of diverse exogenous factors upon the endogenous variables, the focus of 
observations, was examined using the panel dataset and first differences (FD) 
projections, and energy efficiency through the proxy energy use as shown. The 
dataset represented the years 1998 - 2010. In 1998 the members of the EU began to 
enact policies to reach their self-imposed climate protection targets, calculated from 
their Kyoto Protocol obligations. The direct influence of the policy consequences of 
the Kyoto Protocol and the BSA redistributed targets  among the 25 countries was 
completely represented and investigated. Other specifics  of national economies, for 
example population growth or the innovation capacity with the proxy of PATENTS, 
also seem to have an influence on energy intensity. While policies have little or no 
effect on population growth, regulations can affect the formation and control of the 
general framework of the economy, as the conditions of growth processes initiate 
optimisation processes, and innovations result in highly energy-efficient plants. But 
this  influence is indirect, as it is  on population growth. Further research in this area 
must clarify these open questions regarding additional interactions exist and how 
policy makers can have an influence.
The above model tested the policy pressure caused by the Kyoto Protocol and the 
following BSA obligations  among EU members: the redistribution of Kyoto obligations 
with different reduction goals for different countries may result in different levels of 
pressure for one country in relation to another to cut emissions, also if global 
economic challenges and conditions are quiet more similar. Other previous  analysis 
used simple dummy variables  to quantify emission reduction linked to the Kyoto 
Protocol ratification in comparison to non-signatory states, and the meeting of the 
goal over the years, but not changes in compliance.
The findings  of the model expanded from the studies presented in this  chapter are as 
follows: within a group of countries that have homogenous policy conditions of 
contractual obligations due to international treaties, it can be positively inferred that 
the obligations of the Kyoto Protocol redistributed through the BSA exercise pressure 
on EU member states for prompt enactment.
It has been shown that the ecological impact can be influenced also by policy 
measures, as suggested when the simple IPAT was adapted to the STIRPAT 
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methodology with additional variables. The proof of the empirical model with 
enhanced consideration of diverse influential factors implies that climate change can 
be countered, if there is political consensus. This interrelation and the effectiveness 
should again be further examined to explain how to strengthen the influences. If 
necessary, market expectations and trust in policy implementation could be included 
as variables.
The probability of sustainable environmental policies could serve as an indicator and 
as a benchmark for international agreements when implementing control 
mechanisms to achieve global targets. If there is consensus that treaties  are loaded 
with power, future policies will be encouraged to give priority to the development of 
further mechanisms of international agreements to strengthen the synergies of 
international cooperation in the fight against climate change.
Country groups like the EU should also be further analysed, to determine whether 
corresponding measures, for example innovation standards  in product 
manufacturing, subsidies for environmental investments or minimum standards for 
emission limits, might thwart or perhaps  even accelerate economic growth and the 
related energy efficiency.
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5. Final conclusions and recommendations for policy makers
If the European Union is becoming or remaining a global player and innovator in the 
fight against global warming, announcing policies is  not enough. The application of 
environmental policies has to be powerful enough to be anticipated by individuals 
and markets, otherwise policy makers would be helpless to address the global 
challenge to slow down global warming.
While the question about the efficiency of a cap-and-trade system was solved in a 
theoretical approach by modelling the market for emission permits, the problem of 
technological maximisation of the energy harvest was calculated under realistic 
conditions for two different countries. Finally, the doubt about the influence of the 
Kyoto Protocol obligations with binding targets  on emission savings was tested with 
an applied econometric model based on a cross-country panel. To conclude, the 
three propositions presented in chapter 1 were evaluated and tested and can be 
answered as follows:
Proposition 1:
If shocks foil emission reduction plans, the policy maker has to
ensure the achievement of national climate protection plans.
Conclusion 1:
True: Shocks can be dealt with by regulations of allowance
quantities and lead to higher emission savings for the economy
at comparable costs.
As shown in chapter 2, shocks  do not influence the emission saving target in a 
cap-and-trade system, which will always be achieved. Through shocks the demand 
for emission permits changes and system participators will enhance their individual 
economic optimisation. As shocks  are most often related to a decreasing demand for 
emission permits and consequently decreasing prices, emission savings on the 
individual emitter level will decrease, too, while the absolute system cap does not 
change and the total amount of carbon savings remains the same, as  examined in 
the example of the joint application of the EU-ETS cap-and-trade system and 
technology support systems for RES in Germany. From an economic point of view, 
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the results of the shock reduce the costs without negative impacts on the 
environment, the saved financial resources can be spent elsewhere and the total 
economic burden of the instrument is limited to a lower level.
The findings of chapter 2 show in this context the lack of evaluation of the ecological 
efficiency: the high social costs of air pollution and German as a possible "role 
model" that could influence other nations  are not taken into account. If, as done in 
Germany by means of support systems for RES capacities, these technologies are 
developed faster, this provides  political leeway to cut emissions faster. Thus, the cap 
is  not at all exogenous: through policies, green power plants and technologies 
become endogenous factors that influence the cap for the next period.
Chapter 2 confirmed the theoretical potential for policies to put pressure on the 
system with the intention of cutting emissions faster. It endorses joint application of 
different instruments of climate change policies. The question remains open, and is 
under consideration in the following chapters: in what quantity can RES support 
systems lead to additional emission savings and what are their costs?
Proposition 2:
Green technologies are too expensive, without subsidies
a share of green energies of 20 percent of total energy
production is out of reach.
Conclusion 2:
False: A fit between technology and geographical
conditions leads to a higher total energy harvest for an
unchanged investment sum.
The calculations in chapter 3 proved that the RES energy harvest can be improved 
and in what proportion, if a specific technology, e.g. solar power plants, is  not 
supported randomly but in specific geographic areas. The findings show that, as a 
result, the German technology support regimes lead to (private) investments in RES 
sources, even if they are economically uncompetitive. The REFIT for solar energy 
production is paid by all consumers and thus  can be interpreted as an environmental 
tax and the internalisation of the social costs of carbon emissions: the erected green 
energy capacities reduce emissions and boost the price of consumption.
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With the same costs and comparable return on investments81, Germany could have 
accounted for an additional reduction of about 1.2 million tons of CO2 per year. This 
also implies  a potential avoidance of social costs accrued through CO2 emissions of 
approximately 84 million EUR; the additional contribution of total GHG savings would 
be approximately 0.15%. The conditions to realise this  potential are clear: investing 
extraterritorially if the harvest can be higher or stopping the support of specific 
technologies, e.g. solar power plants in Germany, and using others  like wind engines 
instead.
With a European roadmap for RES, the EU could fulfil the Kyoto Protocol obligations 
more easily, more cheaply and earlier. Simultaneously, the objectives of the 20-20-20 
by 2020 targets would be reached more rapidly. This  thesis’ recommendation is to 
implement a path-goal-strategy: a REFIT, parallel to the German model for market 
stimulation, and intra-union concentration of technologies  at the place where they will 
generate the highest harvest. The legal framework for such a policy is given on the 
national (e.g. Germany), European and worldwide (Kyoto) level.
As long as  Europe does not act as a single player, but like a choir with 28 voices, the 
efficiency of climate change policies is  going to be suboptimal from an ecological and 
economic point of view. Otherwise, it is  beneficial if policies intend to decentralise the 
electricity production and promote a convergence in the production share of green 
energies and the conditions of energy use. Whether policies  can put pressure on all 
individuals of a state or the EU to green their consumption is an open question to 
examine within the analysis  of the impact of Kyoto Protocol obligations on national 
plans for emission savings, as conducted in chapter 4.
Proposition 3:
If emissions are correlated to output and growth,
the Kyoto Protocol obligations and energy saving policies
have no effect on the emission output quantity.
Conclusion 3:
Unclear: The Kyoto Protocol might fail on a global scale,
but strong policies on national level put pressure to use
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81 The calculation assumes a lower REFIT but higher harvest per kWh, in conclusion the investors‘ 
return remains steady.
energy more efficiently, on the individual or firm level
and improve the country's energy efficiency.
The anticipation by the policy maker of the Kyoto Protocol and the following 
burden-sharing agreement redistributed obligations and the implementation of policy 
measures lead to increased pressure on individuals to raise the energy efficiency and 
thus lower energy input.
The panel data analysis in chapter 4 shows that energy consumption is highly 
influenced by GDP, but also reveals the dependency of energy use on other factors. 
The test of a participation dummy variable of BSA obligations and its  target 
achievement in an econometric FD panel data analysis shows the pressure of action, 
which significantly affects the energy use of economies. Also if the effect seems to be 
weak, plausible policy actions  and regulations can contribute a significant influence 
on individuals  towards increasing their energy efficiency and thus decreasing their 
use of energy inputs. The whole economy will decrease energy use and the overall 
energy efficiency should rise. Well-directed policies may control and influence growth 
and innovation processes. Appliance standards, regulations and environmental taxes 
set the framework for individuals  to interact in a more environmentally friendly 
market, namely market participators  can generate positive effects of energy savings 
and minimisation of costs through decreasing energy use.
Instruments like the EU-ETS and REFITs are policies that intend not only energy 
savings and new RES capacities, but both have a side effect on energy efficiency, 
too. If emissions because of fuel burnings have a price, one should decrease the 
individual input of energies and the input itself will become greener; the costs  of 
emission permits  can save expenses. To conclude: the joint application of different 
instruments is neither going to cause the Kyoto Protocol, and e.g. the following 
policies like the BSA, to fail nor the instruments  to fail per se, but instead of economic 
optimisation in the present, ecological optimisation would imply bringing down the 
potential (social) costs of tomorrow.
It is  recommended to design legal conditions which continue the success of REFITs 
as technology support regimes. The increasing demand for green technologies in the 
power plant sector leads to decreasing costs  through the growing market, the 
learning curve, and innovations in production, R&D and design; but also the increase 
of competitive players on the supply side. The cost-shrinking effect as well as the fit 
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bet-ween technology and geographical conditions should be the measure for the tariff 
for feed-in energy and decline in the same proportion. As long as the output remains 
attractive for investors and positive above market interest rates, the ecological 
efficiency is in the focus instead of (individual) economic optimisation. Finally, the 
national economies and their societies  realise higher benefits. The correlation was 
demonstrated in chapter 3. An additional benefit can be seen in the greater amount 
of total carbon savings, for example.
If promoting RES, policies should align linked measures, for example the EU-ETS. If 
initially not taken into account, trading schemes should be adjusted after a shock to 
prevent an increase of emissions at the location of the single emitter, as has been 
illustrated in chapter 2. A stronger regulation of trading schemes, allocation of permits 
and a tentative withdrawal of certificates within the trading scheme period have to be 
discussed.
The Kyoto obligations  are not at risk: the compulsory and redistributed BSA targets of 
the European Union and its member states will be achieved, as long as  policies are 
powerful enough to impart confidence in the sustainability of the legal conditions to 
individuals. As shown, side effects of measures for Kyoto compliance give the 
political scope to go ahead with more stringent targets and cut emissions faster on a 
comparable cost level. Today's  policies may have an influence on the energy 
efficiency. However, future measures can be improved if the influential factors  are 
analysed more deeply. The identification of these influential factors need further 
research. It is  worthwhile to intensify research to have a better knowledge about the 
correlation of the factors on ecological-economic output of energy saving polices. 
Limited resources  can be better used, the impact on the environment causes less 
damage and leads to a more sustainable development.
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Appendix 1: Technical appendix to chapter 3
Technological terms and conditions used for the approach outlined above.
Temperature losses: An aberration from STC of ∆°C=1 leads to a temperature loss 
of 0.5% for silicon based cells, as  broadly shown in a series of papers  (Armani et 
al., 2007 (verifying Bucher, 1997), Häberlin, 2007, Rüdiger et al., 2007). The 
authors demonstrate the influence of the natural surrounding temperature. The 
reasons for a lesser performance appears to be a worsening absorption potential 
of silicon, and another coloration of the light, a variation in wave lengths, which 
cannot be absorbed from the cell, with a boosting of the effect the higher the 
temperature is.
Converter losses: Even if the sun is  shining brightly, the radiation alternates 
permanently. The converter tries  to "catch" the maximum power point (MPP) valid 
in a certain moment. It is  an approximation and is forced to be done uninterrupted. 
It seems to be clear that it cannot be more than a try of optimisation. At low 
radiation converters are less efficient because of physical limitations. The higher 
the radiance, the lower the losses of the converter are. If the nominal capacity of 
the solar power plant is less than 30% of the converter capacity, the degree of 
efficiency also decreases significantly.
General losses: 
- Ground and topography: Different soils have different absorption characteristics. 
Barren, rocky soils  for example reflect more radiance due to a lower absorption 
potential of photons, in opposition to e.g. green lawns. Pollution through pollen of 
near plants or the specific micro-climate (wind, rainfall, heat) also affect the 
system performance.
- Geographic location: Urban areas are heated more than rural areas. Locations 
near to the sea will benefit from light reflections of the water surface; sandy 
ground reflects  radiation, while forests absorb photons. In the mountains it is 
more likely to have snow, with subsequent failure of performance of the covered 
modules, as in the lowland areas.
- Aerosols: Aerosols are the smallest particles of air pollution. They have a direct 
impact on the location of their origin, but are not necessarily affected adversely 
by urban areas. Metropolitan areas basically have a high level of air pollution 
caused by exhaust emissions from traffic and industrial pollution, but here 
reflected global radiation can even increase. Thus the reduction of direct 
radiation caused by misty skies can at least be compensated. In contrast, rural 
areas are more polluted by pollen. Near to the seaside salt particles impact the 
pureness of the sky.
 In accumulation, aerosols can reach higher air layers of the atmosphere. They 
influence the formation of clouds in quantity and quality. Lohmann (2006) 
describes this as follows: The less the land mass, the less the sky cover.
- Altitudes: Higher locations  are more favourable than valleys, they benefit 
particularly in months with minor radiance. The exposed positions lead to an 
advantageous angle between the panel and the sun, and the manner of sun 
radiation is shorter (the so called "air mass"). Is the sun is low, the incoming 
radiance to fix-mounted panels  on mountains  is better than in the plains. In 
addition, covered skies and temperatures are lower over the annual period. 
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These pros can be named for solar power plants in the mountains, but seem to 
be less relevant for most investors.
- General losses: An almost optimal installation cannot prevent losses through e.g. 
breaks of soldering joints or cables, leakage currents or the occurrence of minor 
defects  and a little degradation over time, but Renken, Häberlin (2003) 
mentioned no significant effect in the long term survey.
Daily to annual average of global horizontal irradtion:
2500 wh/d  ~    900 kw/y 4000 wh/d  ~  1450 kw/y
3000 wh/d  ~  1100 kw/y 4500 wh/d  ~  1650 kw/y
3500 wh/d  ~  1300 kw/y 5000 wh/d  ~  1800 kw/y
Figure Appendix 1: Horizontal irradition in Europa, source: 
Satel-light.com, Cordis project by EU community, University 
Oldenburg, years of observations: 1996-2006.
Radiation angle: Useful for the final yield is the all penetrating radiance: especially 
when skies are covered by clouds, reflected radiance by mist or aerosol pollution 
can reach high values and compensate installations not done in the optimum 
angle. For latitudes of <45 ° North the proportion of diffuse radiation can become 
even more important than the direct normal one, as shown by Quaschning, Geyer 
(2001).
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The installation angle appears  to be very tolerant: +/- 20° aberration to the 
optimised angle that led to a radiance loss of around 5%: Even if different 
locations in Europe are compared by optimum angle and 0° (=plain) installation of 
solar panels, the difference is  not very high. In addition, an azimuth aberration of 
up to 60° in West-East-direction from optimum South-positioning has only a 
marginal influence.
The optimisation of the installation angle is  a necessity in reaching at least 
periodically the best fitted angle to radiance input for maximum solar harvest. 
Private investors must (and do) ensure a fit to the optimum installation angle, for 
the macro analysis it is negligible.
optimum installation angle 0° angle loss
Goteborg 1070kWh (39°)  918 kWh 14.20% 
Nürnberg 1210 kWh (36°) 1060 kWh 12.40% 
Napoli 1690 kWh (33°) 1500 kWh 11.25% 
Table Appendix 1: Global annual irradiation per square meter
own calculation, data source: PV-GIS, 2008,. http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu
Module efficiency: Solar cells  cannot absorb the radiance in a 1:1 relation. Due to 
the limitations in the design, modern cells make use of only a part of light 
wavelength, the different types are shown in the graphic below. Mostly based on 
mono- or poly-crystalline silicon, the absorption potential is  limited to the absolute 
potential of the raw material. Mono-crystalline cells consist of purer silicon than the 
poly-crystalline ones, that are based no doubt on their name, on several 
(=poly)crystals. Poly-crystalline cells are a little bit less expensive but the 
efficiency is  also slightly reduced. The modularly assembled cells are the product 
from wavers, cut slices from heavy silicon cubes. The abstract is much simpler 
than the reality, but enough for the time being to understand the fundamentals of 
how cells are working.
Prices: Where do the system costs come from? The greatest costs come from the 
solar panels. Their prices are dependent on raw materials, mainly silicon, which is 
the fundamental component of cells: Häberlin (2007) mentioned that mass 
production of panels intends to set a learning curve that could lead to cost 
reductions of about 20% if the production was doubled.
Approximately 8-12% of costs  are for the installation and the initial operational 
procedures. These costs will increase proportionately with the inflation rate. If the 
degree of efficiency rises, required space will be reduced and the costs will reduce 
in parallel.
Cable, clamp systems, brackets and other installation materials  account for 5% of 
costs, prices are relatively steady in relative prices. Marginal differentiation caused 
by the installation type (on-roof, on-plain) are negligible. One type of installation 
requires a few more small parts  and the other more human power. In sum it should 
be more or less equal.
The converter is the last cost component in the calculation. The converter price 
increased substantially over the past years, but remains at 8-12% of the total 
power plant costs. For the whole investment, no more significant reduction is 
expected, but little reductions are imaginable. It is  often not declared that 
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converters are not expected to have a life span of more than 15 years. To take this 
into account, the following analysis will count converter prices twice, which leads 
to a huge percentage increase in the costs of the converters.
For the final yield calculation, there is an alternative in the market: two axis 
tracking systems, which adjust panels over the day and year in position to the sun 
track. They have additional costs per one capacity load factor of about 1000 EUR. 
One must consider whether the tracking systems are a rewarding investment, 
because with the same investment sum installable capacity could be increased by 
20%.
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Appendix 2: Panel Data models of chapter 4
Model 1: Ordinary Least Squares (Pooled OLS)
using 325 observations
included 25 cross-sectional units
time-series length: 13
Dependent variable: ENERGYUSE
Robust (HAC) standard errors
OLS-model coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
const 12.6344 2.05410  6.151 2.31e-09***
GDP -0.005091 0.087582 -0.058 0.9537
POP -0.228872 0.055268 -4.141 4.43e-05***
EMISSION -0.359689 0.269860 -1.333 0.1835
BSA -0.167507 0.075674 -2.214 0.0276**
PATENTS  0.158762 0.037417  4.243 2.90e-05***
TECH-EFFICIENCY -0.285364 0.224721 -1.270 0.2051
Note: Variables indicated with *, ** and *** show significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Mean dependent var 8.148019 S.D. dependent var 0.374977
Sum squared resid 12.14900 S.E. of regression 0.195459
R-squared 0.733322 Adjusted R-squared 0.728290
F(6, 318) 145.7415 P-value(F) 3.75e-88
Log-likelihood 72.91394 Akaike criterion -131.8279
Schwarz criterion -105.3411 Hannan-Quinn -121.2570
rho 0.932465 Durbin-Watson 0.121761
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Model 2: Random-effects (RE)
using 325 observations
included 25 cross-sectional units
time-series length: 13
Dependent variable: ENERGYUSE
RE-Model coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
const 12.4852 0.566104  22.05 4.72e-66***
GDP   0.053116 0.011728    4.529 8.39e-06***
POP  -0.120454 0.031675   -3.803 0.0002***
EMISSION  -0.643871 0.039189 -16.430 2.40e-44***
BSA  -0.009198 0.009565   -0.962 0.3370
PATENTS   0.012034 0.007084    1.670 0.0903*
TECH-EFFICIENCY  -0.085968 0.041688   -2.062 0.0400**
Note: Variables indicated with *, ** and *** show significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Mean dependent var 8.148019 S.D. dependent var 0.374977
Sum squared resid 24.42844 S.E. of regression 0.276728
Log-likelihood -40.59250 Akaike criterion 95.18501
Schwarz criterion 121.6718 Hannan-Quinn 105.7559
'Within' variance = 0.0011277
'Between' variance = 0.0403591
theta used for quasi-demeaning = 0.953639
Breusch-Pagan test -
  Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0
  Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(1) = 1298.4
  with p-value = 2.51763e-284
Hausman test -
  Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent
  Asymptotic test statistic: Chi-square(6) = 38.0188
  with p-value = 1.1139e-06
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Model 3: Fixed-effects (FE)
using 325 observations
included 25 cross-sectional units
time-series length: 13
Dependent variable: ENERGYUSE
Robust (HAC) standard errors
FE-Model coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
const 15.8649 2.061850  7.694 2.16e-13***
GDP   0.060751 0.021680  2.802 0.0054***
POP  -0.332583 0.136051 -2.445 0.0151**
EMISSION  -0.640387 0.094135 -6.803 5.74e-11***
BSA  -0.012107 0.010342 -1.171 0.2427
PATENTS   0.004413 0.012779  0.345 0.7301
TECH-EFFICIENCY  -0.050359 0.099699 -0.505 0.06139
Note: Variables indicated with *, ** and *** show significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Mean dependent var 8.148019 S.D. dependent var 0.374977
Sum squared resid 0.331543 S.E. of regression 0.033581
R-squared 0.992722 Adjusted R-squared 0.991980
F(30, 294) 1336.802 P-value(F) 2.3e-295
Log-likelihood 658.1161 Akaike criterion -1254.232
Schwarz criterion -1136.934 Hannan-Quinn -1207.418
rho 0.473655 Durbin-Watson 0.918364
Test for differing group intercepts -
  Null hypothesis: The groups have a common intercept
  Test statistic: F(24, 294) = 436.636
  with p-value = P(F(24, 294) > 436.636) = 2.45528e-214
Test for normality of residual -
  Null hypothesis: error is normally distributed
  Test statistic: Chi-square(2) = 66.4463
  with p-value = 3.72711e-15
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Model 4: First Differences (FD)
using 300 observations
included 25 cross-sectional units
time-series length: 12
Dependent variable: ENERGYUSE
Robust (HAC) standard errors
FD-model coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
const -0.022925 0.007716 -2.971 0.0032***
GDP  0.133776 0.027944  4.787 2.69e-06***
POP -0.351516 0.395398 -0.889 0.3747
EMISSION -0.604663 0.074595 -8.106 1.44e14***
BSA  0.003358 0.002799  1.199 0.2315
PATENTS  0.002334 0.000781  2.987 0.0031***
TECH-EFFICIENCY -0.010435 0.005711 -1.827 0.0687*
Note: Variables indicated with *, ** and *** show significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Mean dependent var -0.00442 S.D. dependent var 0.043990
Sum squared resid 0.296544 S.E. of regression 0.031813
R-squared 0.487470 Adjusted R-squared 0.476974
F(6, 293) 46.44564 P-value(F) 7.86e-40
Log-likelihood 612.2199 Akaike criterion -1210.440
Schwarz criterion -1184.513 Hannan-Quinn -1200.064
rho 0.079191 Durbin-Watson 1.782756
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Model 5: Chow test for FD (Model 4) for structural difference
with respect to dummy variable EU15
F(7, 286) = 14.9259 with p-value 0.0000
using 300 observations
included 25 cross-sectional units
time-series length: 12
Dependent variable: ENERGYUSE
Robust (HAC) standard errors
FD-model Chow test coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
const -0.00540509 0.013588   -0.3978 0.6911
GDP  0.037623 0.031558    1.192 0.2342
POP  1.125990 0.756559    1.488 0.1378
EMISSION -1.706140 0.118881 -14.350 1.49e-35***
BSA -0.023148 0.011672   -1.983 0.0483**
PATENTS  0.000464 0.002670    0.174 0.8622
TECH-EFFICIENCY -0.022082 0.014213   -1.554 0.1214
EU15  0.004478 0.018223    0.246 0.8061
EU15 GDP  0.086420 0.059572    1.451 0.1480
EU15 POP -1.958450 0.879533   -2.227 0.0267**
EU15 EMISSION  1.220440 0.125767    9.704 1.98e-19***
EU15 BSA  0.027013 0.012558    2.151 0.0323**
EU15 PATENTS -0.000665 0.002971   -0.224 0.8230
EU15 TECH-EFFICIENCY  0.014082 0.020854    0.675 0.5000
Note: Variables indicated with *, ** and *** show significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Mean dependent var -0.00442 S.D. dependent var 0.043990
Sum squared resid 0.217197 S.E. of regression 0.027558
R-squared 0.624608 Adjusted R-squared 0.607544
F(13, 286) 36.60534 P-value(F) 3.06e-53
Log-likelihood 658.9281 Akaike criterion -1289.856
Schwarz criterion -1238.003 Hannan-Quinn -1269.104
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Covariance matrix of regression coefficients:




5.95369e-05 -1.75636e-04 -3.11332e-04 -2.52072e-05 -2.59146e-06 -5.28391e-06 3.71120e-05 CONST.
7.80851e-04 0.00100803 2.64110e-04 1.56526e-05 1.49410e-05 -7.57023e-05 GDP
0.15634 -0.00536643 -6.57906e-04 -5.16881e-05 -6.58110e-04 POP
0.00556442 8.89238e-05 -6.21073e-06 -2.40298e-05 EMISSION







Appendix 3: Panel Data description of chapter 4
Data description: from original sources, if not modified as descriped below.
 (basic model) log(ENERGYUSE)i,t = β1log(GDPi,t) + β2log(POPi,t)
        + β3log(EMISSIONi,t) + β4(BSAi,t)
        + β5log(PATENTSi,t) + β6log(TECH-EFFICIENCYi,t) + ui,t
ENERGYUSE: Worldbank data [EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE] - Energy use (kg of oil 
equivalent per capita) - Energy use refers to use of primary energy before 
transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production plus 
imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels  supplied to ships and aircraft 
e n g a g e d i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a n s p o r t . 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE (August 2012, updated: 
February 2013)
GDP: Eurostat data [nama_gdp_c] - GDP and main components - The data are 
recorded at current and constant prices and include the corresponding implicit price 
indices. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_gdp_c& 
lang=en (August 2012)
POP: Worldbank data [SP.POP.TOTL] – Population, total - Total population is based 
on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents  regardless of legal 
status or citizenship--except for refugees  not permanently settled in the country of 
asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. 
The values  shown are midyear estimates. http://data.worldbank. org/indicator/ 
SP.POP.TOTL (August 2012).
EMISSION: Eurostat data [tsien010] - Greenhouse gas  emissions, Kyoto base year 
(source: EEA) - Index of greenhouse gas emissions and targets - In CO2 equivalents 
(Actual base year = 100): This index shows trends in total man-made emissions of 
the "Kyoto basket" of greenhouse gases. It presents annual total emissions in 
relation to "Kyoto base year". In general the base year is  1990 for the non-fluorinated 
gases and 1995 for the fluorinated gases. The "Kyoto basket" of greenhouse gases 
includes: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and the 
so-called F-gases  (hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6)). These gases are aggregated into a single unit using gas-specific global 
warming potential (GWP) factors. The aggregated greenhouse gas emissions are 
expressed in units of CO2 equivalents. The indicator does not include emissions and 
removals  related to land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF); nor does it 
include emissions  from international aviation and international maritime transport. 
CO2 emissions from biomass with energy recovery are reported as a Memorandum 
item according to UNFCCC Guidelines and not included in national greenhouse gas 
totals. With the exception of Cyprus and Malta all Member States have individual 
targets  under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU-15 agreed (Council Decision 2002/358/EC) 
to a collective 8% reduction of its  greenhouse gas emissions by 2008-12. This 
agreement sets the contribution of each individual EU-15 Member State towards 
reaching the common EU Kyoto target. Eastern European Member States have 




BSA: Dummy variable, bases on the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement, indicates 
countries with 1 that are under pressure to reduce emissions (present emissions 
are above allowed emissions), or with 0 if the emission reduction goals  are already 
met.
PATENTS: Eurostat data [tsiir060] - Patent applications to the European Patent 
Office (EPO) - Number of applications per million inhabitants: Data refer to 
applications filed directly under the European Patent Convention or to applications 
filed under the Patent Co-operation Treaty and designated to the EPO (Euro-PCT). 
Patent applications are counted according to the year in which they were filed at the 
EPO and are broken down according to the International Patent Classification 
(IPC). They are also broken down according to the inventor's place of residence, 




TECH-EFFIENCY: Technological efficiency in the transformation process  of energy. 
The input-output relation is showing conversions losses of the raw energy 
consumption between transformation input and transformation output. The ratio 
based an Eurostat data [nrg_100a] - Annual data on crude oil, oil products, natural 
gas, electricity, solid fuels and renewable covering the full spectrum of the energy 
balances positions from supply through transformation to final energy consumption 
by sector and fuel type. All the data is  measured in physical units (t, TJ, kWh, toe, 
etc.). Basic data are on energy quantities  are in fuel specific units e.g. liquid fuels in 
thousand tonnes, electricity in kilowatt-hours, while structural data on the capacity of 
installations are in Megawatt, thousand tonnes per year (production capacity) or 
thousand square meters of installed surface in case of solar panels. The basic 
energy quantities data are converted to energy units, i.e. in Terajoules and Tonnes of 


























































1998 5659.70793 22400 10203000 89.1 1 1155.32 0.795416152296797
1999 5689.22355 23400 10226000 93.5 1 1343.52 0.787146038816417
2000 5706.984 24600 10252000 93.2 1 1315.18 0.801332663218819
2001 5673.66579 25300 10287000 93.4 1 1212.79 0.812753214726088
2002 5454.65983 26000 10333000 94.5 1 1328.94 0.825627650118755
2003 5709.09237 26600 10376080 92.7 1 1359.09 0.817318702981635
2004 5650.92778 28000 10421120 92.8 1 1515.08 0.815467523304862
2005 5600.43517 29000 10478650 95.4 1 1492.14 0.792648755562881
2006 5509.3128 30200 10547958 99 1 1499.15 0.786324645331574
2007 5366.70525 31600 10625700 103.1 0 1524.6 0.786397381655624
2008 5470.73507 32299 10708433 101.1 0 1449.8 0.803588306498416
2009 5299.74752 31600 10788760 106.5 0 1435.69 0.762197477958481
2010 5212.9228 32700 10895785 101.5 0 1414.54 0.765547221275145
1998 2424.24609 1400 8257000 135.7 0 9.1 0.624027567482901
1999 2225.02437 1500 8208000 139.6 0 8.01 0.631155072698773
2000 2314.26799 1700 8060000 139.8 0 7.43 0.618990580933195
2001 2464.2225 2000 7910000 139.5 0 15.98 0.596148999445537
2002 2416.31719 2200 7869000 141.8 0 14.63 0.587855906874312
2003 2493.92816 2400 7823000 137.8 0 22.45 0.597193454846728
2004 2418.84077 2600 7781000 138.4 0 17.78 0.61923459504738
2005 2569.25065 3000 7740000 138.7 0 23.82 0.613846903949293
2006 2655.53278 3400 7699020 137.7 0 27.13 0.629726866565336
2007 2624.49339 4000 7659764 134.8 0 12.05 0.636127263272349
2008 2594.51334 4600 7623395 136.6 0 17.9 0.641113671636175
2009 2304.54108 4600 7585131 148 0 15.93 0.633517786561265
2010 2370.14919 4800 7534289 146 0 12.2 0.609402113898091
1998 3983.52582 5600 10294900 117.2 0 65.73 0.65752520968806
1999 3727.51143 5700 10283000 119.4 0 59.98 0.639726537381122
2000 3918.11784 6200 10273300 116.1 0 66.58 0.636192393881329
2001 4034.72222 7000 10224000 115 0 72.37 0.633728052266231
2002 4097.16828 8200 10204853 117.2 0 91.82 0.627232347985909
2003 4349.0179 8300 10207362 117.6 0 112.66 0.625215939191524
2004 4452.71425 9000 10216016 116.8 0 112.21 0.621278644874373
2005 4386.94359 10200 10235828 117.2 0 108.59 0.633505647019161
2006 4463.95967 11500 10269134 116.4 0 153.21 0.628724556385549
2007 4429.77465 12800 10334160 116.1 0 182.01 0.61782156359522
2008 4281.51971 14800 10424336 119.2 0 206.72 0.63304395755822
2009 4140.24063 13500 10489970 123 0 239.43 0.614877024595081
2010 4024.19259 14200 10519192 120 0 268.17 0.618434121286075
1998 3774.75948 29300 5301000 69.6 1 799.42 0.799977651134205
1999 3604.36171 30700 5319111 73.8 1 864.01 0.818072976054732
2000 3481.69427 32500 5337344 80.5 1 980.16 0.830873199359772
2001 3575.66887 33500 5355082 78.5 1 926.17 0.829197080291971
2002 3527.18656 34400 5374255 79.6 1 961.81 0.830053034767236
2003 3725.88671 35000 5387174 72.2 1 1103.29 0.812964873228731
2004 3589.21768 36500 5401177 80.9 1 1097.56 0.843986418061595
2005 3471.76447 38300 5415978 86.9 1 1166.85 0.853807171723651
2006 3714.36264 40200 5437272 75.6 1 1103.6 0.814037260088929

























































2008 3460.37704 42800 5493621 86.9 1 1251.15 0.844815363794548
2009 3368.66855 40600 5529270 91 1 1279.25 0.854928229665072
2010 3547.94389 42500 5547683 91 1 1337.8 0.853118840211102
1998 4184.78433 23700 82047000 93 1 19577.73 0.707320513248782
1999 4088.56457 24400 82087000 95.6 1 20994.54 0.703001937830763
2000 4102.79771 24900 82210000 95.9 1 22105.79 0.705188271303197
2001 4219.14664 25500 82333000 94.6 1 21918.08 0.691848347627901
2002 4111.88006 25900 82508000 96.2 1 21818.75 0.693461400562339
2003 4144.24347 26000 82541000 96.7 1 22119.43 0.723354596650386
2004 4163.17998 26600 82516250 97.9 1 23039.1 0.723788631524614
2005 4106.91723 27000 82469400 99.7 1 23861.72 0.746050108838242
2006 4142.40958 28100 82376451 99.2 1 23838.88 0.738725168472433
2007 4046.59877 29500 82266372 101.3 0 23907.18 0.702943658619272
2008 4083.34678 30100 82110097 101.3 0 22655.19 0.707040585955597
2009 3893.84579 29000 81879976 105 0 22253.01 0.706807369328523
2010 4053.7204441399330500 81776930 103 0 21724.39 0.689211482642969
1998 3702.20747 3600 1386200 146.1 0 5.23 0.447405727246952
1999 3498.7114 3900 1375649 149.4 0 7.28 0.457805907172996
2000 3442.83065 4500 1369512 149.3 0 5.58 0.444835680751174
2001 3606.78029 5100 1364097 148.6 0 9.67 0.459612518628912
2002 3465.96338 5700 1358641 150.1 0 5.7 0.470447044704471
2003 3832.22961 6400 1353520 145.5 0 10.73 0.459583671262503
2004 3916.23855 7200 1348998 144.8 0 8.85 0.42042042042042
2005 3836.26774 8300 1346100 146.5 0 6.37 0.425378885178526
2006 3748.28718 10000 1343547 147.6 0 21.22 0.438694267515924
2007 4182.84052 12000 1341672 140.3 0 28.22 0.436550595933629
2008 4026.33002 12200 1340675 144.5 0 34.27 0.411403293192431
2009 3542.85738 10300 1340345 154 0 43.57 0.38329490135793
2010 4083.67801 10700 1340161 144 0 51.02 0.395643153526971
1998 3425.08551 21400 3712900 96.6 1 187.31 0.639367266232938
1999 3539.54727 24300 3755000 94 1 235.01 0.622499350480645
2000 3599.88437 27800 3805400 91.2 1 208.61 0.654187431627568
2001 3739.6061 30600 3866450 87.8 1 252.13 0.634321550741163
2002 3695.50842 33400 3931800 91.2 1 224.29 0.636341986187187
2003 3576.84511 35300 3995700 91.6 1 225.82 0.646831156265119
2004 3569.66412 37000 4068450 92 1 273.24 0.642315470171891
2005 3459.64271 39300 4159100 89.2 1 274.4 0.645580378824672
2006 3444.21071 41800 4260773 90.2 1 284.88 0.680108857001484
2007 3441.87227 43500 4356931 91.3 1 314.44 0.668958031837916
2008 3385.02036 40500 4425675 91.7 1 320.89 0.683947912863576
2009 3215.87206 35900 4450446 102 0 336.39 0.667836415170738
2010 3338.55442 34900 4474356 103 0 353.56 0.668473351400181
1998 2364.5593 11300 10835000 111.8 0 59.94 0.791283893321466
1999 2363.41082 12100 10883000 111.9 0 52.31 0.771088389613884
2000 2480.97092 12600 10917500 108.3 0 56.37 0.78526922172584
2001 2557.4546 13400 10949950 107.1 0 71.77 0.778179536218025
2002 2577.55369 14300 10987550 107.4 0 75.95 0.778221448300709
2003 2643.52228 15600 11023550 103.9 0 84.9 0.781129224421004
2004 2685.5606 16700 11061750 103.6 0 65.82 0.771011289648169
2005 2724.0634 17400 11104000 100.8 0 110.74 0.769509607450195

























































2007 2699.69086 19900 11192763 101.7 0 104.18 0.77630246119309
2008 2707.0166 20700 11237094 106.4 0 90.12 0.776421246157824
2009 2609.18623 20500 11283293 108 0 83.25 0.780535949276229
2010 2387.47761 20100 11315508 114 0 75.97 0.79047137245566
1998 2790.85927 13500 39721100 98.1 1 627.44 0.771579299620086
1999 2910.99214 14500 39926250 88.2 1 732.96 0.75027702798693
2000 3028.79553 15600 40263200 83.6 1 804.19 0.741214866499732
2001 3070.42285 16700 40720450 83.7 1 879.73 0.744395918682848
2002 3119.72106 17700 41313950 77.9 1 939.44 0.729379140064306
2003 3171.68399 18600 42004500 75.4 1 961.4 0.733892036144015
2004 3257.87361 19700 42691650 69.9 1 1209.5 0.737295319680543
2005 3268.1347 21000 43398150 64.8 1 1352.54 0.741109765975422
2006 3206.96767 22400 44116441 67.5 1 1342.81 0.738634022388572
2007 3205.73489 23500 44878945 63.6 1 1371.38 0.737015224883305
2008 3046.66488 23900 45555716 75 1 1407.85 0.749693186998142
2009 2755.90975 22800 45957671 89 1 1426.29 0.761338936386031
2010 2781.27825 22800 46070971 92 1 1454.12 0.76371819960861
1998 4275.77999 21900 58398000 97.4 1 6777.16 0.650162851400984
1999 4252.61527 22700 58622514 100.4 0 7214.72 0.635800544075384
2000 4276.50549 23700 58895516 101.2 0 7307.25 0.640910775651028
2001 4397.89492 24500 59192410 100.8 0 7301.64 0.645740133889924
2002 4381.05948 25000 59598597 102.5 0 7432.07 0.627795410601583
2003 4418.77913 25600 60154851 101.7 0 7929.53 0.631332466746203
2004 4456.01307 26500 60521142 102 0 8313.55 0.630284295075037
2005 4441.00011 27300 60873000 101.3 0 8345.53 0.621272570410045
2006 4350.93414 28400 61352572 104.2 0 8399.38 0.624296284558536
2007 4260.51896 29600 61938464 106 0 8516.85 0.624512594469676
2008 4279.15846 30100 62277432 106.5 0 8577.84 0.629691804789029
2009 4040.66098 29200 62616488 109 0 8655.28 0.621300999349306
2010 4060.36003 29900 65075569 107 0 8740.58 0.597177597177597
1998 2912.70836 19200 56910950 89.1 1 3353.02 0.81137918944539
1999 2957.05229 19900 56921550 87.9 1 3734.43 0.797522328634456
2000 3011.87387 21000 56948600 87.1 1 4006.28 0.785777532909624
2001 3021.07556 22000 56980700 86.1 1 3992.72 0.800615160735547
2002 3016.16239 22800 57157400 85.9 1 4231.78 0.793062621163429
2003 3114.73119 23300 57604650 83.1 1 4394.86 0.785524547444933
2004 3121.58253 24000 58175300 82.4 1 4580.23 0.787229780181755
2005 3137.35293 24500 58607050 82.7 1 4889.72 0.799221663888323
2006 3089.50405 25300 58941499 84.8 1 4997.35 0.790084681983301
2007 3016.32216 26200 59375289 86.6 1 4835.18 0.791095108457012
2008 2942.09576 26300 59832179 88.7 1 4647.69 0.789852261040393
2009 2735.04936 25200 60221211 98.5 1 4567.01 0.796517154056961
2010 2813.52051 25700 60483385 96.5 1 4423.56 0.798539071873156
1998 1783.81743 2500 2410000 147.3 0 4.67 0.836468885672938
1999 1642.67782 2900 2390000 150.3 0 1.7 0.802448979591837
2000 1565.76728 3600 2372000 152.6 0 8.97 0.804967801287949
2001 1725.30733 3900 2359000 150.1 0 5.13 0.815264527320035
2002 1706.15911 4200 2338000 150.2 0 6.53 0.819148936170213
2003 1819.5174 4300 2325341 149.6 0 7.61 0.826238053866203
2004 1879.97953 4800 2312791 149.5 0 9.82 0.811981566820277

























































2006 1987.37034 7000 2287948 146.6 0 17.42 0.835174953959484
2007 2051.7552 9200 2276100 144.6 0 16.33 0.832850241545894
2008 1978.73522 10100 2266094 146.1 0 22.77 0.80990099009901
2009 1871.4269 8200 2255128 150 0 24.09 0.826219512195122
2010 1971.263 8600 2239008 145 0 25 0.824546240276578
1998 2649.50774 2800 3555000 144.1 0 0.67 0.76681153694192
1999 2262.81507 2900 3531000 149.7 0 3 0.761915220733582
2000 2037.98942 3600 3499527 152.8 0 4.69 0.795124133303512
2001 2336.19938 3900 3481295 150.5 0 3.15 0.791602531212588
2002 2512.18336 4400 3469093 149.7 0 2.66 0.769533814839134
2003 2627.78505 4800 3454239 149.1 0 16.85 0.770298086452695
2004 2670.57901 5300 3435584 147.5 0 11.12 0.794943820224719
2005 2521.161 6100 3414300 145.5 0 8.92 0.843432899814206
2006 2497.58256 7100 3394082 144 0 9.67 0.85347516596017
2007 2740.83146 8500 3375618 140.5 0 9.8 0.811612903225806
2008 2732.78312 9700 3358115 142.8 0 16.2 0.856864161849711
2009 2511.66328 8000 3339550 152 0 18.63 0.839183489002711
2010 2106.959 8400 3286820 150 0 21.62 0.963897000265463
1998 7061.45514 40700 424700 103.9 0 74.23 0.318181818181818
1999 7238.51559 46200 430475 100.8 0 62.48 0.297297297297297
2000 7602.56704 50400 436300 96.8 1 80.7 0.326315789473684
2001 7788.91343 51100 441525 94.5 1 72.98 0.416184971098266
2002 8102.20205 53800 446175 86.3 1 60.84 0.497950819672131
2003 8453.82282 57200 451630 83 1 87.33 0.50000000000000
2004 9157.48917 60000 458095 71.7 1 114.74 0.508532423208191
2005 9207.62408 65200 465158 71.2 1 97.97 0.51038062283737
2006 9114.8175 71800 472637 71.8 1 107.87 0.510708401976936
2007 8791.79488 78100 479993 74.9 1 70.72 0.513812154696133
2008 8429.34616 80800 488650 77.1 1 91.57 0.50635593220339
2009 7934.06966 75200 497854 85 1 89.44 0.524436090225564
2010 8294.27186 79500 506953 80 1 83.3 0.522441651705566
1998 2501.80927 4200 10266570 126 0 57.16 0.699960246471874
1999 2490.73751 4400 10237530 125.7 0 115.02 0.696161616161616
2000 2448.24905 4900 10210971 127.2 0 121.64 0.701851558790948
2001 2512.07942 5800 10187576 125.4 0 99.84 0.695314973092751
2002 2520.12874 6900 10158608 127.2 0 121.8 0.688476616420959
2003 2580.17334 7300 10129552 124.6 0 133.73 0.696498054474708
2004 2587.97093 8100 10107146 125.5 0 152.6 0.7010888252149
2005 2734.49621 8800 10087050 124.8 0 134.63 0.708011429780929
2006 2713.6328 8900 10071370 126.3 0 164.35 0.720333281581535
2007 2657.97382 9900 10055780 128.4 0 185.7 0.705885237861697
2008 2635.73466 10500 10038188 130.6 0 178.41 0.704865398863917
2009 2480.06895 9100 10022302 136 0 193 0.699856969963693
2010 2544.13835 9700 10000023 135 0 202.55 0.713414014034374
1998 4600.84087 22900 15698000 87.4 1 2595.77 0.912089265247743
1999 4520.40494 24400 15805000 93 1 2966.53 0.908197239594139
2000 4598.24288 26300 15925431 93.3 1 3465.53 0.914784795176822
2001 4712.23797 27900 16046091 92.6 1 3920.92 0.907000501495199
2002 4687.56647 28800 16148891 92.8 1 3547.33 0.906070682120464
2003 4807.07034 29400 16225267 92.2 1 3484.26 0.908887749120751

























































2005 4827.18898 31500 16319850 94.3 1 3476.92 0.916421867163431
2006 4696.96107 33100 16346101 96 1 3670.73 0.906591147001645
2007 4897.90556 34900 16381696 96.9 1 3241.12 0.877876148659996
2008 4845.12781 36200 16445593 96.9 1 3360.87 0.881629286021711
2009 4729.15996 34700 16531294 101 0 3322.19 0.871357843369498
2010 5015.1663 35400 16615394 95 1 3206.01 0.878073448889199
1998 3593.50331 23900 7982461 83.4 1 956.06 0.853205686103858
1999 3580.77155 24900 8002186 85.5 1 1073.28 0.855516742953505
2000 3559.3565 26000 8011560 85.4 1 1183.38 0.871263322069145
2001 3758.78916 26600 8043015 80.1 1 1208.51 0.867921059083109
2002 3789.38234 27300 8083639 77.9 1 1281.99 0.872328800388538
2003 3973.36717 27700 8117800 70.7 1 1387.85 0.856004282400523
2004 4003.08268 28700 8174700 72 1 1444.31 0.860793584295888
2005 4128.47825 29800 8233300 69.5 1 1515.66 0.858612563940456
2006 4067.89124 31300 8282424 73.5 1 1723.2 0.855846892192438
2007 4005.88474 33000 8300788 77 1 1676.84 0.855396190924054
2008 3987.80078 33900 8336926 77.4 1 1589.12 0.862203594189585
2009 3784.40745 33000 8364095 86 1 1613.61 0.859508186668302
2010 3941.19148 34100 8389771 80 1 1577.08 0.849964985994398
1998 2469.60228 4000 38666145 120.6 0 28.39 0.683893953381029
1999 2405.37534 4100 38658000 122.7 0 36.25 0.681800167334537
2000 2317.48487 4900 38453757 124.7 0 43.39 0.680500292360131
2001 2346.07879 5600 38248076 125.3 0 58.07 0.687657718025121
2002 2324.19969 5500 38230364 127.7 0 84.42 0.682857017041701
2003 2384.66236 5000 38204570 125.5 0 111.47 0.691919688645975
2004 2394.38658 5300 38182222 125.4 0 124.38 0.697525859658932
2005 2420.43524 6400 38165450 124.8 0 124.03 0.687385062796698
2006 2550.91159 7100 38141267 122.5 0 140.26 0.695819101331851
2007 2544.42747 8200 38120560 123 0 199.65 0.704167163230445
2008 2567.31938 9500 38125759 123.8 0 228.99 0.704844397366622
2009 2452.51061 8100 38149886 126 0 263.98 0.701991556143119
2010 2663.7051 9300 38183683 123 0 305.22 0.71234219399357
1998 2254.91164 10800 10129000 101 0 26.85 0.833085465000991
1999 2409.47513 11700 10174000 88.5 1 36.33 0.799766300537509
2000 2412.81774 12500 10225803 91.8 1 41.98 0.805206832681622
2001 2410.87674 13100 10292936 89.4 1 41.45 0.815380736258195
2002 2490.66236 13600 10368326 81.8 1 41.23 0.791656356708072
2003 2407.03854 13700 10441045 90.2 1 66.72 0.824152972205315
2004 2460.20637 14200 10501964 86.2 1 58.48 0.81925882410535
2005 2505.91263 14600 10549450 83 1 123.91 0.805902331558656
2006 2329.76177 15200 10584344 90.5 1 107.22 0.825656004596821
2007 2362.76475 16000 10608335 94.2 1 122.83 0.822094100689797
2008 2274.342 16200 10622413 96.7 1 112.07 0.821156057280234
2009 2266.25524 15800 10632069 103 0 108.12 0.79773897470338
2010 2211.17927 16200 10637346 110 0 108.42 0.837084313066846
1998 1806.0703 1700 22503000 138.1 0 5.23 0.798322720919398
1999 1607.40091 1500 22457994 144.3 0 7.71 0.764546684709066
2000 1612.35129 1800 22443000 143 0 6.12 0.761994529459599
2001 1679.51383 2000 22132000 141.3 0 10.36 0.770266459890032
2002 1721.5419 2200 21803128 139.1 0 11.35 0.769803494934385

























































2004 1769.02031 2800 21684883 136.1 0 23.2 0.765186550297298
2005 1769.63949 3700 21634350 138.3 0 28.68 0.79737379827823
2006 1845.63723 4500 21587666 136.6 0 20.35 0.768608783541456
2007 1824.67312 5800 21546873 137.1 0 32.77 0.752120890774125
2008 1830.46816 6500 21513622 139.6 0 33.47 0.735792159591742
2009 1601.75571 5500 21482395 148 0 35.07 0.734394313967861
2010 1632.15554 5800 21438001 148 0 39.98 0.734264848663937
1998 3252.79935 9800 1982600 97.5 1 39.03 0.436755712906341
1999 3238.47897 10500 1985500 100.7 0 31.37 0.460866526904263
2000 3224.23328 10800 1989000 99.5 1 50.62 0.444764303706369
2001 3379.51807 11500 1992000 95.3 1 51 0.400491400491401
2002 3425.27583 12300 1994000 94 1 84.33 0.385844748858447
2003 3463.44662 12900 1995699 95.5 1 73.44 0.398697291738087
2004 3569.85494 13600 1996999 94.2 1 112.88 0.398596725693284
2005 3645.5886 14400 2000500 92.7 1 108.58 0.399357945425361
2006 3648.47115 15500 2006868 91.6 1 99.76 0.399541884816754
2007 3627.13453 17100 2018122 90.9 1 119.11 0.391680000000000
2008 3826.71487 18400 2021316 87.4 1 139.91 0.392617449664429
2009 3416.62838 17300 2043241 96 1 150.35 0.398045602605863
2010 3462.44599 17300 2048583 96 1 167.21 0.403639909002275
1998 3256.18937 3700 5390657 121.1 0 11.97 0.722148955368918
1999 3272.03405 3600 5395115 122.1 0 15.42 0.696421471172962
2000 3292.60594 4100 5388740 123.7 0 11.23 0.711668709282074
2001 3456.65471 4400 5378900 121.8 0 12.49 0.70857042294832
2002 3482.55284 4800 5379100 122.8 0 24.6 0.70844428664418
2003 3464.72355 5500 5379649 121.2 0 31.14 0.706426794701221
2004 3409.78583 6300 5382449 121.6 0 20.61 0.717302725968436
2005 3495.45201 7100 5387000 122.5 0 31.3 0.71663425844087
2006 3457.35224 8300 5391409 122.8 0 39.56 0.716827626573017
2007 3307.01285 10200 5397318 125.7 0 36.85 0.73767925355376
2008 3385.47553 11900 5406626 124.2 0 33.67 0.713513853113024
2009 3086.14566 11600 5418156 131 0 34.46 0.734725186766275
2010 3179.80243 12100 5430099 128 0 32.76 0.741181159901681
1998 6320.00776 22500 5153000 99 1 1179.23 0.788563735562956
1999 6284.06447 23700 5165446 100 1 1428.93 0.783054297848443
2000 6203.20204 25500 5176197 102.7 0 1434.39 0.785168838447527
2001 6341.7558 26800 5187995 95.3 1 1407.21 0.761070426391075
2002 6653.27477 27600 5200596 92.3 1 1282 0.772491321932423
2003 7046.42823 27900 5212995 81.4 1 1286.04 0.752432945644434
2004 7063.1195 29100 5228143 87 1 1375.59 0.758724157589942
2005 6498.54177 30000 5246100 103.6 0 1313.37 0.785364204833531
2006 7049.0146 31500 5266268 87.8 1 1327.87 0.761434051342579
2007 6925.87242 34000 5288720 90 1 1237.88 0.779425338692869
2008 6635.11248 34900 5313399 101.2 0 1232.6 0.801750978760135
2009 6212.8967 32299 5338395 107 0 1205.68 0.795498809781432
2010 6639.70405 33300 5363352 95 1 1164.95 0.781527372371478
1998 5769.10911 25700 8851800 101.8 0 2082.24 0.739340492415452
1999 5661.8195 27400 8857400 106.5 0 2209.4 0.750971523220998
2000 5362.04758 30200 8869000 108.6 0 2299.07 0.781920956523762
2001 5681.58309 28500 8894000 107.7 0 2147.3 0.729914858203700



























2003 5651.85351 31100 8956000 105.8 0 2042.77 0.704142529238168
2004 5847.86867 32400 8991994 106.4 0 2223.4 0.691644871560935
2005 5711.07841 33000 9024040 110.2 0 2395.66 0.699890123822001
2006 5526.56488 35000 9080505 110.8 0 2587.73 0.701336307672508
2007 5469.00928 36900 9148092 112.3 0 2739.74 0.695110909913988
2008 5378.95364 36100 9219637 115.3 0 2695.76 0.722990315553351
2009 4883.39353 31500 9302123 121 0 2795.79 0.752937013446568
2010 5414.47929 37200 9378126 112 0 2865.14 0.743136533760249
1998 3786.86659 22300 58487141 96.9 1 5200.63 0.734593533271368
1999 3783.75374 24000 58682466 101.1 0 5793.06 0.726696012428793
2000 3785.47263 27200 58892514 100.9 0 6084.31 0.724170896974305
2001 3785.73796 27700 59108687 100.4 0 5680.63 0.708018557589782
2002 3682.12748 28600 59327658 103.2 0 5627.96 0.722899106589192
2003 3730.99827 27600 59568776 102.4 0 5639.18 0.72057134775845
2004 3705.87008 29500 59879865 102.7 0 5565.87 0.731498392854169
2005 3691.54774 30700 60226500 103.2 0 5581.17 0.720962079245304
2006 3612.71112 32299 60604901 103.8 0 5621.56 0.715908049138247
2007 3444.768 33800 60980304 105.1 0 5353.65 0.721666510494753
2008 3394.56812 29500 61406928 106.6 0 5118.65 0.728146590567738
2009 3195.42204 25500 61838154 113.5 0 4964.48 0.717693622949781
2010 3281.85035 27500 62231336 111.5 0 4745.45 0.718685792192331
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